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Abstract 
 
The recent crisis highlighted the failure of former early warning signals models. This research 
attributes this partly to dependent variable specification, independent variable specification, model 
empirical design, and looking at models in isolation (different empirical methodologies and macro 
and micro applications). This research uses a traffic analysis matrix to synthesize the output of the 
different models, which are applied on a macro and micro level, while similarly attempting to 
improve on all the aforementioned in the individual applications. This approach results in significant 
improvement in out-of-sample results and lead-time compared to earlier work and a number of key 
insights for regulation and policymaking. 
 
A dependent variable innovation compared to earlier literature in the component models of the 
traffic lights matrix lies in adopting an ex-ante near-crisis variable compared to an ex-post cost of 
crisis variable used before. This variable is applied in the macro and micro applications throughout. 
Near crises is a necessary and sufficient condition for prediction of full-fledged crises. Near crises 
always precede crises and then either develops into fully-fledged crises or they don’t.  
 
The first paper applies a macro signal extraction framework and looks at the 30 OECD countries 
over a 30-year period (1979 to 2007). A number of variables were found to be significant in 
predicting near crises, including banking assets growth, banking assets to GDP, liquidity and a proxy 
for corporate sector health. The second paper is a macro application comprising a dynamic logit 
model and a macro Z-score model. The third paper is a Z-score methodology applied on a micro 
level to 139 banks. The micro application is an important extension in two ways. Systems that have 
more institutions under stress are scaled on a composite traffic light matrix as worse. The second 
extension is with regards to credit ratings or rankings within a system, whereby the micro application 
would allow regulators to do so. 
 
Different models invariably have different output in some aspects and strengths and weaknesses. 
Signal extraction performed best in terms of Type I errors, the Logit model in terms of NTSR and 
the Z-score model in terms of Type II errors. The overlay of the micro model improves the traffic 
lights matrix substantially. These findings reinforce the need by regulators to use a suite of models 
and a holistic macroprudential approach in judging the build up of systemic vulnerabilities. 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction                  
 
1.1 Motivation 
Any macro or financial system has a set of structural characteristics that contribute to a system’s 
gross risk. These include household sector, corporate sector, financial sector, state sector and 
external sector resilience. Factors such as leverage, diversification, equity, capitalization and flows 
have a major impact on systemic risk. Bearing these in mind we need an EWS to detect imbalance or 
vulnerability at the time of build up or ex-ante to: (i) help reduce boom and bust cycles on a macro-
level (an “activist” approach to regulation a la Goodhart et al.); (ii) ensure network absorption of 
crises rather than amplification (a micro “resilience” approach, Milne et al.). Thus the research 
question this dissertation addresses is how to design an EWS model / suite of models to inform 
regulatory oversight and action in OECD countries. This while attempting to outperform earlier 
literature in lead time, performance output of individual models and introducing a new holistic 
macroprudential approach to EWS in the form of a traffic lights matrix. In addition, the design and 
usability by regulators in terms of credibility and effectiveness of the system is observed to ensure 
the EWS will actually be used to provide insight for and inform policy making. 
  
Previously existing EWS failed to predict the 2007-2010 crisis. This research attributes this partly to 
dependent variable specification, independent variable specification, model empirical design, and 
looking at models in isolation (different empirical methodologies and macro and micro applications), 
rather than holistically. This research also demonstrates that we need a range of dependent variable 
triggers for which results to be presented consistently to regulators to enable sound decision making. 
Or in other words, the inherent feedback loops between the choice of the regulator objective and the 
output of an EWS are relevant in adopting a holistic approach. 
 
1.2 Dependent Variable Innovation 
There is a substantial body of literature that highlights the linkage between the build-up of financial 
fragility and crises, this motivated our research into the precursor to crises, namely near crises or the 
time of the build-up of financial vulnerabilities. In their book, Crisis Economics, Roubini and Mihm 
(2010) consistently highlight the linkage between the build up of imbalances, financial fragility and 
systemic financial crises. They conclude that financial crises would not result in system wide distress 
in the absence of financial fragility. If financial fragility is a precursor to crisis, then the study of 
financial fragility or near-crises is a necessary and sufficient condition for the prediction of full- 
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fledged crises, but not vice versa. Near-crises are episodes of fragility and low banking sector 
capitalization when the financial system has a poor ability to withstand shocks. Gonzalez-Hermosillo 
(1999) also endorses the view that fragility and low capital adequacy are leading indicators of 
banking distress, signaling a high likelihood of near-term failure. The cost of crises is prohibitive 
and earlier detection means policy makers have time to avert or at least minimize crisis cost. As such 
this research aims to improve on existing literature by focusing the analysis on near-crises, as a 
proven leading indicator for full-blown crises. In this respect, the dependent variable specification is 
modified to measure near-crises as opposed to the more commonly used ex-post measures 
characteristic of previous early warning signals research. 
 
The dependent variable, near-crisis, is measured by capital adequacy and banking sector 
profitability. Focusing on near-crises means that a lot of data that was not previously utilized in an 
EWS analysis will now be taken into account. 
 
Dependent Variable Specification 
The dependent variable designed to capture changes to solvency and profitability or periods of near-
crisis is composed of four components as follows: 
 
1. For any given year for any country, if it saw a decrease in its capitalization of more than a 
certain number of basis points (delta capitalization as measured by capital/total assets); 
 
2. Or an increase in its capitalization of more than a certain number of basis points (delta 
capitalization as measured by capital/total assets); 
 
3. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet falls by more 
than a number of basis points (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); 
 
4. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet is less than a 
certain number of basis points; 
this country is deemed to be facing a near-crisis or a period of heightened fragility.  
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The reason the profitability metrics were included as separate components, is to capture any over 
statement of capital or hidden non-performing loans. If these two metrics are really poor, while the 
former two seem robust, then we could potentially be faced with an inflated balance sheet or capital 
base or both. 
 
Commonly used ex-post measures lagged crises occurrence by anywhere from one to several years.  
These include measures such as identified in Davis and Karim (2003), who specify cost of earlier 
systemic crises as direct bailout costs of failed institutions and indirect in terms of GDP costs or 
opportunity losses in GDP compared to its previous growth trajectory. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) 
find bailouts cost on average 10% of GDP, with some crises much more costly like the Mexican 
Tequila Crisis (1994) which cost 20% of GDP, and the Jamaican crisis (1996) at 37% of GDP.  
According to the IMF, the crisis of 2007 - 2010 had cumulative (indirect) output losses over 2008-
2010 estimated at around 5% of global output (c. USD10.2 trillion), while direct bailout measures by 
governments have tallied a similar figure. Furthermore, both direct and indirect costs of the past 
crisis are still being realized on the back of further write-downs by institutions as asset quality and 
prices deteriorate and GDP growth continues to falter. The following paragraphs discuss some of the 
causes of the crisis and motivate this research on Early Warning Signals (EWS) given the significant 
costs of crises and their various other ramifications. 
 
1.3 The role of EWS in the past and their failure to identify the last crisis 
With indirect global output loss estimates in excess of USD10 trillion and direct write downs of 
USD3.4 trillion by agents up to the end of 2010; and more importantly the structural changes that 
have taken place in the global economy, which will unlikely revert to pre-crisis ways, the importance 
of early warning systems for fragility and crises is self-evident. Crises are an intuitive motivator for 
research on EWS, examples include the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s and the Asian 
financial markets crisis of the late 1990s among many others. The recent crisis identified the need 
for further research and new approaches as earlier models simply failed to signal the warnings for 
the 2007-2010 crisis, and this failure could be partly attributed to the dependent variable 
specification as this research demonstrates. Using a sample of 105 countries, covering the years 1979 
to 2003, Davis and Karim (2008) apply macro EWS models, using signal extraction, Logit and 
binary recursive tree methodologies, to US and UK data to test for out-of-sample performance 
(whether a crisis was correctly called) from 2000 – 2007. They find that for the US, both models fail 
miserably with a probability of a crisis occurring in 2007 of 1% for the Logit model and 0.6% for the 
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binary tree model. For the UK, the results were similar, with the Logit probability of a crisis at 3.4% 
in 2007 and 0.6% respectively for the binary tree model. 
 
The question of how to design empirical models to signal financial crises has been addressed in 
previous literature in three generations of models: first generation models based on macro 
weaknesses; second generation models based on self-fulfilling prophecies and herding behavior; and 
third generation models based on contagion and spillovers. These models initially used two main 
types of explanatory variables: macroeconomic indicators and microeconomic factors, followed by a 
number of integrated empirical models that took both types of explanatory variables into account. 
Models were developed to focus on ‘endogenous’ shocks and ‘exogenous’ shocks and either 
predicted individual bank failure or looked at systemic banking crises as a whole. The specific 
methodologies used by these models to predict crises fell into four categories: i) signals models; ii) 
logit/probit models; iii) Merton type models; and a less used class of models, iv) Binary recursive 
trees. One of the major drawbacks of these models was the ex-post crisis definition for the dependent 
variable, as opposed to a near-crisis definition. 
 
1.4 Research and key contribution 
 
The failure of EWS models to predict the past crisis highlights several of their weaknesses in terms 
of: i) static model design, which is only valid in hindsight to the historical crisis period to which 
these models were calibrated; ii) dependent variable specification which identifies a crisis in terms of 
the cost of dealing with it and in turn lags its occurrence by one to several years; iii) explanatory 
variable choice which is dictated by the historical crisis period to which these models were 
calibrated; iv) poor model performance out-of-sample because of the static model design, the 
dependent variable specification, the choice of explanatory variables and explanatory variable 
specifications.  
 
The key contributions of this research improve on all weaknesses listed above as follows: i) a 
dynamic model design ensures that explanatory variables witnessing movements are the ones that 
‘talk’ while others are ‘silent’, this way the model is relevant and usable for different crises and 
different time periods; ii) use of near crises as the dependent variable rather than a measure of ex-
post damage, improves lead time by the duration it takes for losses to materialize and be quantified 
from the date a vulnerability develops, i.e. by one to three years at least; iii) use of near crises as the 
dependent variable also allows for a cleaner model as the explanatory variables are now predicting 
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system vulnerability. While vulnerability may or may not develop into a full-fledged crisis in the 
absence of shocks, this design ensures no crisis will go undetected because the model is picking up 
on vulnerabilities or episodes of financial fragility – a precursor to crises; iv) choice of explanatory 
variables is based on an iterative process using this dynamic model design and as such ensures that 
the ones that remain in the robust final model are effective, predict vulnerabilities with sufficient 
lead time; v) by improving on design, dependent variable specification and explanatory variable 
calibration and choice, model performance out-of-sample improves substantially on earlier literature. 
In this research, the model is applied to OECD countries, but it could be also easily mapped to other 
geographic or geopolitical economic groupings. In summary, as the model improves on crisis 
definitions (dependent variable specification); explanatory variables choice, design and 
specification; methodology design, out-of-sample performance and lead-time of crisis signals, it is a 
credible and usable by alternative by policy makers for the prediction of systemic near-crises or 
fragility.  
 
Finally, vi) Different models invariably have different output in some aspects and strengths and 
weaknesses. Signal extraction performed best in terms of Type I errors, the Logit model in terms of 
NTSR and the Z-score model in terms of Type II errors. The overlay of the micro model improves 
the traffic lights matrix substantially. These findings reinforce the need by regulators to use a suite of 
models and a holistic macroprudential approach in judging the build up of systemic vulnerabilities. 
 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: 
 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the financial crisis of 2007 – 2010 and the motivation for this 
research on EWS and Chapter Three provides a detailed literature review for four distinct 
methodologies used in EWS models.  This includes a history of financial crises in OECD countries 
over the past 30 years.  
 
Chapter Four is a signal extraction application and forecast model for 30 OECD countries; Chapter 
Five is Macro-Applications of Near Crises in OECD countries, this includes a Logit/Probit 
application and a Z-Score (Merton type) application; Chapter Six is a micro-application to a set of 
139 OECD banks in 11 OECD countries and it also presents some proposed rating implications 
based on this analysis. 
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Chapter Seven covers conclusions and policy implications. It synthesizes all the findings and gives 
an overview of Basle III and the proposed changes to existing regulation, macroprudential regulation 
tools and the use of EWS to guide their application. This chapter also discusses policy implications 
and recommendations drawn from the findings of this research for individual country regulators, 
OECD regulators, and other regulators in regional groupings that have different conditions. 
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2. Chapter Two: An Overview of the Financial Crisis of 2007 - 2010 
                 
2.1 Global financial sector structure pre-crisis and systemic hot spots 
With a low interest rate environment for almost a decade, two main changes in financial player 
business models took place: a) a continuous search for yield and b) significant build-up of leverage, 
predominantly in unregulated shadow banking and opaque Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives 
markets. The notional outstanding amount of derivatives was more than 10 times the global GDP in 
2008. Securitization grew to represent a larger portion in bank wholesale funding and credit 
extension, capturing a little under a third of outstanding credit in the US, mostly linked to the 
housing sector. Europe, in contrast, relied on securitization to a limited extent (6% of total 
outstanding credit), but held a disproportionate share of risk, owning more than 72% of Asset 
Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) committed facilities globally. As the crisis unraveled, global 
banking sector capitalization collapsed to almost a third of what it was pre-crisis to USD2.6 trillion 
in March 2009.  
 
The structural changes delineated in the previous paragraph led to the development of asset price 
bubbles, in both the housing and equity markets and to credit bubbles in the plain vanilla banking 
market and in the shadow banking system as illustrated. Poor governance, lack of credit risk transfer 
and poor funding structures also exacerbated the fragilities. 
 
2.2 Non-Bank Financial Institutions: Insurance companies 
Insurance companies heavily involved in the securitization market through the provision of credit 
enhancement (specifically in the US market which is comprised of 60% non-life activities versus 
only 40% of insurance activities related to life) guaranteed some USD2.4 trillion in asset-backed 
securities. When this market sub-segment began to collapse, a number of these companies lost their 
Triple-A status while insurance giant AIG had to be bailed out by the US government after booking 
losses to the tune of USD100 billion in 2008.  
 
2.3 Other Non-bank financial institutions 
Pension fund assets sustained estimated losses of USD3.2 trillion (out of USD25 trillion estimated 
total assets), while the USD2.0 trillion hedge fund industry saw 62 funds collapse. Data on private 
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equity activity showed deals in the first half of 2009 falling to almost a quarter of what they were in 
the same period in 2008. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, US Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs), exposed to USD5.3 trillion of mortgage-related iNTSRuments, were taken over by the US 
government in September 2008. Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), a type of off-balance sheet 
special purpose entity (SPE) used by banks to raise cheap capital in the short-term money markets 
and seek yields in an opaque, unregulated manner, collectively held assets of USD300 billion at the 
beginning of 2007, of which less than USD50 billion was equity financed, and the majority were 
sponsored by US banks. Theoretically without recourse to their sponsors, these ended up being 
subsumed or fully merged with their sponsors as the crisis unraveled.  
 
2.4 Roll-out of Basle II  
Institutions adopting the new accord and the implementation of the various pillars meant that bigger 
banks with more sophisticated risk management systems and greater risk exposures ended up 
holding less capital. While the implementation of Pillar II supervisory tools to correct for that and 
level the playing field lagged considerably. 
 
2.5 Governance issues 
Governance issues specifically related to the US securitization market were that No-Income-No-Job 
(NINJA) loans, Adjusted Rate Mortgages (ARMs) and liar loans where borrowers self-certify their 
own submitted information sold at very low teaser rates. When the rates adjusted on the mortgages, 
linked to a Fed fund rate which was beginning to rise, these mortgages became unaffordable. 
Furthermore, the originate-and-distribute model failed on the back of poor incentives, mortgage 
brokers off-loaded mortgages to other financial sector players, they were compensated on the basis 
of volume rather than quality and had no link to a mortgage once it was off-loaded. Thus, the link 
between originating a mortgage and its sale to a financial institution was severed. The financial 
institution which then acquired these mortgages, pooled them into similar risk categories, based on 
data which was self-verified especially with later vintages where underwriting standards were lax, 
and then repackaged and sold it to the market (distributed the risk). However, at this level, the link 
again between acting as a distributor for a pool and bearing any associated losses should the pool 
perform worse than what it had been priced on the basis of, was also severed. Save for any portion 
retained by the distributing financial institution, it had no further liability for any losses. 
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2.6 No credit-risk transfer 
There was no credit-risk transfer, neither between different market players (banks, insurance 
companies and investors), nor to vehicles set up by their sponsors. Banks were forced to take back 
around 95% of their own sponsored SIV assets, and held on-balance sheet pre-crisis around 40% of 
other SIVs of which they were not sponsors. 
 
2.7 Weak capitalization, excessive leverage and skewed funding structures   
Weak capitalization and excessive leverage are major culprits in increasing bank fragility. A 
decomposition analysis of US, Eurozone and UK banks return on equity (Saleh, 2010) - using on-
balance sheet data from Bankscope - in 1996 and 2007 shows that the increase in banking sector 
return on equity (RoE) over the period was predominantly a pure leverage play, where ROE = return 
on assets (RoA) x leverage. Had this increase in leverage not taken place, banking return on equity 
would have been much lower due to increased competition and smaller spreads. This is especially 
true for the UK, which saw leverage increase from 18 times in 1996 to 28 times in 2007. 
 
Saleh (2010) shows that as leverage normalizes to pre-crisis levels, and assuming pre-crisis levels to 
be 25 times, this would point to normalized post-crisis RoEs of around 14% across Europe, 12.1% 
for the US and 16.6% for the UK respectively. If more aggressive deleveraging is assumed to only 
10 times, RoEs would fall to 6.6% in the US, 5.4% in Europe and 4.8% in the UK. This shows that 
the shift in the banking industry is structural, with real impact on business models, and not a 
transitory shock after which we will return to pre-crisis norms. Moreover, this simulation does not 
take into account increased regulatory burdens, whether in the form of systemic taxes or others. With 
lower profitability, it will take longer to build capital buffers.  Basle III and ring fencing 
requirements in the UK will have a significant cost for institutions in terms of compliance and 
building the adequate systems to support its implementation. Cross subsidization of cost of capital 
across businesses will now also not be possible. 
 
As shown in Saleh (2010), the funding structure of banks over the same period reflected some core 
shifts, while deposits and short-term funding continued to constitute a stable percentage of around 
two thirds of total balance sheet funding. The proportion of wholesale funding as a percentage of 
total deposits and short-term funding showed a massive shift, rising from 24% in the US in 1996, 7% 
in Europe and 29% in the UK to 40% and 19% in the US and Europe respectively in 2007 and a 
sizable 84% in the UK. 
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2.8 Global imbalances: systemic significance of the US  
The reason the crisis was not a localized US event is the systemic significance of the US. In global 
equity capital markets in 2008, it represented 20% of total global equity market capitalization of 
USD59.8 trillion, in global market share of securitizations, greater than 50%, and in banking sector 
capitalization (12% pre-crisis, 14% post-crisis). In terms of global insurance industry share, the US 
represented around a third of total premiums. Finally, share of non-bank financial institutions and 
SIVs activities in the financial markets and money market funding as a percentage of total deposits 
and short-term funding showed the US having 40% of the total capitalization of these markets. This 
sheds light on why and how the spillovers were transmitted and were of this magnitude. 
 
2.9 Systemic and institutional crisis cost  
Davis and Karim (2003) identify cost of systemic crises as both direct bailouts cost and indirect in 
terms of GDP costs. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) find bailouts cost on average 10% of GDP, with 
some crises much more costly like the Mexican Tequila Crisis (1994) which cost 20% of GDP and 
the Jamaican crisis (1996) which had a toll equivalent to 37% of GDP. According to an update from 
the IMF, world growth is projected to fall to a mere 0.5% percent, the lowest rate since World War 
II, with significant financial strains remaining acute. Cumulative (indirect) output losses over 2008-
10 are projected at around 5% of global output (USD10.2 trillion if we apply the rate to IMF global 
output estimates). Direct measures by governments up to 2010 were estimated at around USD10 
trillion or more. While, the IMF’s total estimate of direct losses in the form of write-downs was 
revised significantly upwards in April 2009 to USD4.0 trillion (from USD1.45 trillion in April 2008 
and USD945 million in January 2008) and down again in October 2009 to USD3.4 trillion. Actual 
losses globally realized up to first half of 2010 by financial institutions amounted to USD1.9 trillion 
(compared USD760 billion in September 2008, of which USD580 billion were by banks).  Thus, in 
total the last crisis cost around a hefty 40% of global GDP in 2010. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) identify the impact of banking crises with respect to the real 
economy in the form of a credit crunch hypothesis where markets are starved for credit following a 
crisis resulting in output losses. This has found strong empirical support in Lindgren et al (1996), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Eichengreen and Rose (1998). They find that more financially 
dependent sectors lose about 1% of growth in each crisis year compared to less financially 
dependent sectors. A study by Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2000) finds that growth of 
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both deposits and credit slows down substantially and banks reallocate their asset portfolio away 
from loans. This seems to be applicable to the current crisis. Thus, both theory and empirical 
findings indicate that in times of financial stress, banks prefer cash instruments and reserves to 
traditional extension of credit and other products to the market. The sharp drop in the ratio of 
interbank lending to total bank reserves in the US and the drastic fall in loan multiplier (loans 
divided by bank reserves) over January 1999-May 2009 are evidence of this. 
 
2.10 Asset Price Bubbles: Real Estate 
There are three key indicator sets of house price evolution: house price appreciation year on year, 
house prices to disposable income ratio and house prices to rent ratio. Using 1992 as the base year 
with an index value of 100, there are a few OECD countries which have seen drops in house prices 
in real and nominal terms: Japan, Germany, Switzerland and Korea, the latter saw a drop only in real 
terms but not in nominal terms. At the other end of the spectrum Ireland for example has seen the 
largest increase in real estate prices, at 436% in nominal terms and 233% in real terms. There’s a 
clear link here to the real estate-related non-performing loans in Ireland with lending to developers 
capturing two thirds of GNP, usually without collateral. 
 
Based on this simple index, economies which saw house prices rise by more than 200% very well 
may have experienced a bubble. These include Australia, the UK, Denmark, New Zealand, Spain, 
Norway, the Netherlands and Ireland.  
 
2.11 Regulatory regimes and response to the crisis 
This crisis has triggered much debate as to which regulatory regimes were the most effective: how 
they dealt with past crises, what actions were taken, the set of policy tools and the impact of these on 
losses realized and on the speed of crisis unraveling and its resolution. Preliminary empirical results 
by Nier (2009) classify the losses associated with each main type of regulatory regime - single-
integrated regulator (SIR) versus twin peaks (TP) - in Europe. He finds greater losses associated with 
the SIR model. The single-integrated regulator model has one regulator overseeing market regulation 
(commercial banks, mutual funds and pension funds and insurance companies) and the central bank 
overseeing lender of last resort (LOLR) activities and payments oversight. Examples of SIR-type 
models are the UK (before 2011), Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland among others. TP 
models have the central bank overseeing systemic risk, including LOLR and payment systems and 
all potentially systemic institutions and another regulatory body handling regulation of financial 
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services. Examples of TP type systems include the UK (after 2011), Netherlands, Bulgaria and South 
Africa, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. According to Nier (2009), SIRs have on average lost the 
equivalent of 3% of total outstanding credit, compared to TP systems, which lost only 0.5%. In terms 
of value, SIRs collectively lost USD126.4 billion and TPs USD39.6 billion. 
 
Regulatory policy response to the crisis has been far reaching, from direct intervention in the 
financial sector through capital injections, purchase of assets, central bank provision of liquidity and 
guarantees, in addition to traditional coordinated monetary action and fiscal stimulus and measures 
which have not been used in recent history such as quantitative easing. For the latter, the Federal 
Reserve had announced in March 2009 some USD1.2 trillion for quantitative easing, while the Bank 
of England had initially announced an outlay of GBP75 billion, which was later raised to GBP175 
billion and to GBP275 billion in October 2011. The measures listed have collectively ranged from 
less than 1% of GDP to almost 20% in the UK. Central bank balance sheets in the US, the UK and 
Europe ballooned, exhibiting growth of around 250%, 220% and a third on the low-end as of 2010, 
respectively.  
 
2.12 Fiscal overhang as a consequence of necessary policy action 
The IMF estimates fiscal stimulus in G-20 countries in 2009 to be around 1.5% of GDP, while 
overall fiscal balance in advanced economies was estimated to have deteriorated by 3.25% to -7% 
percent of GDP in 2009. The US has announced a stimulus package to the tune of 2% of GDP in 
2009 and for a total of 4.6% until 2011 (or USD787 billion). 
 
The increase in government debt is forecast to have significant crowding-out effects: for every 10% 
of increase in government debt, global GDP is forecast to drop by 1.3% (1.2% in the US). 
Furthermore, fiscal deterioration in advanced economies poses an additional threat to future global 
growth, as these very same nations have to deal with the effects of a rapidly ageing population and 
the consequences on pension funding deficits, among others. The first nation to show serious threats 
to its fiscal position was Greece in October 2009 which has a forecast public debt of GDP for 2010 
of 120%, with concerns about the fiscal stability of Portugal (90% of GDP), Spain (68% of GDP) 
and Italy (130% of GDP). Thus far the IMF has pledged USD1.1 trillion to help developing 
countries weather the crisis, while a European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) has been set up by 
Eurozone countries with an initial capitalization of Euro 500 billion. 
 
 
 
22 
 
2.13 Regulatory challenges, proposed changes and critique 
 
The IMF identified a set of upcoming policy challenges ahead that will need to be addressed. These 
include policies to a) secure a backdrop for economic recovery, b) strengthen the banking sector and 
promote resumption of lending, c) revive securitization markets, d) prevent crises in emerging 
markets in Europe which remain vulnerable to deleveraging, e) ensure orderly disengagement or exit 
strategies for regulators, and f) manage the recent transfer of private risks to sovereign balance 
sheets. It proposes the following priorities for reform: a) restoring market discipline; b) addressing 
fiscal risks caused by financial institutions (the idea of a ‘systemic tax’); c) living wills; d) a 
macroprudential approach to policy making; e) integrating the oversight of Large and Complex 
Financial Institutions (LCFIs) into the global financial market. However, the road map for regulation 
in the near term is challenging due to a number of reasons, most important of which is that banking 
sectors and indeed individual institutions are too big to fail.  A snapshot of the current size of the 
banking sectors in a number of countries and indeed the size of selected banks relative to the GDP of 
their host countries shows bank assets to GDP range from a high of more than 800% in Switzerland, 
more than 400% in the UK, to a low of 100% in the US (excluding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and 
other key quasi banking players, this ratio however goes up to 230% of these are included). 
 
2.14 Selected proposed regulatory changes 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Association of Deposit 
Insurers (IADI) proposed changes to restore the level and quality of bank capital in 2009. These are 
summarized in the following: a) higher (and better quality) risk-weighted capital requirements, b) 
countercyclical credit loss provisioning, c) formal liquidity and leverage ratios, d) mandatory capital 
insurance or contingent capital, e) convertible capital, f) subordinated debt issuance frequency, g) 
prefunding of deposit insurance, and h) capital charges linked to systemic risk. 
 
A number of ‘super’ or ‘uber’ regulators were also set up in 2009, including the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) to oversee systemic risk at a European level, while in the US these powers were 
delegated to the Federal Reserve. The mandate of the ESRB is the macroprudential oversight of the 
financial system within the European Union. The ESRB aims to prevent and mitigate systemic risks 
within the European financial system in order to prevent financial distress in the European Union. It 
is also charged with issuing risk warnings, giving recommendations on measures and follow-up on 
implementation. 
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2.15 Macroprudential analysis and early warning systems for fragility and crises  
The De Larosière Report recommended that a global EWS needs to be put in place, with all the 
regulatory implications thereof on a national and cross-border level. This research shows that this 
EWS must be guided in design by a meta-theory that takes into account: procyclicality and boundary 
problems playing on the national and cross-border levels; the trade-off of various regulator 
objectives; the need for both macroprudential and microprudential analysis and the interaction 
between them; some degree of built-in countercyclicality as in the Spanish model; and strengthening 
risk-based supervision by enabling national and cross-border regulators to reduce systemic net risk.  
 
This research also shows that the EWS has to be effective, not just the coNTSRuct of a large 
magnitude and political weight. Its effectiveness must be continuously challenged, covering a basic 
checklist of minimum requirements needed for a robust EWS. These include: pre-crisis sanctions on 
undercapitalized institutions, that it be usable by policy makers and effective in identifying stress 
indicators with sufficient lead time; that it is credible and simple enough to be understood by policy 
makers at all levels. 
 
Each crisis will unravel differently, but could have similarities to previous crises, will have different 
triggers or similar ones to its predecessors. As such the best way to prevent a crisis is to ensure that 
the ‘system’ is as healthy as possible by attacking imbalances before they accumulate, and 
recognizing that you cannot predict crises with certainty or their timing. A suite of models will only 
help capture imbalance build-up and as such is necessary as a starting point, however it is nowhere 
near sufficient and must be approached as just one of a set of decision packages to be used. 
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3. Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction on Crises Literature 
The design of empirical models to signal financial crises on a systemic level and bank failure on an 
individual institution level has been addressed in the past mainly over three generations of models. 
First generation models based on macro weaknesses; second generation models based on self-
fulfilling prophecies and herding behavior; and third generation type models based on contagion and 
spillovers, triggered by boom-bust cycles. Another strand of research, is classified as fourth 
generation models, they aim to identify the features of the institutional environment that set the stage 
for the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, which in turn led to banking problems. These 
models initially used two main types of explanatory variables: macroeconomic indicators as key 
explanatory variables and microeconomic factors, followed by a number of integrated empirical 
models which took both types of explanatory variables into account. Models were developed to 
focus on ‘endogenous’ type shocks and ‘exogenous’ type shocks and either predicted individual 
bank failure, with applications on bank ratings, or looked at systemic banking crises as a whole. The 
specific methodologies used by these models to predict crises fell into four categories: i) signals 
models; ii) logit/probit models; iii) Merton type models; and a less used class of models, iv) Binary 
recursive trees. One of the major drawbacks of these models was the ex-post crisis definition for the 
dependent variable, as opposed to a near-crisis definition in the case of a systemic crisis or in the 
case of an individual bank, bank failure as opposed to a ‘close-to-failure’ metric. 
 
3.2. Signal Extraction 
3.2.1 Overview 
The signals approach was originally developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), focusing on ‘twin 
crises’ phenomenon, simultaneous occurrence of currency and banking crises. A wide body of 
literature has utilized signals models for predicting exchange rate crises on the basis of inconsistent 
macro policies or the development of macro weaknesses (first generation models) and has developed 
further to second generation models where speculative attacks with self-fulfilling prophecies or 
herding behavior both playing a large role in causing crises. A third generation of models of external 
crisis using the signaling approach were developed by Krugman (1999), Bris and Koskinen (2000) 
and Cabellero and Krishnamurthy (2000) based on the notion of 'contagion' where the occurrence of 
a crisis in one country or region increases the likelihood of a similar crisis elsewhere. As illustrated 
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by Masson (1998), three related contagion channels can be identified to represent this paradigm: 
'monsoonal trade effects', 'spill over effects' and 'pure contagion effects'. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 
(1996) explore a methodology for analyzing crises that focuses on the depth rather than the 
likelihood of the crisis using a crisis index, which in approach is similar to signal extraction, but to 
‘predict’ or evaluate crisis ‘depth’, rather than its ‘occurrence’.    
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) documented the incidence of both currency and banking and twin 
crises in a sample of 20 industrial and emerging countries, where crises are identified based on an 
index of market turbulence developed by Eichengreen et al (1995). However, because the sample 
was chosen to include only countries with fixed or heavily managed exchange rates which are 
usually more prone to currency crashes than other countries, as such the impact of exchange rate on 
banking crises may have been overemphasized. They describe the behavior of fifteen 
macroeconomic variables in the 24 months period preceding and following a crisis compared to non-
crisis times. A variable is deemed to signal a crisis any time it crosses a certain threshold. If the 
signal is then followed by a crisis in the following 24 months, it is viewed as correct, otherwise a 
false alarm.   
 
Thresholds were chosen to minimize the in-sample noise-to-signal ratio. The performance of each 
signal is evaluated based on three criteria: i) associated Type I and Type II error (probability of 
missing a crisis and probability of a false signal, respectively); ii) the noise-to-signal ratio (hereafter 
NTSR); and iii) the probability of a crisis occurring conditional on a signal being issued. The main 
findings of this paper were that problems in the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis, a 
currency crisis deepens the banking crisis and financial liberalization usually precedes banking 
crises. The evolution of these crises also suggests that crises occur as the economy enters a 
recession, following a prolonged boom in economic activity fuelled by credit, capital inflows at a 
time of currency overvaluation.  
 
Cihak and Shaeck (2007), apply a logit model, a duration model and non-parametric tests akin to 
signal extraction to a dataset of 2,600 banks in more than 100 countries over the period from 1994-
2004. Similar to signal extraction, non-parametric tests do not impose distributional assumptions 
upon the data and as such inferences from them are considered to be more robust. They find that 
capital adequacy, return on equity, Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) to Gross loans and more 
importantly NPLS net of provisions to capital are useful signaling indicators of individual bank 
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fragility or of a bank being ‘close-to-failure’.  They use static thresholds for the indicators and find 
that for the ratio of NPLS net of provisions to capital, more than 66% of all failures are called 
correctly (Type I error of 34%) at a low static threshold cut-off for this variable of 10%.  
 
Lo Duca and Peltonen (2012) cover a set of 28 emerging market and advanced economies with 
quarterly data between 1990 Q1 and 2009 Q4, developing a framework for assessing systemic risks 
and for predicting systemic events. They use a financial stress index for identifying the starting date 
of systemic financial crises and combine both domestic and global indicators of macro-financial 
vulnerabilities to predict crises. The paper shows that combining indicators of domestic and global 
macro-financial vulnerabilities substantially improves the models’ ability to forecast systemic 
financial crises with good out-of-sample performance. 
 
3.2.2. Innovation and Contribution to Model Design 
The structure of the signal extraction model as explained above shows that: a) static thresholds for 
each variable were chosen; and b) these static thresholds were determined on the basis of minimizing 
Type I and Type II errors in-sample, minimizing the NTSR (which itself is another way of 
summarizing a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors) and in some cases assessing the 
probability of a crisis conditional a signal being issued. This research improves on these two points 
substantially. For the choice of variable thresholds: these are no longer static, but rather dynamic in 
the form of standard deviations from a chosen metric (this is somewhat similar to Borio and 
Drehmann (2009) who use gap analysis from a long term trend but for only two variables), which in 
this case has been chosen as a long-run mean for a variable. By shifting the analysis to focus on 
standard deviations as opposed to absolute values, this model focuses on capturing volatility in a 
chosen variable, rather than thresholds chosen on the basis of output of a certain data period. This 
means that the model design as such does not only improve on out-of-sample performance, but also 
is usable in different time periods and different states of the world. One of the problems with earlier 
models is that repeated exercises with different data periods always resulted in different performance 
of indicator variables for crises because causes for crises change over time and because the 
thresholds chosen for each variable to signal a crisis are by default linked to whichever data period 
the model was calibrated to. Furthermore, for the choice of variables itself, each data period seemed 
to dictate a different set of variables, because their performance in-sample showed they were 
significant in predicting crises for that specific data period studied. The design of the model to read 
deviations from a chosen benchmark means that the chosen variables are valid for the data period for 
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which the model was designed and for other data periods as well. Finally, the design of the model to 
signal crises, means that a lot of data on near-crises was not utilized in the analysis – something 
which this model also improves upon by the innovative dependent variable specification. Table 3.1 
further illustrates these points by highlighting some of the major studies and their findings. 
 
For example, taking the choice of explanatory variables, Table 3.1 shows that across the different 
time periods and countries studied the indicator variables chosen vary significantly over time and 
between country groupings. This is also true for looking at the causes of financial crises in general 
and individual bank distress in specific. This is attributable to the static set up of the models. By 
using a dynamic set-up, this would ensure the continuity in use of variables and the ability to add 
new variables as they become systemically significant and more importantly the changing states of 
the economy would not render the model invalid.  
 
An illustration of the changes between different studies of the variables identified as significant to 
predicting crises because of model design is shown as an example by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) 
finding that real exchange rate appreciation, equity prices and the money multiplier are significant 
variables in predicting crises, while Alessi and Detken (2008) find a set of 18 real time financial 
indicators to be significant, of which there is only one overlapping with Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
equity prices, the rest of the variables are different. Alessi and Detken (2008) main significant 
variables in predicting crises are global private credit, long term nominal bond yield, housing 
investment, short-term nominal interest rates, equity price indices and changes in real GDP. While, 
Borio and Drehmann (2009) find two indicators to be significant, these are again equity price 
indices, thus overlapping with Alessi and Detkin, and introducing house price indicators as a new 
variable. On an individual bank level, Cihak and Shaeck (2007), find capital adequacy, the level of 
NPLs to gross loans, NPLs net of provisions to capital and RoE to be significant variables in 
predicting failure.  
 
Note however, if these studies had been calibrated to predict near-crises, and also in a dynamic 
framework as proposed by the signals extraction model in this research, the divergence in 
explanatory variables and their significance across different data periods and countries would not 
have been as pronounced and the model would have been temporally consistent (across different 
time periods) and geographically consistent (in that only relevant variables would ‘talk’ for each 
country as they would be the ones which saw deviations from a long run mean, whereas non-relevant 
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factors would be silent). More importantly this research integrates macro and aggregated micro 
variables on a system level, whereas previous research mainly focused on either one set or the other. 
 
Table 3.1: Signal Extraction Selected Papers 
Authors Year Data Factors and Main Findings 
Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 
(Systemic Crises) 
1998, 
1999 
20 countries, identifying 76 
episodes of currency crises and 26 
banking crises, of these 18 episodes 
are twin crises, 1970-1995. 
Find that these three factors are the most 
influential 
 Real exchange rate appreciation 
 Equity prices 
 Money multiplier 
However, they have a large Type I error, 
failing to issue a signal in 27%-21% of the 
observations during the 24 months preceding 
the crisis for twin crises and 12 months for 
banking crises. 
 
Alessi and 
Detken 
(Systemic Crises)  
 
2008 
 
1970 – 2007, 18 OECD countries. 
 
Propose 18 real-time and financial indicators 
for costly asset price booms and find some 
specifications would have issued persistent 
warning signals prior to the current crisis. The 
most robust indicators were: global private 
credit, long term nominal bond yield, housing 
investment, short-term nominal interest rate, 
real equity price index and real GDP.  
 
Borio, Drehmann 
(Systemic Crises) 
2009 1980-2003 and test out of sample 
2004 – 2008 
Test the behavior of credit and asset prices 
(equity and property using gaps from a long-
term trend) in the prediction of financial crises 
both in-sample and out-of-sample, with low 
noise-to-signal ratios over 1 and 3 year 
horizons. 
Cihak and 
Shaeck 
(Individual 
Banks) 
2007 1994 – 2004, 2,600 banks in more 
than 100 countries (with 51 banking 
crises episodes during) 
Find capital adequacy, return on equity, NPLs 
to Gross Loans, NPLs net of provisions to 
capital useful in signaling problems in 
individual banks. NPLs net of provisions 
correctly calls failure 66% of the time. 
Sources: As listed above. 
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3.2.3 Disadvantages of the Signals Approach 
Disadvantages of the signals approach include that it only considers each variable in isolation and 
there is no clear methodology for aggregating the information provided by each indicator on a stand-
alone basis. Another disadvantage is that the model does not provide a platform to address 
conflicting signals, i.e. one indicator signaling a crisis and others not. Furthermore, the model in the 
static set up focuses only on whether a threshold has been crossed or not, and ignores other useful 
information content in assessing fragility which might be in the data. Also, as such, the model is 
backward looking. To address some of the disadvantages of the signals approach, Kaminsky (1999) 
develops a composite index, constructed as the number of indicators that cross the threshold at any 
given time. Alternatively, also a weighted variant could be used where each indicator is weighted by 
its signal-to-noise ratio (the percentage of correct signals issued to the percentage of false signals, 
this contrasts to the NTSR defined earlier).  
 
Borio and Drehmann (2009), also develop a composite index and use weights for indicators designed 
based on gaps from a long-term trend, they find that in-sample performance of these indicators is 
quite good, with a lead for crisis prediction varying between one and four years. They also examine 
in depth the choice of optimal indicators, indicator signal thresholds and optimal indicator weights. 
They find that it is possible to build relatively simple indicators comprising credit and asset prices 
that can help identify assessments of the build-up of risks of future banking distress in the economy. 
They find that in-sample predictions of crisis average 77% (Type I error of 23%) with a lead time of 
3 years, while out-of-sample performance falls to hover around 60% (Type I error of 40%), for the 
same lead time. Predictive ability both in-sample and out-of-sample, drops considerably in the 1-
year lead time analysis to as low as 30% (Type I error of 70%). This could be an indication that 2 
years before a crisis occurs, it is already too late to act on preventing the crisis because the 
preconditions for the crisis have already been staged, as evidenced by these indicators seeing no 
further deterioration. 
 
On an individual bank level, Cihak and Shaeck (2007) look at each explanatory variable 
independently, however they try to funnel the variables by their effectiveness in signaling failure and 
conclude with a small number of variables useful in predicting individual bank failure. 
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3.2.4 Innovation and contribution in addressing the disadvantages of previous models as listed 
above 
As the signals extraction model in this research is calibrated to predict near-crises, it does capture all 
the necessary information in fragility build-up. Also, while each variable under the new model 
design proposed is still considered independently, the use of a dynamic threshold ensures that only a 
relevant variable to crisis prediction is taken into account when looking at which variables forecast a 
near-crisis. This is because any variable which has not changed significantly as per the defined 
objective function of the model, will not trigger a signal by default and therefore the variables which 
do, are relevant - only the contributors to near-crises will issue signals, or talk while other variables 
will be silent or not issue any signals. Also, another disadvantage of signal extraction models in 
earlier literature was that a static model throws away a lot of information content on fragility which 
might be in the data, a dynamic model, focusing on near-crises, ensures that this information is taken 
into account because all comparisons are relative to a chosen benchmark of change. Furthermore, 
one other disadvantage of earlier design models are that they are backward looking, calibrated on 
historical data and thresholds determined on the basis of the critical levels of these variables in the 
past. By using a dynamic design, this ensures that the model is forward looking because it is 
calibrated to signal crises based on future changes to a chosen benchmark ex-ante not a static level 
chosen ex-poste.  
 
Also, the use of weighted indices of signal indicators, while it did address some of the problems with 
static, backward looking benchmarks, is not sufficient to make them forward looking, on the 
contrary, what they did is in effect improve the fit of the signal extraction model to the data period 
studied (signal extraction model criticisms include this particular issue of over-fitting to a certain 
data period). By using a dynamic model, this criticism is not applicable and it still does not prevent a 
regulator from assigning different weights to variables at a later stage based on their expertise and/or 
objective function, but they will be doing it again on a dynamic basis, because they are choosing a 
weight for a degree of variability of a variable, not a static threshold. Another major problem with 
models in the past and indeed as severely highlighted by the last financial crisis is their blind use and 
lack of understanding of their limitations. By leaving room for regulator input on variables and 
focusing on near-crises, this forces regulators to look at the variables in a more dynamic manner and 
ensures the incorporation of a qualitative human element, which does not preclude also weightings 
being determined by other models used in other parts of the regulatory function (eg. Output of 
models used by different departments within the Bank of England for example, could be used as an 
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input to an EWS, and similarly within other institutions to ensure maximum utilization of available 
resources and expertise across departments).  
 
Finally, as previous research focused on either macro variables or micro variables, while very few 
studies have been conducted using an integrated approach, this research provides a significant 
improvement in the use of macro and aggregated micro variables in its design. 
 
3.3. Logit/Probit Models 
3.3.1Overview 
Logit models use a logistic specification and enable the study of covariates of banking crises, 
developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).  In this paper, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache use a large sample (45 to 65 variables based on the specification of the regression) of 
developing and developed countries during 1980-1994 and find that crises tend to erupt when the 
macroeconomic environment is weak, especially when growth is low and inflation is high. Also high 
real interest rates and vulnerability to balance of payments crises plays a role. They also find that 
countries with an explicit deposit insurance scheme and with weak law enforcement were also 
particularly at risk.  
 
This approach assumes that the probability that a crisis occurs is a function of a vector of 
explanatory variables and its output, although in the form of a probability, is transformed into binary 
mode through a decision rule. Either a country is experiencing a crisis or not (determined by what 
threshold probability is given in the decision rule to label a country as having a crisis). Another 
variant by the same authors uses the forecast probabilities under two frameworks: 
 
 Framework 1: the regulator wants to know whether there is enough fragility to take action. The 
forecast probability of a crisis is used to determine the optimal trade-off between taking action when 
there is no crisis against the costs of doing nothing when there is a real crisis.  
 
Framework 2: the regulator wants to simply rate the fragility of the banking system, depending on 
the rating, different courses of action may follow. This emphasizes one of the main advantages of the 
Logit model, that its non-linear and incorporates several variables simultaneously, granting 
flexibility in output evaluation as compared to other models. 
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When the authors apply the monitoring frameworks to six crisis episodes in Jamaica, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand - the results are mixed, however. This highlights one of 
the main weaknesses of existing econometric analysis tools of systemic banking crises in having 
limited success in out-of-sample prediction accuracy. This could be partly due to the fact that 
coefficients derived from in-sample estimation are of limited use outside sample and that new crises 
are different from past crises. Another limitation is also that banking crises are rare events, so in-
sample estimates are based on relatively few data points.  
 
Probit models are used to estimate the contribution that each explanatory variable makes to the 
probability that financial distress/failure will occur. Another variant, discriminant Analysis 
techniques allow for the identification of those explanatory variables which signal the presence of 
financial failure with the highest probability. These were used by Worrell, Cherebin and Polius-
Mounsey (2001) and by Polius and Sahely (2003). 
 
Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha (2002), using a Probit model, test balance sheet explanations of external 
crises in emerging markets and the role of standards in these crises with the main findings that 
corporate sector balance sheets have a very significant impact on both the likelihood and depth of 
crisis caused by external shocks. The authors use a set of indicators which they call the Lawson 
Indicators (named after the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer) covering: corporate balance 
sheet indicators (degree of financial leverage, maturity structure of debt financing, availability of 
liquidity, profitability and cash flow of a company);  macroeconomic balance sheet and institutional 
indicators (extent of foreign currency financing by corporates and revenues) and legal indicators 
(creditor rights, shareholder rights,  the ability to enforce contracts, accounting standards, and the 
origin of the legal regime). They use a parametric probit model to which they add the Lawson 
indicators. They find that using their indicator set in addition to the macroeconomic variables results 
in a much higher degree of accuracy, calling on average more than 80% of the crisis in-sample (Type 
I error of 20%, compared to 30% on average to Kaminsky and Reinhart 2005 for example), however 
with a high degree of false alarms ranging from around 30% to over 50% for different cut-off 
probabilities (30% false alarms for the higher probability threshold of 50% and 50% false alarms for 
the lower probability threshold of 25%, respectively). 
 
Cihak and Shaeck (2007), apply a logit model to a dataset of 2,600 banks in more than 100 countries 
over the period from 1994-2004. They find that several bank ratios are useful signaling indicators of 
 
 
33 
 
individual bank fragility or of a bank being close-to-failure, especially return on equity, and selected 
macro indicators in line with previous literature, such as credit to the private sector, credit growth, 
the ratio of M2 to international reserves (to capture the impact of capital flows) are also very useful.  
Their results show a Type I error of between 11% to 27% across four different specifications of the 
model, while Type II errors range between a low of 41% to a high of 61% in some specifications. 
 
Pogyhosyan and Cihak (2009), use a logit model based on a database of individual bank distress 
across the EU-25 countries from 1996 to 2008, covering 5,708 banks, and identify a set of indicators 
and thresholds to differentiate between sound banks and banks which are vulnerable or close-to-
failure, which they call banks at risk. They identify 79 distress events for 54 banks. In this study the 
determinants of bank distress are based on CAMELs, with the key explanatory variables of each 
category being capital adequacy, asset quality, cost-to-income ratio and return on equity plus a 
liquidity indicator, in addition to a market discipline variable and a contagion dummy. They find all 
variables to be significant, with the exception of managerial quality and liquidity. The model used 
has strong predictive ability with a pseudo R2 for the base case of 48.5%. For a 10% cut-off 
probability, the model had a Type I error of 44% and a negligible Type II error, (less than 0.1%). 
 
Bussiere (2013), in an application to currency crises in 27 countries over a 7 year period, uses a 
dynamic logit model to identify how early in advance each explanatory variable sends a warning 
signal. He finds some indicators to signal a crisis in the very short run while others signal a crisis at 
more distant horizons. He also shows that state dependence matters, albeit mostly in the short run. 
The results have important implications for crisis prevention in terms of the timeliness and 
usefulness of the envisaged policy response. The results presented have important policy 
implications. First, state dependence suggests that vigilance must not decrease after a first crisis has 
happened as it may be followed by another crisis soon after. It suggests also that the true cost of a 
crisis may be underestimated, because letting a crisis happens increases the probability that a future 
crisis happens too. The second policy implication stems from the results obtained with a more 
flexible lags structure than previously estimated in the literature: some indicators signal crises in the 
very short run, which calls for a particularly quick policy response. This is the case of the short-term 
debt to reserves liquidity ratio and of financial contagion. This calls for heightened vigilance for 
policy makers when such variables are on the rise. 
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3.3.2 Innovation and Contribution to Model Design 
 
As is the case with Signal Extraction, Logit models have failed in reliably calling crises in the past 
and thus motivate new research in the subject. The main challenges are similar to the signal 
extraction application: firstly we need to identify a crisis or a banking failure at a pre-crisis time, 
namely the build-up of imbalances or financial fragility. Secondly, the EWS has to be effective in 
identifying the stress indicators with sufficient lead time and be credible and usable by policy 
makers. The Logit application herein improves on: crisis definitions (dependent variable 
specification); explanatory variables choice and design; methodology, out-of-sample performance 
and lead time of crisis signals. The main difference is that for the Logit model, the output is a 
probability of a crisis occurring, and hence it is possible to map this on to a spectrum where episodes 
are labeled in terms of their degree of severity as a) vulnerability spots; b) near crises; and c) full-
fledged crises in contrast to the signals approach where the output is a binary indicator. 
 
The key innovation in dependent variable design in the Logit application uses the same adapted 
crisis definition as for the signal extraction application, where each country is identified as having a 
crisis or not based on a composite indicator of the solvency and profitability of the banking sector 
and changes in both thereof. By using this definition as opposed to an ex-post metric of losses as a 
percentage of GDP or NPL levels which identify crises at a stage which is too late for policy makers 
to take any action to actually prevent a crisis – this adapted definition would by default lead to a 
longer lead period for spotting imbalances and/or fragility build-up. 
 
The structure of the Logit model as explained above shows that variable selection was determined by 
its impact on overall Logit model performance. This research improves on this point by having the 
variable universe drawn from the signal extraction universe and funneling this to the variables which 
are meaningful in the Logit application. By shifting the analysis to focus on variables already proven 
to have an impact on crises in a dynamic rather than static set up, we avoid the static threshold 
problem of previous Logit specifications. This means that the model design as such should not only 
improve on out-of-sample performance, but would also be usable in different time periods and 
different states of the world. One of the problems with earlier models is that repeated exercises with 
different data periods always resulted in different performance of indicator variables for crises 
because causes for crises change over time and because the thresholds chosen for each variable to 
signal a crisis are by default linked to whichever data period the model was calibrated to. 
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Furthermore, for the choice of variables itself, each data period seemed to dictate a different set of 
variables, because their performance in-sample showed they were significant in predicting crises for 
that specific data period studied. The design of the model to funnel only variables from a universe 
based on deviations from a chosen benchmark means that the chosen variables are valid for the data 
period for which the model was designed and for other data periods as well. Finally, the design of 
the model to signal crises, means that a lot of data on near-crises was not utilized in the analysis – 
something which this model also improves upon by the innovative dependent variable specification. 
Table 3.2 further illustrates these points by highlighting some of the major studies and their findings. 
 
For example, taking the choice of explanatory variables, Table 3.2 shows that across the different 
time periods and countries studied the indicator variables chosen vary significantly over time and 
between country groupings. This is attributable to the static way of choosing variables into the 
model. By using a dynamic set-up, this would ensure the continuity in use of variables and the 
ability to add new variables as they become systemically significant and more importantly the 
changing states of the economy would not render the model invalid. An illustration of the changes 
between different studies of the variables identified as significant to predicting crises because of 
model design is shown as an example by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2005) finding that 
real GDP, real interest rates, budget deficit, private credit to GDP and GDP/capita as significant 
variables in predicting crises, while Eichengreen and Rose (1998) overlap in two variables, but also 
find short term debt to be a significant indicator. Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) find another set of 
significant variables in predicting crises are rapid domestic credit growth, large bank liabilities 
relative to reserves, and deposit rate decontrol, despite having a high data period overlap with 
DandD (1998). Finally, Cihak and Shaeck (2007) and Pogyhosyan and Cihak (2009), find CAMELs 
based indicators, especially relating to capital adequacy, asset quality and return on equity to be 
significant explanatory variables, without any overlap with the aforementioned studies. 
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Table 3.2: Logit Selected Papers 
Authors Model Used Year Data Factors and Main Findings 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache 
Multivariate 
Logit 
1998, 
2005 
94 countries, 77 
crises occurred, 
1980 to 2002. 
 Real GDP growth,  
 real interest rates and  
 real GDP per capita  
 Budget deficit 
 Private credit/GDP 
Around 70% of the time the model predicted crisis 
occurrence correctly. Forecasted data perform 
poorly in predicting crisis, using the same 
coefficients obtained from real data.  
 
Caprio and 
Klingebiel 
 
Multivariate 
logit 
 
2003 
 
117 crises in 93 
countries, 1970 
to 2002 
 
Defines systemic banking crises as episodes 
during which most or all bank capital was 
exhausted. The listing of crises used by these 
authors has been used as a reference by almost all 
academic researchers after this paper. 
Cihak and 
Shaeck 
Logit, duration 
analysis and 
non-Parametric 
2007 2,600 banks in 
more than 100 
countries over 
the period from 
1994-2004 
They find that several bank ratios are useful 
signaling indicators of a bank being ‘close-to-
failure’, especially return on equity, and selected 
macro indicators in line with previous literature, 
such as credit to the private sector, credit growth, 
the ratio of M2 to international reserves (to 
capture the impact of capital flows) are also very 
useful.  Their results show a Type I error of 
between 11% to 27% across four different 
specifications of the model, while Type II errors 
range between a low of 41% to a high of 61% in 
some specifications. 
 
Poghosyan and 
Cihak 
Logit 2009 EU-25 countries 
from 1996 to 
2008, covering 
5,708 banks, 79 
distress events 
for 54 banks. 
Determinants of bank distress are based on 
CAMELs - capital adequacy, asset quality, cost-
to-income ratio and return on equity plus a 
liquidity indicator, in addition to a market 
discipline variable and a contagion dummy. They 
find all variables to be significant, with the 
exception of managerial quality and liquidity. The 
model used has a pseudo R2 for the base case of 
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48.5%. For a 10% cut-off probability, the model 
had a Type I error of 44% and a negligible Type II 
error, (less than 0.1%). 
 
Eichengreen and 
Rose 
 
Multivariate 
probit 
 
1998 
 
105 developing 
countries, 1975-
1992 
 
Main findings: higher crisis probability if higher 
interest rates, low growth, more short-term debt. 
 
Glick and 
Hutchison 
 
Multivariate 
probit 
 
1999 
 
90 industrial and 
developing 
countries, 1975 - 
1997 
 
Main findings: twin crisis are more common in 
emerging markets, especially in the presence of 
financial liberalization. Banking crises are a good 
leading indicator of currency crises, the opposite is 
not true. 
 
Eichengreen and 
Arteta 
 
Probit 
 
2000 
 
75 countries, 78 
crises, 1975 – 
1997. 
 
Authors apply the results in previous empirical 
literature to emerging market crises to check the 
robustness of explanatory variables. 
Factors which they found to be robust are: 
 Rapid domestic credit growth 
 Large bank liabilities relative to reserves 
 Deposit rate decontrol. 
Factors which the authors find not to be robust 
include the relationship between exchange rate 
regimes and banking crises, deposit insurance and 
weak institutional frameworks. 
 
 
Davis and Karim 
 
Multivariate 
Logit and 
Signal 
Extraction 
 
2008 
 
1979 – 2003, 
105 countries, 
72 to 102 
systemic crisis 
depending on 
the definition 
used. 
 
The authors replicate the Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005) study and Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003) study. They find that logit is the 
most suitable approach for EWS while signal 
extraction is more suited for single-country EWS 
and that the same variables with some 
transformations are better predictors of crises, than 
the earlier set in the original papers. 
 
 
Sources: As listed above. 
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3.3.3 Disadvantages of the Logit Approach 
The Logit model forecasts in the static set up are highly dependent on initial conditions, with poor 
initial conditions resulting in an overstated probability of crisis and vice versa. Also variable 
specifications in the past were based on static set ups. In addition, this model by construct is 
backward looking as in the static signals approach. In order to evaluate out-of-sample performance, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache in their extension paper in 2000, use the coefficients estimated 
from the multivariate logit model and forecasts of the right-hand-side variables drawn from 
professional forecasters or international institutions. Finally, the cut-off probabilities for the various 
states of ‘crises’ are linked to the distribution of outcomes and are subject to a heuristic decision rule 
for the final classification. 
 
3.3.4 Innovation and Contribution in addressing the disadvantages of previous models as listed 
above 
The innovation and contribution in addressing the disadvantages of previously used models are 
similar to the signals approach. These predominantly relate to the dependent variable innovation and 
the dynamic model set up. These two contributions improve on out-of-sample performance, signal 
lead time and render the model forward looking. While at the level of the explanatory variables, the 
mesh of macro and aggregated micro variables is an approach adopted on a limited scale in previous 
literature and adds a number of useful insights. 
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3.4. Merton Type Applications 
 
3.4.1 Overview  
This approach has been mainly used to study individual bank failure, with empirical studies dating 
back to the 1970s, mainly relying on bank balance sheet and market information to explain and 
forecast the failure of individual institutions. These include studies with variations of a Merton type, 
options based model to predict expected number of defaults (END) Z-scores or distance to default 
(DD) for financial institutions or sovereigns and credit migrations (recent studies include Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes 2004, Fuertes and Kalotychou 2006 and Savona and Vezzoli, 2008, Tieman and 
Maechler 2009, among others).   
 
A number of applications have used Merton type approaches on an aggregate level to calculate Z-
scores and distance to default measures. Tieman and Maechler (2009), adopt this ‘superbank’ 
approach, which aggregates all players on one ‘pseudo’ balance sheet (this approach was also 
adopted by the Central Bank of Egypt’s Macro-Prudential Unit for some of its stress-testing 
exercises). They focus on the short-run feedback effect from market-based indicators of financial 
sector risk to the real economy through the credit channel, and estimate this effect on an economy-
wide (macro) level and on an individual (micro) bank level. Their sample includes seven countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, and focuses on the 
largest banks in each of these countries (a total of 26 banks) over the period covered 1991–2007, the 
authors find that although there is considerable variation across indicators, in both cases, the period 
2004 to mid-2007 is characterized by low risk, as reflected by (almost) uniformly high DD indicators 
or, conversely, low Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs).  
 
A somewhat similar application, but with a focus on creating a new financial stability quantifiable 
metric is made by Martin Cihak (2007) who presents an integrated measure of financial stability 
which he calls ‘systemic loss’. The author looks at the financial system as if it’s a ‘portfolio’ of 
financial institutions’ and considers the whole ‘distribution’ of systemic losses of this aggregate 
portfolio, over one period. He proposes that systemic loss measurement should be based on i) 
probability of default; ii) loss given default; and iii) correlation of defaults across institutions. An 
earlier paper by Blejer and Schumacher (1998), uses a similar assessment of a distribution of losses 
of a financial system as a whole, but in a value-at-risk (VaR) type set-up, with regards to currency 
crises, by constructing a VaR metric for central banks and concludes that this is a useful monitor of 
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sovereign risk. The analysis covers 29 countries, including 12 in which a systemic banking crisis 
started during the period of study according to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). The main findings are 
that the indicators used do point to increased instability and using the Loss Given Default (LGD) and 
correlations across failures into account improves the measurement (reduces the noise-to-signal 
ratio). 
 
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2004), using a Merton type approach, analyze the ability of equity and 
bond market signals as leading indicators in a sample of EU banks. They find both indicators are 
good leading metrics of fragility, with distance to default exhibiting lead times of 6 to 18 months, 
while bond spreads signal values close to problems only.  In a related study, Krainer and Lopez 
(2004), find that stock returns and equity-based default probabilities are useful indicators for US 
bank supervisors. The authors develop a model of supervisory ratings that combines supervisory and 
equity market information and find that their model forecasts supervisory rating changes by up to 
four quarters. Finally, an application to Estonia by Chen, Funke and Mannasoo (2006) attempts to 
predict bank fragility from market prices through the use of a Merton type approach and find that 
market indicators are moderately useful for anticipating future financial distress and rating changes.  
 
The following table, adapted from Cihak (2007), presents a summary of the different Merton type 
applications to predict banking and systemic crises and the advantages and drawbacks of each sub-
set. 
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Table 3.3:  Merton Type Methods for Crises Prediction and the Advantages and Disadvantages 
of Each 
Indicator Advantages Disadvantages 
DD or Z-Score (or 
probability of 
Default) 
Easy to calculate from 
individual institutions’ or for a 
portfolio, for DDs, Z-scores, or 
PDs. 
 Does not reflect contagion (correlation 
across failures if average of individual 
institutions). 
 Does not reflect LGD of individual 
institutions, even though can be partially 
addressed by weighting. 
 DD requires liquid market in financial 
institutions iNTSRuments used to back out 
the metric if market data is used. 
First-to-default and 
nth-to-default 
indicator 
 Clear theoretical 
underpinnings for the nth to 
default indicator 
 Does not fully reflect differences in LGD 
in different institutions. 
 FTD looks at individual vs systemic risk. 
Expected number 
of defaults (END) 
indicator 
 Relatively easy to interpret.  Does not reflect different LGDs in 
institutions. 
 Difficult to calculate as its not a closed 
form expression 
 Focuses only on central tendency of the 
distribution. 
 Depends on total number of institutions  
Distribution of 
systemic loss 
 Captures differences in LGD 
in institutions 
 Captures correlation across 
bank failures 
 Focuses only on central 
tendencies 
 May be difficult to calculate in some 
cases; no closed-form expression. 
 
Source: Adapted from Cihak (2007). 
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3.4.2 Innovation and Contribution to Model Design 
This research contributes to the existing body of literature in two ways. First, the design of the Z-
score macro application, looking at the aggregate balance sheet of the financial system to calculate 
system Z-scores has been utilized rarely in earlier literature. Second, the innovation in the way the Z-
score is calculated, by focusing on equity to total assets plus profit before tax and provisions to 
average assets, and also using the volatility of the latter for the denominator as opposed to ROA, the 
resulting Z-score is much more indicative. This is because equity to total assets is a ‘clean’ and 
‘standard’ measure of capitalization across countries and financial systems and banks, not subject to 
different classifications of prudential rules for calculation of capital adequacy. Also the returns 
calculation before taxes and provisions, normalizes for the tax regime differences and the 
provisioning differences across different time periods. Where usually provisioning is used as an 
earnings smoothing tool by management. This return measure is akin to operating profit to total 
assets, and as such also improves on lead time, as changes to operating profit usually precede hits to 
income statement lines after further deductions. On the micro-level, the calculation improvements of 
the Z-score are also applicable and as such render the scores more comparable compared to previous 
works across countries and banks. The transition matrices are also more reliable based on the Z-
scores calculated this way. Finally, book equity is used for the calculation of capital adequacy, this is 
on the premise of banking book equity being a proxy for market equity given bank balance sheets 
are the closest to fair value compared to all other industrial or service players given its nature. While 
simultaneously it normalizes for periods of abnormal market volatility, especially around crisis and 
distress episodes.  
 
3.4.3 Disadvantages of Merton Type Applications 
In general, Merton type models are subject to the same set of basic assumptions required for the 
functioning of options pricing and asset pricing models. We assume no information asymmetries, 
liquid markets with no frictions, rational investors, among many others. However, in reality, these 
assumptions do not hold either consistently or at all in some cases and are affected by the level of 
market efficiency or indeed also by periods of irrational behavior by investors. On the macro level, 
another disadvantage is that the aggregated analysis ignores correlations between institutions which 
may decrease or increase the total risk of a system. On a micro-level, differences in liquidity 
between different bank stocks would have an impact on the outcome of the Z-score model calculated 
using market data. 
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3.4.4 Innovation and Contribution in addressing the disadvantages of Merton Type Applications 
Given the research design herein, as book values are used, we avoid all the disadvantages related to 
violation of Merton basic pricing assumptions. The underlying premise is that a bank’s balance sheet 
is sufficiently close to fair value and the long run value of book equity should approximate the long 
run market cap. The improved calculation of the Z-score is more comparable across countries and 
banks, which was not the case in earlier literature. Finally for the micro-application, the universe of 
banks studied is much larger than previous studies using Merton type applications. The micro paper 
also proposes a new rating paradigm based on our particular application which could be more stable, 
forward looking and highly useful for both regulators and market participants.  
 
3.5. Other Methodologies 
3.5.1 Overview 
Other approaches include binary recursive trees (BRTs) and network models. The BRT approach 
analyses a sample of data to reveal a particular value of the explanatory variable that best explains 
the dependent variable. So for example if the level of real GDP is the explanatory variable being 
tested, BRT would identify the exact threshold level of GDP growth that separates crises from 
tranquil periods. The observations would then be split into two branches based on the level of GDP, 
and if low GDP is believed to result in more banking crises, then the low GDP branch should show a 
clustering of failures as such. And then another ‘splitter’ explanatory variable is chosen for the next 
tree node and so on. This approach has been used in a limited number of studies including Davis and 
Karim (2008) and Duttagupta and Cashin (2008) for banking crises, Ghosh and Ghosh (2002) for 
currency crises and Manasse and Roubini (2005) and Manasse et al. (2003) for sovereign debt crises.  
 
Duttagupta and Cashin (2008) analyze banking crises in 50 emerging market and developing 
countries over the period from 1990 – 2005, comprising 127 annual crisis observations and 38 crisis 
episodes, identifying key indicators and their threshold values at which vulnerability to banking 
crises increases. They identify three conditions to be crisis inductive: very high inflation; highly 
dollarized bank deposits combined with nominal depreciation or low liquidity and low bank 
profitability. These factors point to foreign currency risk, poor financial soundness and 
macroeconomic instability being key triggers to banking crises. They also find that their results 
survive under alternative robustness checks endorsing BRT as an approach for monitoring banking 
system vulnerabilities. The authors cite as one of the advantages of a BRT model are that it considers 
a combination of vulnerabilities rather than deterioration of a unique factor. It also recognizes that 
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economic indicators may have a nonlinear impact on the probability of a crisis. The model identifies 
five key variables as the most important determinants of banking crises: nominal depreciation, bank 
profitability, inflation, liability dollarization and bank liquidity.  It also identifies three types of 
environments which are conducive to crises: macroeconomic instability, low bank profitability and 
high foreign exchange risk. The out-of-sample performance of the model, however, varies in 
correctly calling crises from 33% in 2001, 50% in 2002 and 66% in 2003 (for a total of 20 crises 
which occurred from 2001 to 2003). 
 
A similar analysis for US banks, but of network structure nature rather than a binary mode, on a 
much more limited sample and for a short time horizon, was developed by Jagtiani, Kolari, Lemieux 
and Shin (2003) in the form of a non-parametric Trait-Recognition-Analysis (TRA). The analysis is 
closely associated with neural network models used in science for the prediction of earthquakes and 
oil exploration, and seeks to exploit information contained in complex interactions of the 
independent variable set. A unique aspect of the TRA is that variable interactions could be formed to 
be consistent with the logic of a financial analyst, rather than simple cross products of variables.  
 
The drawbacks of TRA models are the required hands-on manipulation by researchers to create and 
input cut-off points for traits and selecting the minimum and maximum percentage definitions of 
features. Also no statistical measures of significance are produced by the TRA analysis. On the other 
hand, the TRA has an advantage over other techniques in that it generates a list of good and bad 
traits that may well be useful to bank supervisors in better understanding a bank’s strength and 
weaknesses.  
 
3.5.2 Focus on other Recent Research 
There are four recent papers, however, which are forward looking in terms of the research focus and 
deserve special attention as such. These cover a) leverage, liquidity creation and off-balance sheet 
activity; b) multiple indicator models (MIMIC); c) multiple indicator models with contagion effects; 
and d) modelling of feedback loops to the real sector.   
 
3.5.2.1 Leverage, Liquidity Creation and Off-Balance Sheet Activity: Berger and Bouwman (2008), 
find interesting patterns for liquidity creation around financial crisis by agents. Their main findings 
can be summarized as follows: first, prior to financial crises, there seems to have been a significant 
build-up or drop-off of abnormal liquidity creation. Second, banking and market-related crises are 
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different. The authors suggest a possible dark side of bank liquidity creation and show that the 
causality may also be reversed in the sense that too much liquidity creation may lead to financial 
fragility. 
 
3.5.2.2 Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause Models (MIMIC) 
Rose and Spiegel (2009), model the causes of the  financial crisis together with its manifestations, 
using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model (basically a set-up of two equations, with 
two vectors and an iterative algorithm to allow explicit modelling of a measurement error around a 
key variable, in this case the authors specified it as the incidence and severity of the crisis variable) 
conducted on a cross-section of 107 countries; focusing on national causes and consequences of the 
crisis and ignoring cross-country contagion effects. The authors replicate this paper adding channels 
of contagion through both financial and real sector exposures. 
 
 
3.5.2.3 Modelling of Feedback Loops to the Real Sector and in Stress-Testing 
Tieman and Maechler (2009), using a Merton-Type approach, estimate the magnitude of key effects 
on the real economy from financial sector stress. They focus on the short-run feedback effect from 
market-based indicators of financial sector risk to the real economy through the credit channel, and 
estimate this effect on an economy-wide (macro) level. The analysis includes adopting a superbank 
approach, which aggregates all players on one pseudo balance sheet (this approach was adopted by 
the Central Bank of Egypt’s Macro-Prudential Unit for some of its stress-testing exercises as early as 
2007). The authors also conduct the same analysis on the level of individual large banks and find 
significant feedback effects. 
 
The sample includes seven countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom, and focuses on the largest banks in each of these countries (a total of 26 banks). 
The period covered is 1991–2007, over which they perform regression analysis on quarterly data. 
For each country, the authors first constructs several economy-wide and bank-specific financial 
sector risk variables. These variables are all based either on a simple Merton-type distance-to-default 
(DD) model, or on Moody’s KMV expected default frequency (EDF). In both cases an economy-
wide risk measure is constructed by averaging the DDs and EDFs of individual large banks in the 
specific country. The authors find that although there is considerable variation across indicators, in 
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both cases, the period 2004 to mid-2007 is characterized by low risk, as reflected by (almost) 
uniformly high DD indicators or, conversely, low EDFs.  
 
The authors find that reductions in credit growth as a result of financial sector fragility are 
substantial. Between July and end 2007, the increased financial sector risk as perceived by the 
market, would lead real credit growth to decrease by 0.4 percentage point in real terms in the 
countries in the sample. Set against an average real credit growth of 4.4 percent over the period 
1991–2006, this implies a decrease of some 10 percent. When taking account of further turmoil in 
the first half of 2008, i.e., looking out of sample at the impact over the period July 2007–July 2008, 
using estimated coefficients, the total impact on real credit growth amounts to a decrease of 32 
percent. Similar effects are found for GDP with the increase in financial fragility over the period 
July 2007 to July 2008 possibly having a negative impact on GDP growth of over 1 percentage point 
on average, ranging up to 2.5 percentage points for specific countries. 
 
3.5.3 Innovation and contribution in addressing the disadvantages of previous models as listed 
above 
 
As this research uses a dependent variable definition that is calibrated to predict near-crises, it does 
capture all the necessary information in fragility build-up. The variables under the new empirical 
model designs used for each paper that rely upon dynamic thresholds and are the relevant variables 
in crisis and failure prediction. This is because any variables that did not change significantly as per 
the defined objective function of each of the applications, will not trigger a signal and the variables 
that did change significantly will.  
 
Also, another disadvantage of models in earlier literature was that being designed to predict full 
fledged crises as opposed to near crises or failure of a bank throws away a lot of information content 
on fragility which might be in the data, a dynamic model, focusing on near-crises or near-failure, 
ensures that this information is taken into account because all comparisons are relative to a chosen 
benchmark of change.  
 
Furthermore, one other disadvantage of earlier design models are that they are backward looking, 
calibrated on historical data and thresholds determined on the basis of the ‘critical’ levels of these 
variables in the past. By using a dynamic design, this ensures that the model is forward looking 
because it is calibrated based on future changes to a chosen benchmark ex-ante not a static level 
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chosen ex-poste. By using a dynamic model, it still does not prevent a regulator from assigning 
different weights to variables at a later stage based on their expertise and/or objective function, but 
they will be doing it again on a dynamic basis, because they are choosing a weight for a degree of 
variability of a variable, not a static threshold.  
 
Finally, this research proposes a new rating paradigm in the last application. While the building 
blocks of a holistic traffic light analysis or risk heat map, an innovation not included in any previous 
literature, to be used by regulators, are clearly demonstrated. This was a major problem with models 
in the past and indeed as severely highlighted by the last financial crisis is their blind use and lack of 
understanding of their limitations. By leaving room for regulator input on variables and focusing on 
near-crises, this forces regulators to look at the variables in a more dynamic manner and ensures the 
incorporation of a qualitative human element, which does not preclude also weightings being 
determined by other models used in other parts of the regulatory function (eg. Output of models used 
by different departments or think tanks for example, could be used as an input to an EWS, and 
similarly within other institutions to ensure maximum utilization of available resources and expertise 
across departments).  
 
Thus, to conclude this section, the use of a traffic lights or risk heat map approach, with input form a 
suite of models and continuous monitoring of the system by regulators and indeed the markets is 
proven throughout as such. 
 
 
3.6. Dependent Variable in Earlier Literature  
Earlier literature (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996 and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998) defines a 
crisis ex-post and after losses are realized and/or public scale nationalization or melt downs occurred 
– specifically: 
a. Proportion of NPLs to total banking system assets is greater than 10% 
b. Public bailout costs exceed 2% of GDP 
c. Systemic crisis causes large scale nationalization 
d. Extensive bank runs and/or emergency government intervention 
e. All or most of banking capital is exhausted; and 
f. Level of non-performing loans falls between 5% and 10% or less if subjectively deemed 
systemically significant.  
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The following Table 3.4 presents the number of crises in line with the definition in earlier literature.  In total previous literature identified 135 crisis 
episodes, out of 870 observations or 15.5%.  
Table 3.4: Crises Definitions in Earlier Literature for OECD Countries (1980 – 2007) 
 
 
Crises Definitions in Earlier Literature
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
1 Australia 1 1 1 1 4
2 Austria 0
3 Belgium 0
4 Canada 1 1 1 3
5 Czech Republic 0
6 Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
7 Finland 1 1 1 1 4
8 France 1 1 2
9 Germany 0
10 Greece 1 1 1 1 1 5
11 Hungary 0
12 Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 5
13 Ireland 0
14 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
15 Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
16 Korea 1 1 2
17 Luxembourg 0
18 Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18
19 Netherlands 0
20 Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
21 New Zealand 1 1 1 1 4
22 Poland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
23 Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 5
24 Slovakia 0
25 Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
26 Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 5
27 Switzerland 0
28 Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
29 UK 1 1 1 1 1 5
30 US 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
Total 3 7 4 6 6 6 4 6 6 9 9 12 11 8 9 7 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 135
Total Observations 870
15.5%
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Table 3.4: Crises Definitions in Earlier Literature for OECD Countries (1980 – 2007) - Continued 
 
 
Sources: Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996 and 2003) Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008), Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
While an adapted descriptive chronicle of crises in OECD countries over the past 30 years from the Laeven and Fabian IMF Database (2008) is presented in 
Table 3.5.
Crises Definitions in Earlier Literature
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
1 Australia 1 1 1 1 4
2 Austria 0
3 Belgium 0
4 Canada 1 1 1 3
5 Czech Republic 0
6 Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
7 Finland 1 1 1 1 4
8 France 1 1 2
9 Germany 0
10 Greece 1 1 1 1 1 5
11 Hungary 0
12 Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 5
13 Ireland 0
14 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
15 Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
16 Korea 1 1 2
17 Luxembourg 0
18 Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18
19 Netherlands 0
20 Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
21 New Zealand 1 1 1 1 4
22 Poland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
23 Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 5
24 Slovakia 0
25 Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
26 Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 5
27 Switzerland 0
28 Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
29 UK 1 1 1 1 1 5
30 US 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
Total 3 7 4 6 6 6 4 6 6 9 9 12 11 8 9 7 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 135
Total Observations 870
15.5%
Crises Definitions in Earlier Literature
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
1 Australia 1 1 1 1 4
2 Austria 0
3 Belgium 0
4 Canada 1 1 1 3
5 Czech Republic 0
6 Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
7 Finland 1 1 1 1 4
8 France 1 1 2
9 Germany 0
10 Greece 1 1 1 1 1 5
11 Hungary 0
12 Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 5
13 Ireland 0
14 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
15 Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
16 Korea 1 1 2
17 Luxembourg 0
18 Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18
19 Netherlands 0
20 Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
21 New Zealand 1 1 1 1 4
22 Poland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
23 Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 5
24 Slovakia 0
25 Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
26 Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 5
27 Switzerland 0
28 Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
29 UK 1 1 1 1 1 5
30 US 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
Total 3 7 4 6 6 6 4 6 6 9 9 12 11 8 9 7 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 135
Total Observations 870
15.5%
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Chronicle of Crises in OECD Countries over a 30 year period (ending in 
2008)* 
Country Systemic 
Banking 
Crisis 
(Starting 
Date) 
Share of 
NPLs at 
peak 
(%) 
Fiscal 
Cost 
(gross 
% of 
GDP) 
Output 
Loss 
(IMF 
estimate, 
% of 
GDP) 
Minimum 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
% 
Description 
Czech 
Republic 
1996 18 6.8  -0.8 In 1994, a small bank, Banka Bohemia, failed 
due to fraud. All depositors were covered, 
however, this triggered the introduction of 
partial deposit insurance. Other runs followed at 
small banks, until by the end of 1995 two small 
banks failed, Ceska and AB Banka, which 
triggered a second phase of bank restructuring 
starting in 1996 for 18 small banks representing 
9% of the industry's assets. 
 
Finland 1991 13 12.8 59.1 -6.2 The three Nordic countries went through a 
financial liberalization process that led to a 
lending boom. However, they also suffered the 
adverse consequences of higher German 
interest rates. In the case of Finland, the 
problems were exacerbated by the collapse of 
exports to the Soviet Union. The first bank in 
trouble was Skopbank, which was taken over 
by the Central Bank in September 1991. 
Savings banks were badly affected and the 
government took control of there banks that 
together accounted for 31% of system deposits.  
 
Hungary 
1991 23 10   -11.9 
In the second half of 1993, 8 banks representing 
25% of the financial system were deemed 
insolvent. 
 
Japan 1997 35 14 17.6 -2 Banks suffered from sharp decline in stock 
market and real estate prices. In 1995 the 
official estimate of nonperforming loans was 40 
trillion yen (USD469 billion or 10% of GDP). 
An unofficial estimate put non-performing 
loans at USD1 trillion, equivalent to 25% of 
GDP. Banks made provisions for some bad 
loans. At the end of 1998 banking system NPLs 
were estimated at 88 trillion yen (USD725 
billion, or 18% of GDP). In 1999 Hakkaido 
Takushodu Bank was closed, the Long Term 
Credit Bank was nationalized, Yatsuda Trust 
was merged with Fuji Bank, and Mitsui Trust 
was merged with Chuo Trust. In 2002 NPLs 
were 35% of total loans, with a  total of 7 banks 
nationalized, 61 financial institutions closed 
and 28 institutions merged. In 1996, rescue 
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costs were estimated at more than USD100 
billion. In 1998, the government announced the 
Obuchi Plan, which provided 60 trillion yen 
(USD500 billion, or 12% of GDP) in public 
funds for loan losses, bank recapitalizations, 
and depositor protection. 
 
Korea 1997 35 31.2 50.1 -6.9 The devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 
and the following regional contagion, the crash 
of the Hong Kong stock market sent shock 
waves to the Korean financial system. Korea’s 
exchange rate remained broadly stable through 
October 1997. However, the high level of short 
term debt and the low level of usable 
international reserves made the economy 
increasingly vulnerable to shifts in market 
sentiment. While macroeconomic fundamentals 
continued to be favourable, the growing 
awareness of problems in the financial sector 
and in industrial groups (chaebols) increasingly 
led to the difficulties for the bank in rolling 
over their short-term borrowing. Through May 
2002, 5 banks were forced to exit the market 
through “purchase and assumption” and 303 
financial institutions shut down (of which 215 
were credit unions)’ another 4 banks were 
nationalized. 
 
Mexico 1981   51.3 -3.5 The government took over a troubled banking 
system. 
 
 1994 18.9 19.3 4.2 -6.2 Of 34 commercial banks in 1994, 9 were 
intervened and 11 participated in the 
loan/purchase recapitalization program. The 9 
intervened banks accounted for 19% of the 
financial system assets and were deemed 
insolvent. By 2000, 50% of bank assets were 
held by foreign banks. 
 
Norway 1991 16.4 2.7 0 2.8 Financial deregulation undertaken during 1984-
1987 led to a credit boom (with real rates of 
credit growth 20% YoY), coupled with a boom 
in both residential and none-residential real 
estate. In 1985 oil prices fell sharply, turning a 
4.8% surplus in the current account into a 6.2% 
deficit in 1986 with ensuing pressures on the 
exchange rate. Meanwhile, rate increases by the 
Bundesbank following the reunification of 
Germany, forced Norway to keep interest rates 
high throughout the economic recession, which 
started in 1988. Problems at small banks that 
began in 1988 were addressed via mergers and 
assistance from the guarantee fund, funded by 
banks. However, by 1990 the fund had been 
depleted and the financial condition at large 
banks began to deteriorate as well. The turmoil 
reached systemic proportions by October 1991, 
when the second and fourth largest banks had 
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lost substantial equity. 
 
Poland 1992 24 3.5  2 In 1991 seven of nine treasury owned 
commercial banks, accounting for 90% of 
credit, the Bank for Food Economy, and the 
cooperative banking sector experienced 
solvency problems. 
 
Slovakia 
1998 35 0   0 
NPLS reached 35% in 1998 and a bank 
restructuring programme was put in place for 
the major state owned banks. 
 
Spain 
1977  5.6  0.2 
In 1978-83, 24 institutions were rescued, 4 were 
liquidated and 4 were merged and 20 small and 
medium size banks were nationalized. These 52 
banks (of 110), representing 20% of banking 
system deposits, were experiencing solvency 
problems. 
 
Sweden 
1991 13 3.6 30.6 -1.2 
Nordbanken and Gota Bank, accounting for 
22% of banking system assets, were insolvent. 
Sparbanken Foresta, accounting for 24% of 
banking system assets, intervened. Overall, 5 of 
the 6 largest banks, with more than 70% of 
banking system assets experienced difficulties. 
 
Turkey 
1982  2.5 0 3.4 
Three banks were merged with the state-owned 
Agricultural Bank and then liquidated, two 
large banks were restructured.  
 
 
2000 27.6 32 5.4 -5.7 
Banks had a high exposure to the government 
through large holdings of public securities, 
sizeable maturities and exchange rate risk 
mismatches making them highly vulnerable to 
market risk. In November 2000, interbank 
credits to some banks holding long term 
government paper were cut, forcing them to 
liquidate the paper, which caused a sharp drop 
in the price of such securities, triggering a 
reversal in capital flows, a sharp increase in 
interest rates and decline in the value of the 
currency. Two banks closed and 19 banks have 
been take over by the Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund.  
 
UK 
     
On September 14, 2007, Northern Rock, a mid 
sized UK mortgage lender, received a liquidity 
support facility from the Bank of England, 
following funding problems related to global 
turmoil in credit markets caused by the US 
subprime meltdown. Starting on September 14, 
2007, Northern Rock experienced a bank run, 
until a government blanket guarantee, covering 
only Northern Rock was issued on September 
17, 2007. On February 22, 2008, the bank was 
nationalized following two unsuccessful bids to 
take it over. On April 21, 2008, the Bank of 
England announced it would accept a broad 
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range of mortgage backed securities and swap 
those for government paper for a period of 1 
year to aid banks in liquidity problems. The 
scheme enabled banks to temporarily swap high 
quality but illiquid mortgage backed assets and 
other securities with Treasury bills for a period 
of one year.  
 
US 
1988 4.1 3.7 4.1 -0.2 
More than 1,400 savings and loan institutions 
and 1,300 banks failed. Cleaning up savings 
and loan institutions cost USD180 billion or 3% 
of GDP. 
 
 
2007     
During 2007, the US subprime mortgage 
market melted down. The crisis manifested 
itself first through liquidity drying up in the 
banking system owing to a sharp decline in 
demand for asset-backed securities. Hard to 
value structured products had to be severely 
market down due to newly implemented fair 
value accounting. Credit losses and asset write-
downs go worse wit the accelerating mortgage 
foreclosures. On August 16, 2007, Countrywide 
Financial ran into liquidity problems triggering 
a deposit run on the bank. The Federal Reserve 
Bank lowered the discount rate by 0.5% and 
accepted USD17.2 billion in repurchase 
agreements for mortgage backed securities to 
aid in liquidity. Bear Stearns, a leading 
investment bank, was acquired by JP Morgan 
Chase with federal guarantees on its liabilities 
in March 2008. By June 2008 sub-prime related 
losses or write-downs by global financial 
institutions stood at around USD400 billion. 
The Fed introduced the Term Securities 
Lending Facility to swap mortgage-backed 
securities for Treasury notes. On September 7, 
2008, mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were placed under conservatorship. 
 
*Source: Adapted from the Laeven and Fabian IMF Database (2008). 
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3.7. Explanatory Variables Used in Earlier Literature 
There are several variables which have been identified as contributors to financial fragility and 
crises, these include financial liberalization; international shocks and restrictive exchange rate 
regimes; bank ownership and structure; credit, market and liquidity risk, CAMELs (Capital 
adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Efficiency, Liquidity and sensitivity analysis) based models; 
and stage of institutional development. Johnston, Chai and Schumacher (2000), introduce a concept 
of net risk of a financial system which is based on comparing the risk in the environment with the 
adequacy of the risk management/supervisory systems and Nier (2009) provides significant evidence 
towards the losses associated with various regulatory set ups, twin peaks versus single independent 
regulator. This enforces the role supervision has in either increasing or decreasing the net risk of a 
financial system.  
 
In an application to Asian crises, Hardy and Pazarbaşiouğlu (1998), find that macroeconomic 
indicators were of limited value in predicting the Asian crises, while the best warning signs were 
proxies for the vulnerability of the banking and corporate sector, such as credit growth and rising 
foreign liabilities. They examine 43 episodes of banking distress in 50 countries.  The authors 
differentiate the causes and leading indicators by i) region; ii) severity of the crisis; and iii) pre-crisis 
and crisis episodes. Another application to Hong Kong and other emerging markets in Asia by Wong 
et al (2007) finds that macroeconomic fundamentals, currency crisis vulnerability, credit risk of 
banks and companies, asset price bubbles, credit growth and the occurrence of distress in other 
economies in the region are important leading indicators. Other research in Asia with a focus on 
EWS for corporate distress includes work by Lieu, Lin, Yu (2008). 
 
Emerging Markets: Hawkins and Klau (2000) try to construct a relatively simple index for 24 
emerging markets to summarize information about economies facing financial stress and those likely 
to face such stress in future periods. They find that three explanatory variables with sufficient lead 
time and predictive power for crises determination are the real effective exchange rate, real interest 
rate and high external debt/GDP ratio.  
 
Nordic Banking Crisis: Drees and Pzarbasioglu (1998) studied the Nordic banking crisis (Finland, 
Norway and Sweden) in the early 1990s and find that individual banks in a banking system are 
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affected the same way by a common shock because they have similar fundamental characteristics, 
weaknesses or exposures. 
 
Latin America: Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001), attribute financial crisis in Latin 
America to lending booms. They investigate episodes over 40 years and find that lending booms are 
often associated with greater volatility and vulnerability to financial and balance of payment crises. 
Rojas-Suarez (2003), investigates the appropriate indicator set to gauge banking problems in Latin 
America and East Asia. She finds that interest paid on deposits and interest rate spreads, have 
performed robustly. More importantly she stresses that in emerging markets, a one size fits all 
approach is not applicable, with the choice of effective indicators varying according to the stage of 
development of a country. 
 
European Banks: Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) present a unique database of individual bank distress 
across the European Union from mid-1990’s to 2008 on the basis of which they identify a set of 
indicators (CAMELS based) and thresholds to distinguish between sound banks and banks 
vulnerable to financial distress. They highlight the usefulness of an EU-level early warning system 
based on this model, with published results by banks as compared by benchmarks to enhance market 
discipline. The dataset is based on Bankscope data, on 5,708 banks, plus information obtained from 
NewsPlus/Factiva on each bank with regards to any financial support or other forms of rescue or 
merger.  
 
UK: Andrew Logan (2001), studied the failure of small and medium-sized banks over a three year 
period in the UK following the closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) on 
5th July 1991.  He finds a number of measures of bank weakness such as low loan growth, poor 
profitability and illiquidity to be good predictors of failure, as are a high dependence on net interest 
income and low leverage. He also finds that the best longer-term leading indicator of future failure is 
rapid loan growth at the peak of the previous boom.   
 
US: King, Nuxoll and Yeager (2006), the authors emphasize the need for dynamic models that use 
forward-looking variables and address the various types of risks banks face individually (credit, 
market and liquidity), as the González-Hermosillo (1999) paper has done. The authors extend the 
analysis further by describing a new generation of EWS used by supervisory agencies, starting with 
discrete-response and hybrid systems used by the various US regulatory bodies to forward looking 
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systems for EWS. For the latter they identify two systems, the Growth Monitoring System (GMS) 
used by the FDIC since 2000 and the Liquidity and Asset Growth Screen (LAGS) used since 2002. 
GMS is a logit model of downgrades that estimates which institutions are most likely to be classified 
as problem banks at the end of three years, using forward-looking variables such as loan growth and 
non-core funding.  
 
Jagtiani, Kolari, Lemieux and Shin (2003), develop a simple EWS for US banks over a sample 
period from 1988 to 1990 and more than 450 banks, which focuses on predicting banks in an early 
stage of capital distress, with a primary capital to assets ratio falling below the 5.5% minimum 
capital adequacy standard.  They find that their model is able to detect financial distress in 
commercial banks one year in advance with a reasonable degree of accuracy. They find that a logit 
model with only the lagged capital ratio and lagged change in capital ratio predicted 80% of banks 
which became capital inadequate, while a more complex logit model with 16 variables performed 
poorly, with a predictive ability of around 25% only.   
 
Global Applications : Cihak and Schaeck (2007), the authors examine aggregate banking system 
ratios during systemic banking crises across a wide cross-country global dataset of 100 developed 
and developing countries, between 1994 to 2004 for 13 explanatory variables comprising regulatory 
capital, asset quality and profitability. The authors also include two measures for the nonbank 
corporate sector, profitability and leverage. Their results confirm the importance of return on equity 
of banks for the detection of systemic banking problems. 
 
Table 3.6 presents an analysis of variables selected by earlier papers and some of the related 
weaknesses/ issues associated with their selection. 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3.6: Data Sources, Variables and Weaknesses for Selected Key Papers 
 
 
 
Paper Data Years Countries & Variables Sources Weaknesses
Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) 1990 to 2008
EU countries, CAMELs based 
indicators. Bankscope Database, data on 5,708 banks. News Plus/ Factivia.
Comparability of accounts 
only feasible at global 
summary levels, limited 
country application.
Tieman & Maechler (2009) 1991 to 2007
Seven developed countries, 
high frequency/quarterly data 
on banks distance-to-default, 
system-wide DD based on 
Datastream banking index, 
asset weighted system wide 
DD index. Credit growth and 
GDP growth. Naitonal data, Datastream, KMV.
Limited analyses to a small 
sub-group of countries and 
banks within each country.
Rose & Spiegel (2009) 2003 to 2008
112 countries, Change in Real 
GDP, stock market indices, 
country credit ratings, 
exchange rates. Another sixty 
National data, EIU, Euromoney, Institutional Investor, IMF, IFS, 
Economic Freedom of the World Dataset, Barth, Caprio & Levine, 
World Bank Global Development Finance, BIS. 
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Borio & Drehmann (2009) 1980 to 2003
94 countries, credit, equity & 
property price gaps from long 
term trends.
National data for each country, author's calculations. Crises 
definition: 1: Countries where the government had to inject capital 
in more than one large bank
and/or more than one large bank failed (seven crises). Crisis 
definition 2: Countries that undertook at least
two of the following policy operations: issue wholesale guarantees; 
buy assets; inject capital into at least
one large bank or announce a large-scale recapitalisation 
programme (14 crises). Signals are assessed
over a three-year horizon.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Davis & Karim (2008) 1979 to 2003
105 countries, real GDP 
growth, real interest rates, real 
GDP per capita, budget deficit, 
private credit/GDP, inflation, 
fiscal deficit/GDP
National data, Datastream, Caprio & Klingebiel and Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache dependent crisis variable definitions.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points.
Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) 1350 to 2007
100+ countries. Various macro-
variables, including inflation, 
real GDP growth, public debt, 
currency exchange rates.
National data, IFS, WEO, Global Financial Data (GFD), Oxford Latin 
American History Database, European State Finance Database, IMF, 
UN, World Bank, national statistical yearbooks.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Cihak & Schaek (2007) 1994 to 2004
100+ countries. Regulatory 
capital, asset quality and 
profitability. Nonbank 
corporte sector profitability 
and leverage. GDP growth, 
inflation, real interest rates 
and GDP per capita.
Data on 2,600 banks, Bankscope. World Development Indicators, La 
Porta et al, 2000.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points.
Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache (2005) 1980 to 2003
94 countries, real GDP growth, 
real interest rates, real GDp 
per capita, budget deficit, 
private credit/GDP
Dependent Crises Dummy: 1998 list updated by the authors using 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) and IMF country reports. Macro-
variables: World Development Indicators (WDI) and International 
Finance Statistics (IFS)
Missing data points in earlier 
years.
Caprio & Klingebiel (1996, 2003) 1970 to 2002
117 countries, banking sector 
capital exhaustion, real credit 
and real GDP growth.
National data for each country, World Bank data (FSR & interviews 
with country specialists), IMF International Finance Statistics, The 
Economist, FT, author's calculations. Depenedent variable author's 
definition.
Standardization, 
comparability, subjectivity/ 
expert opinion in 'calling' 
crises & missing data points - 
author's own crises 
definitions.
Kaminsky & Reinhart (1998, 1999) 1970 to 1995
20 countries, real exchange 
rate appreciation, equity 
prices, money multiplier. IFS, OECD data, IFC stock market indices (now S&P index suite).
Standardization, 
comparability, subjectivity/ 
expert opinion in 'calling' 
crises & missing data points - 
author's own crises 
definitions.
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Table 3.6: Data Sources, Variables and Weaknesses for Selected Key Papers - Continued 
 
 
Sources: Please refer to the references section. 
 
Paper Data Years Countries & Variables Sources Weaknesses
Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) 1990 to 2008
EU countries, CAMELs based 
indicators. Bankscope Database, data on 5,708 banks. News Plus/ Factivia.
Comparability of accounts 
only feasible at global 
summary levels, limited 
country application.
Tieman & Maechler (2009) 1991 to 2007
Seven developed countries, 
high frequency/quarterly data 
on banks distance-to-default, 
system-wide DD based on 
Datastream banking index, 
asset weighted system wide 
DD index. Credit growth and 
GDP growth. Naitonal data, Datastream, KMV.
Limited analyses to a small 
sub-group of countries and 
banks within each country.
Rose & Spiegel (2009) 2003 to 2008
112 countries, Change in Real 
GDP, stock market indices, 
country credit ratings, 
exchange rates. Another sixty 
National data, EIU, Euromoney, Institutional Investor, IMF, IFS, 
Economic Freedom of the World Dataset, Barth, Caprio & Levine, 
World Bank Global Development Finance, BIS. 
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Borio & Drehmann (2009) 1980 to 2003
94 countries, credit, equity & 
property price gaps from long 
term trends.
National data for each country, author's calculations. Crises 
definition: 1: Countries where the government had to inject capital 
in more than one large bank
and/or more than one large bank failed (seven crises). Crisis 
definition 2: Countries that undertook at least
two of the following policy operations: issue wholesale guarantees; 
buy assets; inject capital into at least
one large bank or announce a large-scale recapitalisation 
programme (14 crises). Signals are assessed
over a three-year horizon.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Davis & Karim (2008) 1979 to 2003
105 countries, real GDP 
growth, real interest rates, real 
GDP per capita, budget deficit, 
private credit/GDP, inflation, 
fiscal deficit/GDP
National data, Datastream, Caprio & Klingebiel and Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache dependent crisis variable definitions.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points.
Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) 1350 to 2007
100+ countries. Various macro-
variables, including inflation, 
real GDP growth, public debt, 
currency exchange rates.
National data, IFS, WEO, Global Financial Data (GFD), Oxford Latin 
American History Database, European State Finance Database, IMF, 
UN, World Bank, national statistical yearbooks.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Cihak & Schaek (2007) 1994 to 2004
100+ countries. Regulatory 
capital, asset quality and 
profitability. Nonbank 
corporte sector profitability 
and leverage. GDP growth, 
inflation, real interest rates 
and GDP per capita.
Data on 2,600 banks, Bankscope. World Development Indicators, La 
Porta et al, 2000.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points.
Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache (2005) 1980 to 2003
94 countries, real GDP growth, 
real interest rates, real GDp 
per capita, budget deficit, 
private credit/GDP
Dependent Crises Dummy: 1998 list updated by the authors using 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) and IMF country reports. Macro-
variables: World Development Indicators (WDI) and International 
Finance Statistics (IFS)
Missing data points in earlier 
years.
Caprio & Klingebiel (1996, 2003) 1970 to 2002
117 countries, banking sector 
capital exhaustion, real credit 
and real GDP growth.
National data for each country, World Bank data (FSR & interviews 
with country specialists), IMF International Finance Statistics, The 
Economist, FT, author's calculations. Depenedent variable author's 
definition.
Standardization, 
comparability, subjectivity/ 
expert opinion in 'calling' 
crises & missing data points - 
author's own crises 
definitions.
Kaminsky & Reinhart (1998, 1999) 1970 to 1995
20 countries, real exchange 
rate appreciation, equity 
prices, money multiplier. IFS, OECD data, IFC stock market indices (now S&P index suite).
Standardization, 
comparability, subjectivity/ 
expert opinion in 'calling' 
crises & missing data points - 
author's own crises 
definitions.
Paper Data Years Countries & Variables Sources Weaknesses
Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) 1990 to 2008
EU countries, CAMELs based 
indicators. Bankscope Database, data on 5,708 banks. News Plus/ Factivia.
Comparability of accounts 
only feasible at global 
summary levels, limited 
country application.
Tieman & Maechler (2009) 1991 to 2007
Seven developed countries, 
high frequency/quarterly data 
on banks distance-to-default, 
system-wide DD based on 
Datastream banking index, 
asset weighted system wide 
DD index. Credit growth and 
GDP growth. Naitonal data, Datastream, KMV.
Limited analyses to a small 
sub-group of countries and 
banks within each country.
Rose & Spiegel (2009) 2003 to 2008
112 countries, Change in Real 
GDP, stock market indices, 
country credit ratings, 
exchange rates. Another sixty 
National data, EIU, Euromoney, Institutional Investor, IMF, IFS, 
Economic Freedom of the World Dataset, Barth, Caprio & Levine, 
World Bank Global Development Finance, BIS. 
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Borio & Drehmann (2009) 1980 to 2003
94 countries, credit, equity & 
property price gaps from long 
term trends.
National data for each country, author's calculations. Crises 
definition: 1: Countries where the government had to inject capital 
in more than one large bank
and/or more than one large bank failed (seven crises). Crisis 
definition 2: Countries that undertook at least
two of the following policy operations: issue wholesale guarantees; 
buy assets; inject capital into at least
one large bank or announce a large-scale recapitalisation 
programme (14 crises). Signals are assessed
over a three-year horizon.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Davis & Karim (2008) 1979 to 2003
105 countries, real GDP 
growth, real interest rates, real 
GDP per capita, budget deficit, 
private credit/GDP, inflation, 
fiscal deficit/GDP
National data, Datastream, Caprio & Klingebiel and Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache dependent crisis variable definitions.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points.
Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) 1350 to 2007
100+ countries. Various macro-
variables, including inflation, 
real GDP growth, public debt, 
currency exchange rates.
National data, IFS, WEO, Global Financial Data (GFD), Oxford Latin 
Americ n History D tabase, European State Fin nce Databa e, IMF, 
UN, World Bank, n tional statistical yearbooks.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points. 
Author's own crises 
definitions.
Cihak & Schaek (2007) 1994 to 2004
100+ countries. Regulatory 
capital, asset quality and 
profitability. Nonbank 
corporte sector profitability 
and leverage. GDP growth, 
inflation, real interest r es 
and GDP per capita.
Data on 2,600 banks, Bankscope. World D velopment Indicators, La 
Porta et al, 2000.
Standardization, comparability 
& missing data points.
Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache (2005) 1980 to 2003
94 countries, real GDP growth, 
real interest rates, real GDp 
per capita, budget deficit, 
private credit/GDP
Dependent Crises Dummy: 1998 list upd ted by the authors using 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) and IMF country reports. Macro-
variables: World Development Indicators (WDI) and International 
Finance Statistics (IFS)
Missing data points in earlier 
years.
Caprio & Klingebiel (1996, 2003) 1970 to 2002
117 countries, banking sector 
capital exhaustion, real credit 
and real GDP growth.
N tional data for each country, World Ba k data (FSR & interviews 
with coun ry pecialists), IMF International Finance Statistics, The 
Economist, FT, author's calculations. Depenedent variable author's 
definition.
Standardization, 
co parability, subjectivity/ 
expert opinion in 'calling' 
crises & missing data points - 
author's own crises 
definitions.
Kaminsky & Reinhart (1998, 1999) 1970 to 1995
20 countries, real exchange 
rate appreciation, equity 
prices, money multiplier. IFS, OECD data, IFC stock market indices (now S&P index suite).
Standardization, 
comparability, subjectivity/ 
expert opinion in 'calling' 
crises & missing data points - 
author's own crises 
definitions.
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4.  Chapter Four: Signal Extraction Application 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The recent crisis highlighted the failure of former early warning signals models. For example, using 
a sample of 105 countries, covering the years 1979 to 2003, Davis and Karim (2008) apply macro 
EWS models, using signal extraction, Logit and binary recursive tree methodologies, to US and UK 
data to test for out-of-sample performance (whether a crisis was correctly called) from 2000 – 2007. 
They find that for the US, both models fail miserably with a probability of a crisis occurring in 2007 
of 1% for the Logit model and 0.6% for the binary tree model. For the UK, the results were similar, 
with the Logit probability of a crisis at 3.4% in 2007 and 0.6% for the binary tree model. This paper 
attributes this failure partly to dependent variable and independent variable specification and model 
empirical design, all three areas which we attempt to improve on.  
 
Commonly used dependent variable specifications in the past are ex-post measures of the cost of 
crises in the form of direct bailout funds or indirect GDP losses compared to its previous growth 
trajectory (Davis and Karim 2003). Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) find bailouts cost on average 10% 
of GDP, with some crises much more damaging like the Mexican Tequila Crisis (1994) which cost 
20% of GDP, and the Jamaican crisis (1996) which cost 37% of GDP. According to the IMF, the 
past crisis of 2007 - 2010 had cumulative (indirect) output losses over 2008-2010 estimated at 
around 5% of global output (this amounts to around USD10.2 trillion if we apply the rate to IMF 
global output estimates), while direct bailout measures by governments have almost tallied a similar 
figure and direct write-downs by agents tallied some USD3.4 trillion. These collectively are 
equivalent to 40% of global GDP in 2010. 
 
However, given that there is a substantial body of literature that highlights the linkage between the 
build-up of financial fragility and crises, this motivated our research into the precursor to crises, 
namely the build-up of financial vulnerabilities. In their book Crisis Economics Roubini and Mihm 
(2010) consistently highlight the linkage between financial fragility, the build up of imbalances and 
systemic financial crises and conclude that financial crises would not result in system wide distress 
in the absence of financial fragility. While Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) and Jagtiani, Kolari, 
Lemieux and Shin (2003) prove that low capital adequacy and a fragile banking sector is a leading 
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indicator of banking distress, signaling a high likelihood of near-term bank failure. Furthermore, 
Cihak and Shaeck (2007) confirm the importance of bank profitability for the detection of systemic 
banking problems. Therefore, a dependent variable specification which focuses on ex-ante 
prediction, on banking sector fragility, as measured by capital adequacy and banking sector 
profitability was intuitive to us. As a measure it is also both necessary and sufficient for the 
prediction of full- fledged crises, but not vice versa. This dependent variable could be viewed as a 
near crisis. By focusing on near crises, the model is calibrated to detect a pre-crisis and in turn would 
give policy makers more lead time to avert or at least minimize crises costs. This way the EWS 
would be credible and usable by policy makers, and thus effective. Also the specification of the 
dependent variable to signal near-crises, means that a lot of data which was not previously utilized in 
an EWS analysis will now be taken into account. 
 
Focusing on independent variable specifications, these evolved in earlier literature over three 
generations of thought. The first generation (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, is an example) was 
based on macro weaknesses and relied on macro-economic indicators as explanatory variables such 
as real GDP growth, real exchange rates, current account balance, inflation, etc. Second generation 
was based on self-fulfilling prophecies and herding behavior using explanatory variables such as 
changes in real interest rates or changes in interest rate spreads which could signal changes in agent 
expectations. These include work by Flood and Garber (1984) and Obstfeld (1986), and Claessens 
(1991). Finally, third generation such as Krugman (1999), Bris and Koskinen (2000) and Cabellero 
and Krishnamurthy (2000) was based on contagion and spill-overs from other countries or markets 
which used explanatory variables such as changes in capital flows, changes in trade flows, in 
addition to other variables. Thus, independent variable use spanned across macro factors, micro 
factors, a combination of both, on an endogenous and exogenous level as the case may be.  
 
The choice of independent variables for this paper was as such guided to include exogenous and 
endogenous variables representative of all three schools and across all the different classifications. 
We look at real GDP growth, banking sector asset growth, the level of banking sector assets to GDP, 
development of asset price bubble indicators (a house price indicator and an equity capital markets 
indicator), a dividend yield indicator as a proxy for the health of the corporate sector, a banking 
sector liquidity indicator and a banking sector funding indicator as micro structural indicators for the 
industry, and a pension funds to GDP indicator as a proxy for the development of liquidity bubbles. 
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The specific empirical model designs used to predict crises fall into four categories: i) signals 
models; ii) logit/probit models; iii) Merton type models; and a less used class of models, iv) Binary 
recursive trees. In this paper we use a signal extraction methodology. Predominantly in earlier 
literature such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Alessi and Detken 2008, the structure of the 
signal extraction model was based on a static threshold chosen for each independent variable 
determined on the basis of minimizing Type I and Type II errors in-sample for this variable or in 
other words minimizing the Noise-To-Signal Ratio (NTSR - which itself is another way of 
summarizing a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors) and assessing the probability of a crisis 
conditional a signal being issued. This paper improves on empirical design substantially with the 
choice of variable thresholds no longer static, but rather dynamic in the form of standard deviations 
from a chosen metric which in this case has been chosen as a long-run mean for a variable (this is 
somewhat similar to Borio and Drehmann (2009) who use gap analysis from a long term trend but 
for only two independent variables). By shifting the analysis to focus on standard deviations as 
opposed to absolute values, this model focuses on capturing volatility in a chosen variable, rather 
than thresholds chosen on the basis of output of a certain data period. This means that the model 
design as such is usable in different time periods and different states of the world.  
 
One of the problems with earlier models is that repeated exercises for different time periods always 
resulted in different performance of a fixed set of indicator variables. This is because causes for 
crises change over time and also because static thresholds chosen for each variable to signal a crisis 
are by default linked to whichever data period they were calibrated to. This explains why in-sample 
performance of these models was much better than out-of-sample and why the old models failed to 
predict the last crisis. The design of our model to read deviations from a chosen benchmark means 
that the chosen variables are valid for the data period for which the model was designed and for 
other data periods as well. Thus, improving on out-of-sample performance, another major weakness 
in earlier models.  
 
The results of this paper using a signal extraction methodology for the set of 30 OECD countries 
over a 30 year period show a number of variables to be significant in predicting near-crises. These 
include growth in pension assets (significant at the 5% level for the base case), an indicator for the 
development of liquidity bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. While equity market 
dividend yield was significant at the 10% level for the base case. This is a proxy for corporate 
balance sheet health on the premise that companies usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking 
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order hypothesis as free cash flows to equity shareholders, after debt service, are available. Banking 
sector assets growth was also significant at the 10% significance level for the base case, indicating a 
strong relationship between the rapid growth of the banking sector and the development of 
vulnerabilities (positive coefficient). Micro banking sector funding and liquidity indicators also 
improve the overall predictive ability of the model. 
  
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of 
countries that vulnerabilities were building up. The best in-sample model for the base case, is the 3-
year rolling one standard deviation specification. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-
sample in terms of overall noise to signal ratios, with the range falling from 0.7 to 0.63 for the base 
case. Levels of Type I errors are also very low ranging from a high of 36% to a low of 0% - or no 
misses.  
 
This paper proposes that we should focus on minimizing Type I error as the optimal regulator 
objective function as this is the most conservative approach and it would ensure continuous action to 
ensure a sound system as such. Although Type II errors might be more, however if the regulator 
objective is clearly formulated to be ‘having a healthy financial system and continually correcting 
imbalances as they develop’, then this is what the model will achieve. This objective is equivalent to 
‘avoiding crises at all costs’.  
 
The best out-of-sample model for the base case is the 10-year rolling one standard deviation 
specification which results in a noise-to-signal ratio of 0.6 and a Type I error of 0%. These results 
show a significant improvement compared to earlier work, for example the median NTSR in Borio 
and Drehmann (2009) applied to the same period 2004 – 2008, is 0.67 over the three year forecast 
horizon and the median Type I error is 30%.  The outperformance also holds in comparison to 
KLR99, where Type I errors over a two year horizon range between 25% for the best individual 
indicator to 9% for the poorest individual indicator, whereas for this model, the corresponding figure 
is 4% to 0%. Using an adapted dependent variable specification for near crises has improved the 
performance of the model in terms of minimizing Type I errors over a three year period and NTSR 
out-of-sample. Furthermore out-of-sample performance, because of the dynamic set up of this 
model, is better than in-sample performance, a major improvement to previously existing models 
which worked well in-sample, but performed poorly out-of-sample as indicated by Davis and Karim 
(2008).  
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The structure of the Signal Extraction chapter is as follows: Section 4.2. Literature Review; 4.3 
Empirical Model design; 4.4. Data and descriptive statistics; 4.5. Dependent and explanatory 
variables; Section 4.6. Preliminary empirical findings; Section 4.7. Near-Crises forecasts and model 
performance evaluation; and Section 4.8. Concludes the signal extraction application.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
The signals approach was originally developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), focusing on ‘twin 
crises’ phenomenon, simultaneous occurrence of currency and banking crises. A wide body of 
literature has utilized signals models for predicting exchange rate crises on the basis of inconsistent 
macro policies or the development of macro weaknesses (first generation models) and has developed 
further to second generation models where speculative attacks with self-fulfilling prophecies or 
herding behavior both playing a large role in causing crises. A third generation of models of external 
crisis using the signaling approach were developed by Krugman (1999), Bris and Koskinen (2000) 
and Cabellero and Krishnamurthy (2000) based on the notion of 'contagion' where the occurrence of 
a crisis in one country or region increases the likelihood of a similar crisis elsewhere. As illustrated 
by Masson (1998), three related contagion channels can be identified to represent this paradigm: 
'monsoonal trade effects', 'spill over effects' and 'pure contagion effects'. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 
(1996) explore a methodology for analyzing crises that focuses on the depth rather than the 
likelihood of the crisis using a crisis index.   
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) documented the incidence of both currency and banking and twin 
crises in a sample of 20 industrial and emerging countries, where crises are identified based on an 
index of market turbulence developed by Eichengreen et al (1995). However, because the sample 
was chosen to include only countries with fixed or heavily managed exchange rates which are 
usually more prone to currency crashes than other countries, the impact of exchange rate on banking 
crises may have been overemphasized. They describe the behavior of fifteen macroeconomic 
variables in the 24 months period preceding and following a crisis compared to non-crisis times. A 
variable is deemed to signal a crisis any time it crosses a certain threshold. If the signal is then 
followed by a crisis in the following 24 months, it is viewed as correct, otherwise a false alarm.   
 
Thresholds were chosen to minimize the in-sample noise-to-signal ratio. The performance of each 
signal is evaluated based on three criteria: i) associated Type I and Type II error (probability of 
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missing a crisis and probability of a false signal, respectively); ii) the noise-to-signal ratio (hereafter 
NTSR); and iii) the probability of a crisis occurring conditional on a signal being issued. The main 
findings of this paper were that problems in the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis, a 
currency crisis deepens the banking crisis and financial liberalization usually precedes banking 
crises. The evolution of these crises also suggests that crises occur as the economy enters a 
recession, following a prolonged boom in economic activity fuelled by credit, capital inflows at a 
time of currency overvaluation.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Detailed Review of Signal Extraction Selected Papers 
Authors Year Data Factors and Main Findings 
Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 
1998, 
1999 
20 countries, identifying 76 
episodes of currency crises 
and 26 banking crises, of 
these 18 episodes are twin 
crises, 1970-1995. 
Find that these three factors are the 
most influential 
 Real exchange rate 
appreciation 
 Equity prices 
 Money multiplier 
However, they have a large Type I 
error, failing to issue a signal in 27%-
21% of the observations during the 24 
months preceding the crisis for twin 
crises and 12 months for banking 
crises. 
 
Alessi and 
Detken  
 
2008 
 
1970 – 2007, 18 OECD 
countries. 
 
Propose 18 real-time and financial 
indicators for costly asset price booms 
and find some specifications would 
have issued persistent warning signals 
prior to the current crisis. The most 
robust indicators were: global private 
credit, long term nominal bond yield, 
housing investment, short-term 
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nominal interest rate, real equity price 
index and real GDP.  
 
Borio, 
Drehmann 
2009 1980-2003 and test out of 
sample 2004 – 2008 
Test the behavior of credit and asset 
prices (equity and property using gaps 
from a long-term trend) in the 
prediction of financial crises both in-
sample and out-of-sample, with low 
noise-to-signal ratios over 1 and 3 year 
horizons. 
Sources: As listed above. 
 
 
4.3. Empirical Model Design 
Methodology 
The indicators are based on a signal extraction method, for each period, t, a signal, S, is calculated 
which takes the value of 1 (“on”) if indicator variables exceed critical thresholds or is 0 (“off”) 
otherwise. For a signal to be issued, critical thresholds which were usually calibrated statically have 
to be breached and aggregating the information issued by different indicators was a challenge. In 
line with Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) (1999), who were the creators of this 
methodology, among others and a later application by Borio and Drehmann (2009), we modify this 
approach by choosing dynamic thresholds measured in standard deviations to a benchmark and a 
signal monitor which summarizes the model output. 
 
The decision rule for whether a variable is ‘on’, i.e. is a ‘1’ or is ‘off’, i.e. is ‘0’, for our chosen 
explanatory variables is based on whether it is a certain number of standard deviations away from a 
chosen benchmark. The benchmark was calculated for three cases as the mean of a 3-year, 5-year 
and 10-year period of the variable in question. These ‘0’ and ‘1’ indicators for each independent 
variable and for each case are then summarized using the ‘SIGNAL MONITOR’ for each country 
for each year and is currently calibrated to read ‘1’ or is ‘On’ if two of the nine variables modeled 
are ‘On’. Thus, the crisis prediction process is on two levels: predicting aberrations in the individual 
variables by being too ‘far’ from a rolling mean, and then ‘translating’ or ‘summarizing’ this into a 
crisis predictor.  
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The use of standard deviations from a mean is an innovation partly inspired by Borio and 
Drehmann’s (2009) gap analysis, but with methodological changes in the number of variables and 
how the output is summarized and evaluated. The selection of the number of standard deviations that 
turns the fluctuation in an economic time series into a signal is subject to a trade-off. If the cut-off is 
chosen too ‘tight’ (a small number of standard deviations) it is likely to signal a lot of crises, 
including false ones. This compares to KLR where a low absolute threshold is chosen that would 
increase the number of false signals, i.e. result in Type II errors. On the other hand, if the threshold 
is too high, or set at a large number of standard deviations, it would result in Type I errors, missing a 
crisis when there is one in the making. This compares to KLR where a high absolute threshold was 
chosen. 
 
There is no consensus approach to choosing the size of a threshold. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), 
choose the size of the optimal threshold for each variable by selecting the value that minimizes the 
in-sample noise-to-signal ratio, ω, that is computed in their application as follows: 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
Where α is the size of the type I error and β is the size of the type II error, and where both are 
functions of the chosen variable threshold. The NTSR calculation for this paper is calculated in the 
same way, with the difference that now both are functions of the chosen deviation threshold. 
 
4.4. Dependent and Explanatory Variables  
4.4.1 Dependent Variable 
This paper uses an adapted definition focusing on near-crises, where each country is identified as 
having a near-crisis or not based on a composite indicator of the solvency and profitability of the 
banking sector and changes in both thereof. By using this definition of near-crises as opposed to an 
ex-post metric of losses as a percentage of GDP or NPL levels which identify crises at a stage which 
is too late for policy makers to take any action to actually prevent a crisis – this adapted near-crisis 
definition would by default lead to a longer lead period for the signals issued as they will point to 
imbalance and/or fragility build-up. 
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Dependent Variable Specification, Unbundling and Calibrations 
  
The dependent variable designed to capture changes to bank solvency and profitability or periods of 
‘near-crisis is composed of four components as follows: 
1. For any given year for any country, if it saw a decrease in its banking sector capitalization of 
more than a certain number of basis points (delta banking sector capitalization as measured 
by capital/total assets); 
 
2. Or an increase in its banking sector capitalization of more than a certain number of basis 
points* (delta banking sector capitalization as measured by capital/total assets); 
 
3. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet falls by more 
than a number of basis points (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); 
 
4. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet is less than a 
certain number of basis points; 
this country is deemed to be facing a near-crisis or a period of heightened fragility.  
 
The reason the profitability metrics were included as separate components, is to capture any over 
statement of capital or hidden non-performing loans. If these two metrics are really poor, while the 
former two seem robust, then we could potentially be faced with an inflated balance sheet or capital 
base or both. 
Notes 
*The use of component two as part of the dependent variable specification was tested separately as 
an explanatory variable based on the intuition that banks would potentially increase their capital ex-
ante in anticipation of taking on more risk in future. However, when calibrated as such the model 
performance for the 12 unbundled runs (3 cases plus one consolidated times 3 dependent variable 
specifications unbundled) deteriorated drastically across the board. Which led to another potential 
reasoning, which is that banks increase capital only if they know they have already taken on more 
risk, so this is a ‘post’ or dependent variable. This variable proxies the asymmetry in ‘realizing’ the 
impact of increased risk explicitly on the assets side (i.e. that ‘booking’ the risk happens with a lag 
after the action of risk taking has occurred). The increase in capital/total assets is then the mirror 
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image to the decrease metric, where the assets  are booked and capital is catching up. I am grateful to 
Professors Alistair Milne and Steve Thomas of Cass Business School for their comments on this 
particular point.   
 
Three cases were considered for the dependent variable calibration as follows:  
 
1. Base Case: changes in banking sector capitalization of more than 0.5% (delta banking sector 
capitalization); net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet falls by 
50 bps (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); or net income before provisions as 
a percentage of average balance sheet is less than 5 bps (0.05% absolute threshold), a country 
is deemed to be facing a banking near-crisis.   
2. High Change Dynamic Threshold: changes in banking sector capitalization of more than 
1.0% (delta banking sector capitalization); net income before provisions as a percentage of 
average balance sheet falls by 100 bps (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); or 
net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet is less than 10 bps 
(0.10% absolute threshold), a country is deemed to be facing a banking near-crisis. 
3. Low Change Dynamic Threshold: changes in banking sector capitalization of more than 
0.10% (delta banking sector capitalization); net income before provisions as a percentage of 
average balance sheet falls by 10 bps (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); or 
net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet is less than 1 bps 
(0.01% absolute threshold), a country is deemed to be facing a banking near-crisis. This is 
explained more in details in the following Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Unbundled Dependent Variable Near-Crises Definition by Criteria  
 
*Case calibration is for rules 1 through 4 in order. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
As table 4.2 shows, for the base case, the most dominant factor is banking capitalization in line with 
earlier literature, with 206 out of 232 near crisis observations being captured by this. The other two 
factors which look at the link between income statement returns and the balance sheet capture only 
55 out of the 232 near crisis. This is because if a bank is realizing poor or negative returns it should 
have already been liquidated or merged – so these criteria capture the ‘zombies’ still in the system so 
to speak, which by default should be very few. Please note that there were 29 incidences where more 
than one criterion captured a near crisis and the double counting was eliminated.  
 
The use of profitability metrics is to capture any ‘hidden’ factors in asset quality or bank operations, 
which are not evident on the surface just looking at solvency, but are manifested in very low and/or 
sizable drops in profitability. The duration of a near-crisis is one year/ each vulnerability spot is 
viewed separately.  
 
The High Change Dynamic Threshold and the Low Change Dynamic Threshold scenarios both show 
very low incidence (15%) and very high incidence (59%), of systemic crises respectively and 
resulted in poorly performing models for the 12 runs when tested.  
 
No. Criteria High Change Dynamic Threshold Base Case Low Change Dynamic Threshold
100 bps, 100 bps, -100, and 10 bps 50 bps, 50 bps, -50bps and 5 bps 10 bps, 10 bps, -10bps and 1 bps
1 Decrease in banking sector capitalization 45 91 222
2 Increase in banking sector capitalization 62 115 265
3
Net Income before provisions/Average 
Balance sheet falls 12 36 131
4
Net Income before provisions/Average 
Balance sheet is less than 18 19 22
Sub-total 137 261 640
Less Double counting between the four rules 10 29 131
Net 127 232 509
% of Total Observations 15% 27% 59%
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The number of near-crises for the base case, by country and year are 232 observations out of 870 or 
27% as per the following Table 4.3. The new model proposed identifies a greater number of near-
crisis as compared to full fledged crises identified in earlier literature (which amounted to only 15% 
of total observations). This makes sense given that not all near-crises would necessarily grow to 
become crises. But from the perspective of a regulator, this paper puts forward the argument that 
regulators should always be concerned with predicting the near crises and working on the conditions 
within their purview to prevent them from developing into crises. 
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Table 4.3: Dependent Variable Near-Crises Identified for OECD Countries (1980 – 2007)- Base Case* 
*As per the rules explained. Source: Author’s calculation. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
1 Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 8
2 Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
3 Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
4 Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 14
6 Denmark 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 13
7 Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 12
8 France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
9 Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
11 Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7
12 Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 22
13 Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 5
14 Italy 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
15 Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 10
16 Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 11
17 Luxembourg 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
18 Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 6
19 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
20 Norway 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
21 New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 9
22 Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 7
23 Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 6
24 Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 10
25 Spain 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9
26 Sweden 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 12
27 Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
28 Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
29 UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 6
30 US 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
Total 3 2 3 6 5 3 5 3 7 3 8 9 8 15 9 8 10 11 8 11 11 8 14 10 12 11 15 14 232
Total Observations 870
% Crises 27%
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The advantage of this definition of near-crises over previous literature is that we gain at least a 
couple of years by doing this based on the underlying assumption that a well capitalized and 
profitable banking sector can better withstand any shock. Also this way the EWS has a pre-emptive 
built in component because it will always ensure a minimum level of ‘sector health’ as it 
continuously corrects for near-crises.   
 
The correlation between the predicted total near crises by country in the base case model and full-
fledged crises in earlier literature is very high at 0.98, which supports the premise on which the new 
dependent variable specification was designed. While Table 4.4, presents the binary (logit) 
regression output between the definition of crises in earlier literature and the new definition 
presented in the base case. This shows near-crises as predicting ‘crises’ with a coefficient of 0.61, 
significant at the 1% level. The model’s MacFadden’s R2 is quite low however, at only 1% and the 
residuals suffer from heteroskedasticity with kurtosis at 4.4 (normal distribution at around 3).  Thus 
this relationship could be further investigated in future research. 
 
Table 4.4: Relationship between ‘Crisis’ Definitions in Earlier Literature and near crises OECD 
Countries (1980 – 2007) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Z-Statistic Probability 
C -1.858582 0.118728 -15.65417 0.0000 
NEAR_CRISES 0.616869 0.197187 3.128350 0.0018 
     
McFadden’s R-Squared 0.012818  Mean Dependent Var 0.159524 
S.D dependent Var 0.366382  S.E. of regression 0.364416 
Akaike info criterion 0.871269  Sum squared resid 111.2856 
Schwarz criterion 0.882539  Log Likelihood -363.9331 
Hannan-Quinn criter 0.875589  Prob (LR statistic) 0.002110 
LR statistic 9.451245    
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
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4.4.2 The explanatory variables 
 
Based on analysis of earlier literature and fundamental analysis, narrowing down the universe to the 
data set which is available for the 30 year period under study- from a long list of 30 variables, nine 
were chosen after an iterative process that proved they are significant in ‘explaining’ the dependent 
near crisis variable in an OLS model. These nine variables and their definitions are presented in the 
following table. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Explanatory Variables, Definitions and Sources 
Acronym Variable Explanation / Rationale for Use    Data Source 
BAG Banking 
Sector 
Asset 
Growth 
(BAG)  
The faster the growth of banking sector 
assets, the more vulnerable the system 
could become as the quality of lending 
decisions is affected. (Expected sign: 
Positive) 
OECD database, 
growth 
calculated YoY, 
end of year 
balance. 
BAGDP Banking 
Sector 
Assets to 
GDP 
(BAGDP) 
The greater the proportion of banking 
sector assets to GDP, the more vulnerable 
the financial system is to any shock in the 
sector. (Expected sign: Positive) 
Banking Sector 
Assets as above, 
Nominal GDP 
from IMF WEO 
database. 
HPI 
House Price 
Indicator 
(HPI) 
The greater the appreciation in house 
prices, the more likely asset bubbles are to 
develop and the more likely this would 
negatively impact the financial sector. 
(Expected sign: Positive or negative 
depending on the impact on agents and 
initial conditions) 
OECD database, 
real appreciation 
in house prices 
YoY. 
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PENS 
Pension 
Fund Assets 
to GDP 
(PENS) 
Pension funds are large liquidity providers 
in their markets, therefore the changes in 
how much they hold as a percentage of 
GDP indicate how much liquidity they are 
providing to the system. Increases could 
result in more funds poured into the stock 
markets and real estate (contributing to 
crises by bubble development) and drops 
could mean sale of these assets 
contributing to bubble deflation and losses 
by other agents, resulting in crises if 
substantial.    
(Expected sign: Positive or Negative 
depending on which economic agents are 
affected and initial conditions). 
OECD database, 
pension assets as 
a % of GDP. 
EMKTDY 
Equity 
Capital 
Markets 
Dividend 
Yield 
(EMKTDY) 
This is a proxy for corporate leverage, in 
most cases, companies only increase their 
dividend when they have free cash flows 
to equity shareholders, after they have 
made their debt service and interest 
repayments from free cash flows to the 
firm as a whole. Rising dividend yields 
should indicate healthier corporate balance 
sheets, and lower crisis probability. 
(Expected sign: Negative) 
World 
Federation of 
Stock 
Exchanges 
(WFE) 
EMI 
Equity 
Market 
Index 
(EMI) 
This is a proxy for stock market 
appreciation, with an expected positive 
sign. The more price appreciation, the 
greater the possibility that a bubble could 
be forming. 
World 
Federation of 
Stock 
Exchanges 
(WFE) 
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DRGDP 
Change in 
Real GDP 
(DRGDP) 
Growth in real GDP provides agents with 
the conditions in which they can flourish, 
build their balance sheets and retained 
earnings from higher profits, it results in a 
boost in capital investment. However, 
growth in real GDP could also result in the 
development of credit and asset price 
bubbles, thus depending on a country’s 
position in the cycle, it can affect the 
probability of a crisis arising in either way. 
 
Expected sign: Positive or Negative. 
WEO database. 
LIQ 
Liquidity 
Indicator 
The proportion of securities to total assets 
held by the financial system as a whole 
indicates the availability of short term 
liquidity in the system in the time of crisis. 
If there is too much liquidity, it could 
trigger the development of bubbles. If 
there is too little liquidity, this may lead to 
solvency issues. Expected sign: positive or 
negative. 
OECD database, 
authors’ 
calculation. 
FUN 
Funding 
Indicator 
The ratio of loans to deposits indicates 
how much of a banks’ loan books are 
funded by deposits, and how much are 
funded from external sources. The greater 
the proportion funded from external 
sources, the larger the banking system’s 
exposure to changes in market conditions. 
Expected sign: positive or negative 
(positive if above 100%, negative if less 
than 100%). 
OECD database, 
authors’ 
calculation. 
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Empirical OLS Model Used to Verify Choice of Variables 
These nine explanatory variables were used to estimate an OLS regression to verify their choice as 
components of the signal indicator, for each of the 30 countries. The models were compared by 
assessing: i) Information criterion (Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn); and ii) adjusted   .  The 
OLS regression model is as follows: 
Crisisi = C + aDRGDPi + bHPIi+ cMEMIi+cBAGi+dBAGDPi+ePENSi+fEMKTDYi+gLIQ+hFUN+ 
Ei 
 
The best model according to the criteria is presented in the table below.  
 
Table 4.6: Empirical OLS Model to Verify Choice of Variables 
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Stat Prob 
C -0.1641 0.4293 -0.3823 0.7034 
DRGDP 4.8779 4.6713 1.0442 0.3001 
HPI -1.0048 1.1245 -0.8897 0.3768 
DEMI 0.3799 0.3356 1.1321 0.2616 
CAB 0.9902 1.0886 0.9096 0.3663 
BAG 1.3807 0.7651 1.8056 0.0756 
BAGDP 0.0458 0.0449 1.0184 0.3121 
PENS -0.3243 0.1646 -1.9704 0.0529 
EMKTDY -4.5277 2.6076 -1.7363 0.0870 
LIQ 0.8912 1.3224 0.6739 0.5026 
FUN 0.0917 0.2322 0.3951 0.6940 
Observations 79    
R-Squared 27.2%    
Adjusted R-
Squared 
16.5%    
Prob (F-Stat) 1.1%    
Source: Authors Calculations. 
 
The model’s adjusted   , or its explanatory power adjusted for the number of variables incorporated 
is 16.5%, i.e. it explains 16.5% of the results. The overall significance of the model however, as 
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indicated by the F-Statistic is 1.1%, indicating the model is significant at the 1% level.  The model 
also provides the smallest information criteria values among the models estimated using various runs 
with different variable combinations from the universe of 30 possible independent variables.  
 
Growth in pension assets is positive and significant at the 5% level, and equity market dividend yield 
is positive and significant at the 10% level. The former is an indicator for the development of 
liquidity bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. The latter is a proxy for corporate balance 
sheet health on the premise that companies usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking order 
hypothesis, after meeting all other cash flow needs and when they believe the coming years will be 
better and also as excess free cash flows to equity shareholders, after debt service, are available. 
 
Banking sector assets growth is also significant at the 10% significance level, indicating a strong 
relationship between rapid growth of the banking sector and the development of vulnerabilities 
(positive coefficient). 
 
Other variables not significant at the 10% level but are included in the model as they have correct 
signs and help improve substantially the overall forecasting ability of the model are House Price 
Indicators, mean equity market price rises over a rolling period, a sector micro liquidity indicator 
and a sector micro funding indicator. 
 
4.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics of Country Universe 
 
OECD comprises: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, UK and the US. Collectively, these countries captured 75% of global nominal GDP in 2007 
(60% on a purchasing-power-parity adjusted basis) and had a total population of 1.2 billion, 18% of 
total global population, respectively. OECD data on banking activity is available for 30 years, back 
to 1979 for on-balance sheet activities. The data period spans 30 years from 1980 to 2009 with 9 
explanatory variables for the 30 OECD countries (this translates into approximately 8,000 
observations).  
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This data set is obtained from OECD, IMF, World Bank, World Federation of Exchanges and 
national central banks. In this sample there were 232 years of systemic vulnerabilities for the base 
case as per the definition explained earlier, out of 870 usable observations. Innovation and 
contribution to data sources includes the use of World Federation of Exchanges data on dividend 
yields as a proxy for corporate sector health and using data on fluctuations in pension assets which 
have not been used before in the literature. Table 3.6 shows the nine variables chosen for this paper 
and their descriptive statistics. It shows the mean growth in real GDP for OECD countries over the 
study period to be 2.9%, with a standard deviation of 2.7% and a slight skew to the left of 0.5 
(normal distribution skewness is approximately zero), and almost normal kurtosis, or no fat tails, 
with kurtosis at 3.46 (normal distribution is approximately three). 
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Table 4.7: Signal Extraction Data Descriptive Statistics* 
 
  
*Signal Monitor for the Base Case Dependent Variable Specification, 10 year - 1 SD calibration. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Acronym DRGDP HPI DEMI CAB BAG BAGDP PENS EMKTDY LIQ FUN SIGNAL Monitor
Long-Name
Delta Real GDP in 
%
House Price 
Indicator %
Delta Equity 
Market Index %
Current Account 
Balance %
Banking Sector 
Asset Growth
Banking Sector 
Assets to GDP
Pension Fund 
Assets to GDP
Equity Capital 
Markets 
Dividend Yield
Liquidity 
Indicator
Funding 
Indicator Signal Monitor
Definition
Change in Real 
GDP YoY
Real 
appreciation in 
House Prices YoY
Change in eqity 
capital markt 
index YoY
Current Account 
balance to GDP 
%
Change in 
banking sector 
assets YoY %
Banking Sector 
Assets to GDP %
Pension Fund 
Assets to GDP
Equity Capital 
Markets 
Dividend Yield %
Securities / T. 
Assets
Loans to 
Deposits Ratio
Model Output 
based on ex-
ante decision 
rule
No. Of Observations 825 246 691 811 613 649 243 287 481 481 840
Mean 2.87% 3.79% 18.83% -0.70% 13.03% 328.36% 36.18% 3.43% 18.65% 105.08% 34.29%
SD 2.7% 6.0% 45.0% 5.0% 15.3% 655.4% 45.9% 2.9% 6.5% 28.7% 47.5%
Skewness 0.5-                        0.4                        5.9                        0.2                        3.5                        3.5                        2.9                        4.0                        0.1                        0.6                        0.7                       
Kurtosis 3.5 0.7 57.0 1.7 16.1 11.1 19.2 20.8 -0.8 0.7 -1.6
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The mean of the signal monitor for the base case 10-year rolling mean, 1 SD specification, over the 
study period was 34.3% (i.e 30% of the time a signal was issued based on the decision rule for the 
current calibration of any two signals of the nine pointing to a crisis, this ‘Signal Monitor’ reads 1, 
otherwise it is 0). The standard deviation of the series is 47.5% and a skew to the right of 0.7 
(normal distribution skewness is approximately zero), and fat tails with kurtosis at negative 1.6 
(normal distribution is approximately three). These statistics endorse the use of the SIGNAL 
MONITOR as a summary indicator, because its resulting distribution is close to normal given a 
small skew and slightly negative kurtosis.  
 
4.6. Empirical Estimations 
 
Setting Up the Independent Variable Indicator Signals 
For each of the nine variables, a signal is issued if it crosses a threshold theta, Ɵ, which is defined in 
terms of number of standard deviations from a 3-year, 5-year and 10-year  rolling mean for that 
variable. 
 
    
           
                  
   
 
In the first run, Theta1,     is calibrated at one-standard deviation from a three year rolling mean. 
This is done for each variable, for each country, for each year. The following table below shows the 
calibration of Theta1 to Theta9:    ,    ,   ,   ,   ,   ,    ,   ,   . 
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Table 4.8: Signal Extraction Calibration of Signal Triggers for Nine Iterations 
Run Acronym Rolling Mean Period No. Of Standard Deviations (Signal 
Trigger) 
Theta1    3 Years One 
Theta2    3 Years Two 
Theta3    3 Years Three 
Theta4    5 Years One 
Theta5    5 Years Two 
Theta6    5 Years Three 
Theta7    10 Years One 
Theta8    10 Years Two 
Theta9    10 Years Three 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
 
These runs where replicated for each of the unbundled four component dependent variable 
calibrations, for a total of 144 iterations. Independent variable thresholds set at more than one 
standard deviation (i.e for Theta2 and Theta3, Theta5 and Theta6 and Theta8 and Theta9) resulted in 
almost no triggers. This means that if standard deviation is calculated on the basis of a volatile 
series, the signal is effectively ‘understated’ or ‘muted’, and an adjusted measure of standard 
deviation or an adjusted signal for volatile series should be investigated or alternatively the dynamic 
measure should be something other than standard deviation. 
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4.7. Forecasts and Model Performance 
 
4.7.1 Crisis Signal Forecasts 
Crisis signal forecasts for each of the 144 iterations is summarized based on the Signal Monitor, 
which is currently calibrated to forecast a crisis if two out of the nine indicators signal a crisis (other 
calibrations, whether they be linear, weighted could be adjusted to reflect the regulator’s views on 
contributors to fragility). In-sample forecasts are the reading of the Signal Monitor for the same year. 
Out of sample forecasts are the signal monitor reading of the year t-1.  
 
A summary is presented below in Table 4.9 which shows the outputs for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 
(  ,    and   ), by country, for the base case dependent variable scenario, using one standard 
deviation from a 3-year rolling mean, a 5-year rolling mean and a 10-year rolling mean, respectively. 
As can be seen, the output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
more than 20 countries, out-of-sample and in-sample, that vulnerabilities were building up. 
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Table 4.9: Signal Extraction Forecasts for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 (   ,    and   ) – Base Case Dependent Variable 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
No. Country 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
1 Australia 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Belgium 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
4 Canada 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
5 Czech Republic 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Denmark 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Finland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 France 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
9 Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Greece 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
11 Hungary 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 Iceland 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 Ireland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 Italy 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 Japan 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
16 Korea 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
17 Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 Mexico 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 Norway 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 New Zealand 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
22 Poland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
23 Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
24 Slovakia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 Spain 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 Sweden 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 Switzerland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
28 Turkey 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
29 UK 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
30 US 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total 21 18 16 24 21 18 26 27 22 24 26 27 22 26 29 21 22 26
Signal Monitor Theta 7
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Signal Monitor Theta 4
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Signal Monitor Theta 1
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
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Table 4.9: Signal Extraction Forecasts for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 (   ,    and   ) – Base Case Dependent Variable- Continued 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
No. Country 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
1 Australia 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Belgium 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
4 Canada 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
5 Czech Republic 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Denmark 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Finland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 France 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
9 Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Greece 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
11 Hungary 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 Iceland 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 Ireland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 Italy 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 Japan 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
16 Korea 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
17 Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 Mexico 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 Norway 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 New Zealand 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
22 Poland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
23 Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
24 Slovakia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 Spain 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 Sweden 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 Switzerland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
28 Turkey 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
29 UK 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
30 US 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total 21 18 16 24 21 18 26 27 22 24 26 27 22 26 29 21 22 26
Signal Monitor Theta 7
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Signal Monitor Theta 4
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Signal Monitor Theta 1
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
No. Country 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
1 Australia 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Belgium 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
4 Canada 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
5 Czech Republic 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Denmark 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Finland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 France 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
9 Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Greece 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
11 Hungary 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 Iceland 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 Ireland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 Italy 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 Japan 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
16 Korea 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
17 Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 Mexico 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 Norway 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 New Zealand 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
22 Poland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
23 Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
24 Slovakia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 Spain 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 Sweden 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 Switzerland 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
28 Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 UK 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
30 US 0 1 1 0 1
Total 21 18 16 24 21 18 26 27 22 24 26 27 22 26 29 21 22 26
Signal Monitor Theta 7
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Signal Monitor Theta 4
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Signal Monitor Theta 1
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
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While Table 4.10 shows the Summary Consolidated Runs for the three dependent variable cases: namely the base case, high change dynamic 
threshold and low change dynamic threshold scenarios. 
 
Table 4.10: Signal Extraction Forecasts for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 (   ,    and   ) – Summary Consolidated Runs for Dependent 
Variable Cases 
 
 
Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon** Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon** Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
In-Sample In-Sample In-Sample
Type I % 18% 33% 21% 4% 0% Type I % 20% 20% 25% 10% 0% Type I % 22% 28% 24% 4% 0%
Type II % 118% 80% 71% 92% 70% Type II % 360% 360% 188% 260% 156% Type II % 17% 16% 8% 40% 34%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.44        1.20        0.91        0.96        0.70           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 4.50        4.50        2.50        2.89        1.56              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.22        0.22        0.11        0.41        0.34          
Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
Type I % 9% 33% 36% 0% 0% Type I % 0% 80% 50% 0% 0% Type I % 17% 28% 32% 2% 0%
Type II % 136% 80% 93% 96% 63% Type II % 400% 420% 225% 270% 150% Type II % 26% 16% 20% 44% 29%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.50        1.20        1.44        0.96        0.63           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 4.00        21.00      4.50        2.70        1.50              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.32        0.22        0.29        0.45        0.29          
Noise-To-Signal Summary
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Horizon*
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Horizon** Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon** Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
In-Sample In-Sample In-Sample
Type I % 9% 13% 21% 4% 0% Type I % 20% 20% 25% 10% 0% Type I % 13% 12% 20% 2% 0%
Type II % 145% 93% 86% 108% 73% Type II % 440% 460% 213% 290% 161% Type II % 26% 20% 12% 52% 38%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.60        1.08        1.09        1.12        0.73           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.50        5.75        2.83        3.22        1.61              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.30        0.23        0.15        0.53        0.38          
Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
Type I % 18% 20% 7% 4% 3% Type I % 20% 40% 13% 10% 6% Type I % 22% 12% 12% 4% 3%
Type II % 145% 93% 100% 104% 70% Type II % 420% 460% 250% 280% 156% Type II % 30% 16% 20% 50% 36%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.78        1.17        1.08        1.08        0.72           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.25        7.67        2.86        3.11        1.65              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.39        0.18        0.23        0.52        0.37          
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Horizon*
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Horizon** Noise-To-Signal Summary
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In-Sample In-Sample In-Sample
Type I % 9% 7% 0% 4% 0% Type I % 20% 20% 0% 10% 0% Type I % 26% 12% 0% 4% 0%
Type II % 118% 87% 107% 108% 73% Type II % 380% 460% 263% 280% 161% Type II % 26% 20% 16% 48% 37%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.30        0.93        1.07        1.12        0.73           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 4.75        5.75        2.63        3.11        1.61              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.35        0.23        0.16        0.50        0.37          
Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
Type I % 9% 27% 14% 0% 0% Type I % 20% 40% 25% 0% 0% Type I % 22% 20% 12% 8% 5%
Type II % 136% 80% 107% 92% 60% Type II % 420% 400% 263% 240% 133% Type II % 30% 12% 20% 48% 32%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.50        1.09        1.25        0.92        0.60           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.25        6.67        3.50        2.40        1.33              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.39        0.15        0.23        0.52        0.33          
Base Case
50 bps, 50 bps, -50bps and 5 bps
High Change Dynamic Threshold
100 bps, 100 bps, -100, and 10 bps
Low Change Dynamic Threshold
10 bps, 10 bps, -10bps and 1 bps
Theta 1
Theta 4
Theta 7
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
Theta 1
Theta 4
Theta 7
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
Theta 1
Theta 4
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1-Year Horizon
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Table 4.10: Signal Extraction Forecasts for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 (   ,    and   ) – Summary Consolidated Runs for Dependent 
Variable Cases - Continued
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.60        1.08        1.09        1.12        0.73           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.50        5.75        2.83        3.22        1.61              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.30        0.23        0.15        0.53        0.38          
Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
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Type II % 145% 93% 100% 104% 70% Type II % 420% 460% 250% 280% 156% Type II % 30% 16% 20% 50% 36%
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Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
Type I % 9% 27% 14% 0% 0% Type I % 20% 40% 25% 0% 0% Type I % 22% 20% 12% 8% 5%
Type II % 136% 80% 107% 92% 60% Type II % 420% 400% 263% 240% 133% Type II % 30% 12% 20% 48% 32%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.50        1.09        1.25        0.92        0.60           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.25        6.67        3.50        2.40        1.33              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.39        0.15        0.23        0.52        0.33          
Base Case
50 bps, 50 bps, -50bps and 5 bps
High Change Dynamic Threshold
100 bps, 100 bps, -100, and 10 bps
Low Change Dynamic Threshold
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Type II % 118% 80% 71% 92% 70% Type II % 360% 360% 188% 260% 156% Type II % 17% 16% 8% 40% 34%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.44        1.20        0.91        0.96        0.70           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 4.50        4.50        2.50        2.89        1.56              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.22        0.22        0.11        0.41        0.34          
Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
Type I % 9% 33% 36% 0% 0% Type I % 0% 80% 50% 0% 0% Type I % 17% 28% 32% 2% 0%
Type II % 136% 80% 93% 96% 63% Type II % 400% 420% 225% 270% 150% Type II % 26% 16% 20% 44% 29%
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Type II % 145% 93% 86% 108% 73% Type II % 440% 460% 213% 290% 161% Type II % 26% 20% 12% 52% 38%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.60        1.08        1.09        1.12        0.73           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.50        5.75        2.83        3.22        1.61              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.30        0.23        0.15        0.53        0.38          
Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
Type I % 18% 20% 7% 4% 3% Type I % 20% 40% 13% 10% 6% Type I % 22% 12% 12% 4% 3%
Type II % 145% 93% 100% 104% 70% Type II % 420% 460% 250% 280% 156% Type II % 30% 16% 20% 50% 36%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.78        1.17        1.08        1.08        0.72           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.25        7.67        2.86        3.11        1.65              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.39        0.18        0.23        0.52        0.37          
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Type I % 9% 7% 0% 4% 0% Type I % 20% 20% 0% 10% 0% Type I % 26% 12% 0% 4% 0%
 II % 1 87 10 108 7  II % 38 46 26 28 161  II 6 20 6 48 37
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.30        0.93        1.07        1.12        0.73           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 4.75        5.75        2.63        3.11        1.61              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.35        0.23        0.16        0.50        0.37          
Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample Out-of-Sample
Type I % 9% 27% 14% 0% 0% Type I % 20% 40% 25% 0% 0% Type I % 22% 20% 12% 8% 5%
Type II % 136% 80% 107% 92% 60% Type II % 420% 400% 263% 240% 133% Type II % 30% 12% 20% 48% 32%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.50        1.09        1.25        0.92        0.60           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.25        6.67        3.50        2.40        1.33              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.39        0.15        0.23        0.52        0.33          
Base Case
50 bps, 50 bps, -50bps and 5 bps
High Change Dynamic Threshold
100 bps, 100 bps, -100, and 10 bps
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1-Year Horizon
Theta 1
Theta 4
Theta 7
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
 
 
94 
 
Table 4.10: Signal Extraction Forecasts for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7 (   ,    and   ) – Summary Consolidated Runs for Dependent 
Variable Cases - Continued
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.30        0.93        1.07        1.12        0.73           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 4.75        5.75        2.63        3.11        1.61              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.35        0.23        0.16        0.50        0.37          
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Type II % 136% 80% 107% 92% 60% Type II % 420% 400% 263% 240% 133% Type II % 30% 12% 20% 48% 32%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.50        1.09        1.25        0.92        0.60           Noise-To-Signal Ratio 5.25        6.67        3.50        2.40        1.33              Noise-To-Signal Ratio 0.39        0.15        0.23        0.52        0.33          
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4.7.2 Noise-to-Signal Ratios and Forecast Performance (In-Sample and Out-of-Sample) 
The model performance for Theta1,Theta4 and Theta7  (  ,    and   ), or one standard 
deviation from a 3-year rolling mean, a 5-year rolling mean and a 10-year rolling mean, 
respectively for the base case is summarized in Table 4.10. The 1-year NTSR is 
calculated based on whether a crisis was correctly called in the year following the 
forecast. However, measuring NTSR this way would result in an attempt to also predict 
crisis timing, which according to (Borio and Drehmann 2009) is not feasible. What if a 
crisis occurs after 1 year and 2 months from a signal being issued? Or 1 year and 3 
months? In this case the NTSR would be indicating a false signal, whereas it is not true, 
predicting the timing however was what was not possible. The NTSR over a two year 
horizon, measures how correct the model was in signaling crises in the 24 months period 
after a crisis occurs, this is in line with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). This paper 
chooses to focus on the three year horizon, i.e. the ability of a signal to predict a crisis in 
the three years following a signal being issued. By using this focus, from the regulatory 
perspective, this means that the signal being evaluated could signal a crisis as early as 3 to 
4 years before a crisis occurs.    
 
Performance in-sample shows small Type I errors ranging from 0% to 3%. The noise-to-
signal ratio range, improves significantly to 0.7 from 1.6 times, over the three year 
forecast horizon as compared to the one year horizon, as the range of false alarms falls 
from 145% to 70%. The best in-sample model, is the 3-year rolling one standard 
deviation specification. 
 
Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample, in terms of overall noise to signal 
ratios, with the range falling from 1.6 to 0.6 over the three year forecast horizon as 
compared to the one year horizon. Levels of Type I errors are also very low ranging from 
a high of 36% to a low of 0% - or no misses. These results show a significant 
improvement compared to earlier work, for example the median NTSR in Borio and 
Drehmann (2009) applied to the same period 2004 – 2008, is 0.67 over the three year 
forecast horizon and the median Type I error is 30%. The outperformance also holds in 
comparison to KLR99, where Type I errors over a two year horizon range between 25% 
for the best individual indicator to 9% for the poorest individual indicator, whereas for 
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this model, the corresponding figure is 4% to 0%. The best out-of-sample model is the 10-
year rolling one standard deviation specification. 
 
Comparing the base case with the High Change Dynamic dependent variable specification 
and the low change dynamic threshold dependent variable specification shows that the 
best performing calibration is the base case calibration, which has an overall crisis 
incidence of 27%. Although the low change dynamic threshold seems to have better noise 
to signal indicators – it has an overall crisis incidence of almost 60%, which would render 
any model used by regulators invalid as it is an environment where crises are prevalent 
two thirds of the time, which is not credible. 
 
4.7.3 Comparison between Model Results for the base case using near-crises as the 
Dependent Variable and ‘Crises’ as per the Definition in Earlier Literature 
 
To evaluate the model performance had it been calibrated using the crises definitions in 
earlier literature as opposed to a near-crises definition as proposed by this research, a run 
using the crises definition in earlier literature was done for the base case. The results are 
presented in table 4.11 (B). 
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Table 4.11 (A): Signal Extraction near crises Noise-to-Signal Ratios 
 
   
             
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-Sample
Type I % 18% 33% 21% 4% 0%
Type II % 118% 80% 71% 92% 70%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.44        1.20        0.91        0.96        0.70           
Out-of-Sample
Type I % 9% 33% 36% 0% 0%
Type II % 136% 80% 93% 96% 63%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.50        1.20        1.44        0.96        0.63           
Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-Sample
Type I % 9% 13% 21% 4% 0%
Type II % 145% 93% 86% 108% 73%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.60        1.08        1.09        1.12        0.73           
Out-of-Sample
Type I % 18% 20% 7% 4% 3%
Type II % 145% 93% 100% 104% 70%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.78        1.17        1.08        1.08        0.72           
Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-Sample
Type I % 9% 7% 0% 4% 0%
Type II % 118% 87% 107% 108% 73%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.30        0.93        1.07        1.12        0.73           
Out-of-Sample
Type I % 9% 27% 14% 0% 0%
Type II % 136% 80% 107% 92% 60%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 1.50        1.09        1.25        0.92        0.60           
Base Case
50 bps, 50 bps, -50bps and 5 bps
Theta 1
Theta 4
Theta 7
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
1-Year Horizon
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Table 4.11 (B): ‘Crises’ in Earlier Literature Noise-to-Signal Ratios using Proposed 
Signal Extraction Model Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-Sample
Type I % 100% N/M 0% 50% 0%
Type II % 1100% N/M 950% 1350% 725%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio N/M N/M 9.50        27.00      7.3
Out-of-Sample
Type I % 0% N/M 50% 0% 0%
Type II % 1150% N/M 1050% 1300% 650%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 11.50      N/M 21.00      13.00      6.50           
Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-Sample
Type I % 50% N/M 0% 50% 0%
Type II % 1250% N/M 1050% 1450% 725%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 25.00      N/M 10.50      29.00      7.25           
Out-of-Sample
Type I % 50% N/M 0% 50% 25%
Type II % 1200% N/M 1250% 1400% 700%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 24.00      N/M 12.50      28.00      9.33           
Noise-To-Signal Summary
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
In-Sample
Type I % 100% N/M 0% 50% 0%
Type II % 1150% N/M 1350% 1350% 725%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio N/M N/M 13.50      27.00      7.25           
Out-of-Sample
Type I % 0% N/M 0% 0% 0%
Type II % 1150% N/M 1250% 1200% 600%
Noise-To-Signal Ratio 11.50      N/M 12.50      12.00      6.00           
1-Year Horizon
Base Case
50 bps, 50 bps, -50bps and 5 bps
Theta 1
1-Year Horizon
Theta 4
1-Year Horizon
Theta 7
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This shows clearly that the model with the new dependent variable specification 
outperforms substantially the model with the old dependent or crisis variable 
specification. This outperformance is across Type I and Type II errors as well as overall 
Noise-To-Signal-Ratios (NTSRs). For example the median NTSR in Borio and Drehmann 
(2009) applied to the same period 2004 – 2008 referred to earlier, is 0.67 over the three 
year forecast horizon and the median Type I error is 30%.   
 
For the three-year rolling mean, 1SD specification (Theta1), the new model has Type I 
errors of 4% for the 2-year forecast horizon Vs Type I error of 50% for the specification 
with the old dependent crises definitions and an NTSR of 0.96 for the new definition 
versus 27 for the old definition, in sample. Out of sample, NTSR for the new model is 
0.96 for the 2-year horizon and 0.63 for the 3-year horizon, versus 13.0 for the old 
definition and 6.5, respectively.  
 
For the five-year rolling mean, 1SD specification (Theta 4), the new model has Type I 
errors of 4% for the 2-year forecast horizon Vs Type I error of 50% for the specification 
with the old dependent crises definitions and an NTSR of 1.12 for the new definition 
versus 29 for the old definition, in sample. Out of sample, NTSR for the new model is 
1.08 for the 2-year horizon and 0.72 for the 3-year horizon, versus 28.0 for the old 
definition and 9.33, respectively.  
  
For the ten-year rolling mean, 1SD specification (Theta 7), the new model has Type I 
errors of 4% for the 2-year forecast horizon Vs Type I error of 50% for the specification 
with the old dependent crises definitions and an NTSR of 1.12 for the new definition 
versus 27 for the old definition, in sample. Out of sample, NTSR for the new model is 
0.92 for the 2-year horizon and 0.60 for the 3-year horizon, versus 12.0 for the old 
definition and 6.0, respectively.  
 
Thus, the comparison between the two sets of definitions also confirms the out-
performance of the 10 year horizon model with near crises definitions. 
 
In summary, the model used in this chapter outperforms compared to earlier work in 
dependent variable specification, independent variable specification, methodology, 
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forecasting performance out-of-sample and usability by regulators due to the longer lead 
time and room for utilization of their specific country experience in model calibration. 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
 
Using a signal extraction framework and looking at OECD countries over a 30 year 
period a number of variables were found to be significant in predicting crises. These 
include growth in pension assets (positive and significant at the 5% level) and equity 
market dividend yield (positive coefficient, significant at the 10% level). The former is an 
indicator for the development of liquidity bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. 
The latter is a proxy for corporate balance sheet health on the premise that companies 
usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking order hypothesis, and also as free cash 
flows to equity shareholders, after debt service, are available. 
 
Banking sector assets growth was also significant, indicating a strong relationship 
between rapid growth in the sector, its relative size to GDP and the development of 
vulnerabilities (positive coefficient). 
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up across 144 runs for an 
unbundled dependent variable of four components, with three cases: a base case, a high 
change dynamic threshold case and a low change dynamic threshold case. For the base 
case dependent variable runs, the consolidation run shows the best in-sample model, is the 
3-year rolling one standard deviation, very closely followed by the 10-year rolling one 
standard deviation specification. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in 
terms of overall noise to signal ratios, with the range falling from 1.60 to 0.6. Levels of 
Type I errors are also very low ranging from a high of 36% to a low of 0% - or no misses. 
These results show a significant improvement compared to earlier work, for example the 
median NTSR in Borio and Drehmann (2009) applied to the same period 2004 – 2008, is 
0.67 over the three year forecast horizon and the median Type I error is 30%. The 
outperformance also holds in comparison to KLR99, where Type I errors over a two year 
horizon range between 25% for the best individual indicator to 9% for the poorest 
individual indicator, whereas for this model, the corresponding figure is 4% to 0%.   
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This chapter proposes that we should focus on minimizing Type I error as the optimal 
regulator objective function as this is the most conservative approach and it would ensure 
continuous action to ensure a sound system as such. Although Type II errors might be 
more, however if the regulator objective is clearly formulated to be ‘having a healthy 
financial system and continually correcting imbalances as they develop’, then this is what 
the model will achieve. This objective is equivalent to ‘avoiding crises at all costs’.  
 
The trade-off between the costs of Type I and Type II errors is widely debated. The cost 
of a Type I error, represents the cost of a crisis using the standard direct (losses) and 
indirect (opportunity losses) measures described in detail in earlier chapters, which 
showed a range of anywhere between 10% to 40% of GDP historically and up to the last 
global crisis of 2007-2010. The cost of Type II errors is more difficult to measure but 
could be broken down into direct and indirect components as well.  
 
The direct components comprise the cost of complying with new regulation. According to 
a Mckinsey November 2010 study on the impact of Basle III implementation on European 
banks, the new information technology and risk capability requirements will result in an 
investment cost of Euro 35 million to Euro 70 million for each bank that adopts the 
accord. If we take the Euro 50 million as a midpoint, and assuming the leading 50 banks 
in Europe incur this cost, this gives a total estimated cost of Euro 2.5 billion (0.02% of 
Eurozone total GDP of Euro 12.6 trillion in 2010). The indirect components in terms of 
losses to GDP are much more difficult to measure, however a February 2011 study by 
Slovik and Cournede on OECD countries, indicates a loss of between 0.05 to 0.15 
percentage point per annum over a five year period. If we take the midpoint 0.10 percent, 
and multiply this by OECD GDP as of 2010 (and then multiply by five, assuming flat 
growth for a five year period), this amounts to USD225 billion. The magnitude of direct 
and indirect Type II errors which are measurable as such, is much smaller than the cost of 
Type I errors. Other costs of Type II errors cited by an IMF paper are unintended 
consequences for cost of capital, funding patterns, interconnectedness, and risk migration 
in banks. These may well be greater than the measurable Type I errors, however 
measurement might not be feasible. 
 
The best out-of-sample model, is the 10-year rolling one standard deviation specification 
with a Type I error of 0% and a noise-to-signal ratio of 0.6. These results show a 
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significant improvement compared to earlier work. Using an adapted crisis definition as 
measured by a solvency proxy, in itself an innovation, has improved the performance of 
the model in terms of minimizing Type I errors over a three year period and NTSR out-of-
sample. Furthermore out-of-sample performance is better than in-sample performance. A 
major improvement to previously existing models. 
 
Furthermore, an evaluation of model performance had it been calibrated using the crises 
definitions in earlier literature compared to the near-crises definition proposed by this 
research, shows clearly that the model with the new dependent variable specification 
outperforms substantially the model with the old dependent or crisis variable 
specification. This outperformance is across Type I and Type II errors as well as overall 
Noise-To-Signal-Ratios (NTSRs).   
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5.  Chapter Five: Macro-Applications of Near Crises to OECD 
Countries 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As touched upon in Chapter 4 in the case of the Signal Extraction application, macro 
Logit and Merton type models failed miserably in calling the 2007-2010 crisis. Using a 
sample of 105 countries, covering the years 1979 to 2003, Davis and Karim (2008) apply 
macro EWS models, using signal extraction, Logit and binary recursive tree 
methodologies, to US and UK data to test for out-of-sample performance (whether a crisis 
was correctly called) from 2000 – 2007. They find that for the US, both models fail 
miserably with a probability of a crisis occurring in 2007 of 1% for the Logit model and 
0.6% for the binary tree model. For the UK, the results were similar, with the Logit 
probability of a crisis at 3.4% in 2007 and 0.6% for the binary tree model. This paper 
attributes this failure partly to dependent variable and independent variable specification 
and model empirical design, all three areas which we attempt to improve on.  
 
Commonly used dependent variable specifications macro models in the past, are similar to 
those discussed in the signal extraction application. These are in the form of ex-post 
measures of the cost of crises in the form of direct bailout funds or indirect GDP losses 
compared to its previous growth trajectory (Davis and Karim 2003). Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996) find bailouts cost on average 10% of GDP, with some crises much 
more damaging like the Mexican Tequila Crisis (1994) which cost 20% of GDP, and the 
Jamaican crisis (1996) which cost 37% of GDP. According to the IMF, the past crisis of 
2007 - 2010 had cumulative (indirect) output losses over 2008-2010 estimated at around 
5% of global output (this amounts to around USD10.2 trillion if we apply the rate to IMF 
global output estimates), while direct bailout measures by governments have almost 
tallied a similar figure and direct write-downs by agents tallied some USD3.4 trillion. 
These collectively are equivalent to 40% of global GDP in 2010. 
 
However, given that there is a substantial body of literature that highlights the linkage 
between the build-up of financial fragility and crises, as discussed previously in details in 
Chapter 4, we have adopted the innovative approach based on focusing on near-crises for 
the dependent variable as in this macro-applications Chapter 5.  
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Focusing on independent variable specifications, we also adopt the same variable section 
approach described in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
The specific empirical model designs used to predict crises fall into four categories: i) 
signals models; ii) logit/probit models; iii) Merton type models; and a less used class of 
models, iv) Binary recursive trees. In this paper we use a macro-application comprising 
two models: a Logit macro model and a Z-score macro model. Predominantly in earlier 
literature such as Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999 and Alessi and Detken 2008, the structure 
of the empirical model was based on static thresholds chosen for each independent 
variable or threshold probability, determined on the basis of minimizing Type I and Type 
II errors in-sample or in other words minimizing the Noise-To-Signal Ratio of the model. 
This paper improves on empirical design substantially with the choice of variable 
thresholds no longer static, but rather dynamic in the form of standard deviations from a 
chosen metric. By shifting the analysis to focus on change as opposed to absolute values, 
this model focuses on capturing volatility in a chosen variable, rather than thresholds 
chosen on the basis of output of a certain data period. This means that the model design as 
such is usable in different time periods and different states of the world.  
 
One of the problems with earlier models is that repeated exercises for different time 
periods always resulted in different performance of a fixed set of indicator variables. This 
is because causes for crises change over time and also because static thresholds chosen for 
each variable to signal a crisis are by default linked to whichever data period they were 
calibrated to. This explains why in-sample performance of these models was much better 
than out-of-sample and why the old models failed to predict the last crisis. The design of 
our model to read deviations from a chosen benchmark means that the chosen variables 
are valid for the data period for which the model was designed and for other data periods 
as well, thus improving on out-of-sample performance, another major weakness in earlier 
models.  
 
 
Using the Logit framework and looking at OECD countries over a 30 year period a 
number of variables were found to be significant in predicting crises. These include 
growth in pension assets (positive and significant at the 5% level) and equity market 
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dividend yield (positive coefficient, significant at the 10% level). The former is an 
indicator for the development of liquidity bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. 
The latter is a proxy for corporate balance sheet health on the premise that companies 
usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking order hypothesis, and also as free cash 
flows to equity shareholders, after debt service, are available. 
 
Banking sector assets growth was also significant at the 10% level, indicating a strong 
relationship between rapid growth in the sector, its relative size to GDP and the 
development of vulnerabilities (positive coefficient). 
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up across a dependent variable with 
three cases: a base case, a high change dynamic threshold case and a low change dynamic 
threshold case. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in terms of overall 
noise to signal ratios. These results show a significant improvement compared to earlier 
work, in terms of NTSR and Type I and Type II errors for all calibrations, with the 
exception of the 100 bps dependent variable calibration. Again a point to support the 
importance of the dependent variable regulator objective calibration and the inherent 
feedback loop to actual model performance. 
 
Using the Merton type Z-score framework and looking at OECD countries, movements in 
PD by more than one standard deviation were found to be significant in predicting crises. 
The PDs were calculated using a Merton type Z-score framework, where the Z-score is a 
capital adequacy measure plus returns on average assets (the latter defined as Net Income 
(NI) before provisions/average assets) all divided by the standard deviation of returns 
(same definition, NI before provisions/average assets).  
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up across the base case dependent 
variable calibration. The model performs well compared to World Bank published Z-
Score indicators to calculate migration matrices in PDs. 
 
For the various models, the countries signaled to have crises do not map one to one in all 
three applications and some key countries called by the signal extraction to be susceptible 
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to crises are not called by the Logit model but are called by the Z-score model, but the 
Logit model raises the alarm bell for other countries. These two findings reinforce the 
need by regulators to use different models and to look at all of them in judging the build 
up of vulnerabilities, even within the same system / country.  
 
Comparing the Z-score macro application with the Logit and signal extraction 
applications point to a number of key recommendations. First, regulator objective 
functions do have an impact on model performance, and therefore EWS should always be 
designed with a set of objective functions and crises evaluated for each set as evident 
from the output of the three methodologies based on the three scenarios for the magnitude 
of change in the dependent variable that is deemed systemic. Second, regulators should 
use a number of models simultaneously to monitor changes in their respective systems 
and the impact from spill-overs from other interconnected systems as each model has 
strengths and weaknesses. Third, there is a lot of value in the initial data searching 
exercise for variables, because this helps determine at any one point in time on a dynamic 
basis as these are the factors that are ‘moving’ in the system and could cause 
vulnerabilities. Last, regulatory oversight and judgment need to be exercised at all times 
without over reliance on models as clearly, the outcomes must be then mapped onto real 
life by the regulator and also assessed in terms of cost of intervention versus cost of 
waiting for certain further critical triggers and regulators need to exercise vigilance and 
prudence consistently. 
 
In order to better evaluate how the models map, one additional analysis component is 
necessary, in the form of a traffic light type analysis. Clearly the models are not expected 
to have the same results consistently, otherwise they would not be sufficiently different to 
be adding information to the decision making information set of a regulator. However, the 
confirmation of signals by all models should raise the ‘red’ alarm and the disagreement 
should point to an ‘amber’ alarm, whereas the full agreement for a ‘no crisis’ signal 
should be a ‘green light’ that the financial system is robust. Note that the traffic signals 
panel is somewhat similar to a risk heat map and could be easily scaled to include other 
models as well or calibrated to modify output based on regulatory objective functions/ 
thresholds for intervention.  
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This chapter covers macro-applications of Near Crises to OECD countries and includes a 
Logit Model and a Z-Score application. The topics covered are: Literature review; 
Empirical Model design; Data and descriptive statistics; Dependent and explanatory 
variables; Preliminary empirical findings; Near-Crises forecasts and model performance 
evaluation; and the last section provides a comparison between the various macro 
applications and traffic light results.  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
5.2.1 Logit Model 
Logit models use a logistic specification and enable the study of covariates of banking 
crises, developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).  In this paper, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (hereinafter DandD) use a large sample (45 to 65 based on the 
specification of the regression) of developing and developed countries during 1980-1994 
and find that crises tend to erupt when the macroeconomic environment is weak, 
especially when growth is low and inflation is high. Also high real interest rates and 
vulnerability to balance of payments crises plays a role. They also find that countries with 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme and with weak law enforcement were also 
particularly at risk.  
 
This approach assumes that the probability that a crisis occurs is a function of a vector of 
explanatory variables and its output, although in the form of a probability, is transformed 
into binary mode through a decision rule. Either a country is experiencing a crisis or not 
(determined by what threshold probability is given in the decision rule to label a country 
as having a crisis). The advantage of this model is that its non-linear and incorporates 
several variables simultaneously. 
 
A related class of models, probit models are used to estimate the contribution that each 
explanatory variable makes to the probability that financial distress/failure will occur. 
Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha (2002), using a Probit model, test balance sheet explanations 
of external crises in emerging markets and the role of standards in these crises with the 
main findings that corporate sector balance sheets have a very significant impact on both 
the likelihood and depth of crisis caused by external shocks. The authors use a set of 
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indicators which they call the Lawson Indicators (named after the former UK Chancellor 
of the Exchequer) covering: corporate balance sheet indicators (degree of financial 
leverage, maturity structure of debt financing, availability of liquidity, profitability and 
cash flow of a company); macroeconomic balance sheet and institutional indicators 
(extent of foreign currency financing by corporates and revenues) and legal indicators 
(creditor rights, shareholder rights,  the ability to enforce contracts, accounting standards, 
and the origin of the legal regime). They use a parametric probit model to which they add 
the Lawson indicators. They find that using their indicator set in addition to the 
macroeconomic variables results in a much higher degree of accuracy, calling on average 
more than 80% of the crisis in-sample (Type I error of 20%, compared to 30% on average 
to Kaminsky and Reinhart 2005 for example), however with a high degree of false alarms 
ranging from around 30% to over 50% for different cut-off probabilities (30% false 
alarms for the higher probability threshold of 50% and 50% false alarms for the lower 
probability threshold of 25%, respectively). 
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Table 5.1:Detailed Review of Logit Selected Papers 
Authors Model Used Year Data Factors and Main Findings 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache 
Multivariate 
Logit 
1998, 
2005 
94 countries, 
77 crises 
occurred, 
1980 to 
2002. 
 Real GDP growth,  
 real interest rates and  
 real GDP per capita  
 Budget deficit 
 Private credit/GDP 
Around 70% of the time the model 
predicted crisis occurrence correctly. 
Forecasted data perform poorly in 
predicting crisis, using the same 
coefficients obtained from real data.  
 
Caprio and 
Klingebiel 
 
Multivariate 
logit 
 
2003 
 
117 crises in 
93 countries, 
1970 to 
2002 
 
Defines systemic banking crises as 
episodes during which most or all bank 
capital was exhausted. The listing of crises 
used by these authors has been used as a 
reference by almost all academic 
researchers after this paper. 
 
Eichengreen and 
Rose 
 
Multivariate 
probit 
 
1998 
 
105 
developing 
countries, 
1975-1992 
 
Main findings: higher crisis probability if 
higher interest rates, low growth, more 
short-term debt. 
 
Glick and 
Hutchison 
 
Multivariate 
probit 
 
1999 
 
90 industrial 
and 
developing 
countries, 
1975 - 1997 
 
Main findings: twin crisis are more 
common in emerging markets, especially 
in the presence of financial liberalization. 
Banking crises are a good leading indicator 
of currency crises, the opposite is not true. 
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Authors Model Used Year Data Factors and Main Findings 
 
Eichengreen and 
Arteta 
 
Probit 
 
2000 
 
75 countries, 
78 crises, 
1975 – 
1997. 
 
Authors apply the results in previous 
empirical literature to emerging market 
crises to check the robustness of 
explanatory variables. 
Factors which they found to be robust are: 
 Rapid domestic credit growth 
 Large bank liabilities relative to 
reserves 
 Deposit rate decontrol. 
Factors which the authors find not to be 
robust include the relationship between 
exchange rate regimes and banking crises, 
deposit insurance and weak institutional 
frameworks. 
 
 
Davis and Karim 
 
Multivariate 
Logit and 
Signal 
Extraction 
 
2008 
 
1979 – 
2003, 105 
countries, 72 
to 102 
systemic 
crisis 
depending 
on the 
definition 
used. 
 
The authors replicate the Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2005) study and Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003) study. They find 
that logit is the most suitable approach for 
EWS while signal extraction is more suited 
for single-country EWS and that the same 
variables with some transformations are 
better predictors of crises, than the earlier 
set in the original papers. 
 
 
Source: As listed. 
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5.2.2 Z-Score Model 
This approach has been mainly used to study individual bank failure, with empirical 
studies dating back to the 1970s, mainly relying on bank balance sheet and market 
information to explain and forecast the failure of individual institutions. These include 
studies with variations of a Merton type, options based model to predict expected number 
of defaults (END) Z-scores or distance to default (DD) for financial institutions or 
sovereigns and credit migrations (recent studies include Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes 2004, 
Fuertes and Kalotychou 2006 and Savona and Vezzoli, 2008, among others).   
 
A number of applications have used Merton type approaches on an aggregate level to 
calculate Z-scores and distance to default measures. Tieman and Maechler (2009), adopt 
this ‘superbank’ approach, which aggregates all players on one ‘pseudo’ balance sheet 
(this approach was also adopted by the Central Bank of Egypt’s Macro-Prudential Unit 
for some of its stress-testing exercises). They focus on the short-run feedback effect from 
market-based indicators of financial sector risk to the real economy through the credit 
channel, and estimate this effect on an economy-wide (macro) level. Their sample 
includes seven countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom, and focuses on the largest banks in each of these countries (a total of 26 
banks) over the period covered 1991–2007, the authors find that although there is 
considerable variation across indicators, in both cases, the period 2004 to mid-2007 is 
characterized by low risk, as reflected by (almost) uniformly high DD indicators or, 
conversely, low Expected Number of Defaults (EDFs).  
 
A somewhat similar application, but with a focus on creating a new financial stability 
quantifiable metric is made by Martin Cihak (2007) who presents an integrated measure 
of financial stability which he calls systemic loss. The author looks at the financial system 
as if it’s a portfolio of financial institutions and considers the whole distribution of 
systemic losses of this aggregate portfolio, over one period. He proposes that systemic 
loss measurement should be based on i) probability of default; ii) loss given default; and 
iii) correlation of defaults across institutions. An earlier paper by Blejer and Schumacher 
(1998), uses a similar assessment of a distribution of losses of a financial system as a 
whole, but in a value-at-risk (VaR) type set-up, with regards to currency crises, by 
constructing a VaR metric for central banks and concludes that this is a useful monitor of 
sovereign risk. The analysis covers 29 countries, including 12 in which a systemic 
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banking crisis started during the period of study according to Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003). The main findings are that the indicators used do point to increased instability and 
using the Loss Given Default (LGD) and correlations across failures into account 
improves the measurement (reduces the noise-to-signal ratio). 
The following table, adapted from Cihak (2007), presents a summary of the different 
Merton type applications to predict banking and systemic crises and the advantages and 
drawbacks of each sub-set. 
Table 5.2:  Merton Type Methods for Crises Prediction and the Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Each 
Indicator Advantages Disadvantages 
DD or Z-Score (or 
probability of 
Default) 
Easy to calculate from individual 
institutions’ or for a portfolio, for 
DDs, Z-scores, or PDs. 
 Does not reflect contagion (correlation across 
failures if average of individual institutions). 
 Does not reflect LGD of individual 
institutions, even though can be partially 
addressed by weighting. 
 DD requires liquid market in financial 
institutions iNTSRuments used to back out the 
metric if market data is used. 
First-to-default and 
nth-to-default 
indicator 
 Clear theoretical underpinnings 
for the nth to default indicator 
 Does not fully reflect differences in LGD in 
different institutions. 
 FTD looks at individual vs systemic risk. 
Expected number of 
defaults (END) 
indicator 
 Relatively easy to interpret.  Does not reflect different LGDs in institutions. 
 Difficult to calculate as its not a closed form 
expression 
 Focuses only on central tendency of the 
distribution. 
 Depends on total number of institutions  
Distribution of 
systemic loss 
 Captures differences in LGD in 
institutions 
 Captures correlation across 
bank failures 
 Focuses only on central 
tendencies 
 May be difficult to calculate in some cases; no 
closed-form expression. 
Source: Adapted from Cihak (2007). 
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Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2004), using a Merton type approach, analyze the ability of 
equity and bond market signals as leading indicators in a sample of EU banks. They find 
both indicators are good leading metrics of fragility, with distance to default exhibiting 
lead times of 6 to 18 months, while bond spreads signal values close to problems only.  In 
a related study, Krainer and Lopez (2004), find that stock returns and equity-based default 
probabilities are useful indicators for US bank supervisors. The authors develop a model 
of supervisory ratings that combines supervisory and equity market information and find 
that their model forecasts supervisory rating changes by up to four quarters. Finally, an 
application to Estonia by Chen, Funke and Mannasoo (2006) attempts to predict bank 
fragility from market prices through the use of a Merton type approach and find that 
market indicators are moderately useful for anticipating future financial distress and rating 
changes.  
 
5.3 Empirical Model Design  
 
5.3.1 Logit Model Empirical Design 
Logit models use a logistic specification and enable the study of covariates of banking 
crises, developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).  This approach assumes that 
the probability that a crisis occurs is a function of a vector of explanatory variables and its 
output, although in the form of a probability, is transformed into binary mode through a 
decision rule. Either a country is experiencing a crisis or not (determined by what 
threshold probability is given in the decision rule to label a country as having a crisis). 
The advantage of this model is that its non-linear and incorporates several variables 
simultaneously. 
 
The probability distribution in a logit model is assumed to be logistic.  Hence, the 
estimated coefficients reflect the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on ln ((P 
(i,t)/ (1-P(i,t)). Thus, the increase in the probability depends upon the original probability, 
and in turn on the initial values of all the independent variables and their coefficients.  
 
Under this model, in each period, a country is either experiencing a crisis with a 
probability ranging from zero to one. 
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More formally, the log-likelihood function of the model is: 
 
 
  
 
Where: 
 
X (i,t) = vector of n explanatory variables 
P (i,t) = banking crisis dummy variable 
B = vector of n unknown coefficients 
F[ B’X(i,t) ] = cumulative probability distribution function, evaluated at  B’X(i,t) 
 
One of the challenges linked to this methodology is how to deal with the explanatory 
variables following a crisis, when these variables would have been impacted by the crisis 
itself. This is addressed by the authors by excluding the years during which the crisis is 
unfolding from the sample. Another challenge was the coNTSRuction of the banking 
crisis dependent variable. 
 
There is no consensus approach to choosing the best fit model. However, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1996), choose the size of an optimal threshold for individual variable by 
selecting the value that minimizes the in-sample noise-to-signal ratio, ω, that is computed 
in their application as follows: 
 
ω=β/(1-α) 
 
 
Where α is the size of the type I error and β is the size of the type II error, and where both 
are functions of the chosen variable threshold. 
 
Applying this to the Logit model proposed in this chapter, the noise-to-signal ratio of each 
run, ω, would also be computed in the same way. Where α again is the size of the type I 
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error and β is the size of the type II error, with the difference that now both are functions 
of the chosen model. 
 
The question is from a regulatory perspective, if the objective function of the regulator is 
to prevent crises at all costs, then model evaluation should be on the basis of minimizing 
Type I errors as they are much more costly, and accepting Type II errors as a downside. 
By setting this objective function, the regulator would ensure a continuously healthy 
system and is taking the most risk-averse stance they could take. This is another 
innovation that this research attempts. 
 
5.3.2 Setting Up the Logit Model for the Three Dependent Variable Specifications 
For each of the three dependent variable specifications, an optimized best fit model was 
constructed. This contrasts to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2005) where only 
one model was optimized with one dependent variable specification. By using the three 
different specifications, this is an improvement on previous approaches as we are also 
capturing the significance of the different independent variables given a dependent 
variable specification. The formula for each of the three Logit models optimized is: 
 
     
1..... 1....
 L = ( , ) ln ' , (1 ( , )) ln 1 ( ' ( , ))
t T i n
Ln P i t F B X i t P i t F B X i t
 
        
 
Where: 
X (i,t) = vector of n explanatory variables, P (i,t) = banking crisis dummy variable 
B = vector of n unknown coefficients, F[ B’X(i,t) ] = cumulative probability distribution 
function, evaluated at  B’X(i,t) 
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The three Logit models using this methodology are summarized below. 
 
Table 5.3: A. Macro Logit Model Specifications –In-Sample 
 
 
B. Macro Logit Model Specifications –Out-of-Sample 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
 
These models use the consolidated dependent variable crisis specifications without 
unbundling given that the construct of the Logit model, in contrast to signal extraction, is 
to evaluate the effectiveness of a set of variables collectively or a model on the whole, 
rather than individual significance of an indicator on an unbundled LHS variable. 
Furthermore, the model is not possible to estimate with any less number of observations 
as evident by for the 100 bps calibration, where the equation has to be modified to avoid 
overflow, given the smaller number of data points (last observation for each country in 
2004). The HPI variable was dropped as such for this particular run. 
 
 
10 bps 50 bps 100 bps
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
C 4.615373 C -1.09926 C 4.898859
DRGDP -124.1171 DRGDP 67.98443 DRGDP 249.8444
HPI -30.93891 HPI -1.62905 MHPI -137.0561
MBAG 26.4513 BAG 0.835172 SBAG 69.86863
SBAGDP 12.44683 SBAGDP 6.933158 PENS -17.59901
PENS -7.441338 PENS -2.82216 EMKTDY -88.09279
EMKTDY -81.38702 EMKTDY -88.8771 LIQ -27.05003
LIQ 28.52972 SDLIQ 52.50506
MacFadden's R2 46.20% MacFadden's R2 30.47% MacFadden's R2 62.30%
10 bps 50 bps 100 bps
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
C 14.08314 C -0.34736 C -2.59088
DRGDP -221.3545 DRGDP 205.2767 DRGDP 14.28067
HPI -14.16391 HPI -8.5871
MBAG 20.80639 BAG -10.6851 SBAG -14.92136
SBAGDP 16.46121 SBAGDP 19.11613 PENS -5.633749
PENS -12.8104 PENS -6.7851 EMKTDY -9.714505
EMKTDY -202.1921 EMKTDY -182.973 LIQ 3.416117
LIQ 30.080661 SDLIQ -70.0149
MacFadden's R2 52.50% MacFadden's R2 45.60% MacFadden's R2 16.60%
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5.3.3 Z-Score Model Empirical Design 
 
The Z-score has been used extensively as a measure of individual financial institutions’ 
soundness as in Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, Tressel (2006) and Cihak (2007). The Z-
score is defined as z ≡ (k+μ)/σ, where k is equity capital as percent of assets, μ is return as 
percent of assets, and σ is standard deviation of return on assets as a proxy for return 
volatility. The z-score is simple to calculate and its attractiveness lies in it being inversely 
related to the probability of a financial institution’s default.  
 
The probability of default for the integral from - to k, is given by 
 
p (μ < k) = ∫ φ (μ) dμ 
  
If μ is normally distributed, then p (μ < k) = ∫ N(0,1) dμ where z is the z-score. Hence if 
returns are normally distributed, the z-score measures the number of standard deviations a 
return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity. In the case μ is not normally 
distributed, z is the lower bound on the probability of default (by Tchebycheff inequality) 
and therefore a higher z-score implies a lower probability of insolvency. 
 
The z-scores have several limitations, the most important is that they are based on low 
frequency accounting data. Also, the z-score applied to an individual financial institution, 
does not take into account the correlation of institutions in the system. However, an 
advantage of the z-score is that it can be used for any institution, even if its not traded or 
its securities are not liquid enough to enable a higher frequency Merton type application.  
 
Similar to “portfolio DD,” we can define “portfolio z-score,” as z ≡ (k+μ)/σ, where k is 
total equity capital in the system as percent of total assets in the system, μ is total return as 
percent of total assets, and σ is standard deviation of the aggregate return on aggregate 
assets as a proxy for return volatility. The portfolio z-score is always higher than the sum 
of z-scores for the individual institutions.  
 
Similar to the signal extraction and the Logit applications, the evaluation of a Z-score 
model could be done using a NTSR framework choosing the model that minimizes the 
noise-to-signal ratio, ω, that is computed in as follows: 
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Where α is the size of the type I error and β is the size of the type II error, and where both 
are functions of the chosen variable threshold. 
 
Applying this to the Z-score model, the noise-to-signal ratio of each Z-score run, ω, 
would also be computed in the same way. Where α again is the size of the type I error and 
β is the size of the type II error. 
 
The question is from a regulatory perspective, if the objective function of the regulator is 
to prevent crises at all costs, then model evaluation should be on the basis of minimizing 
Type I errors as they are much more costly, and accepting Type II errors as a downside. 
By setting this objective function, the regulator would ensure a continuously healthy 
system and is taking the most risk-averse stance they could take. This is another 
innovation attempted throughout this research. 
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5.4 Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 
 
5.4.1. Logit Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 
5.4.1.1 Dependent Variable - Innovation and contribution, A note on crises definitions 
This research uses an adapted definition focusing on near-crises, where each country is 
identified as having a near-crisis or not based on a composite indicator of the solvency 
and profitability of the banking sector and changes in both thereof. By using this 
definition of near-crises as opposed to an ex-post metric of losses as a percentage of GDP 
or NPL levels which identify crises at a stage which is too late for policy makers to take 
any action to actually prevent a crisis – this adapted near-crisis definition would by 
default lead to a longer lead period for the signals issued as they will point to imbalance 
and/or fragility build-up. This is the same approach adopted in the signal extraction 
application. Please refer to section 4.4.1 for details. 
 
5.4.1.2. Logit Explanatory Variables 
The variables and their definitions are the same used for the signal extraction application, 
please refer to section 4.4.2. 
 
5.4.2 Dependent and Explanatory Variables for Z-Score Model 
 
5.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The number of near-crises for the base case as per the definition discussed at length in 
earlier chapters. For the base case there were 232 systemic vulnerability observations out 
of a total of 870 observations, or 27%.  For the shorter sample period and differing 
number of countries for the Z-Score application, without changing the definition, the total 
vulnerability spots are 80 out of 273 usable observations, or around 29%. Thus the 
dependent variable percentage of crisis identified did not change. 
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Table 5.4: Macro Logit Near-Crises Identified for Selected OECD Countries (1995 – 2007)- Base Case (50 bps Consolidated)* 
 
 
*As per the relevant definitions in earlier chapters. This is the time and country subset which is applicable to the current Z-Score application. 
 Source: Authors calculation. 
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Table 5.4: Macro Logit Near-Crises Identified for Selected OECD Countries (1995 – 2007)- Base Case*-Continued 
 
 
*As per the relevant definitions in earlier chapters. This is the time and country subset which is applicable to the current Z-Score application. 
 Source: Authors calculation. 
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5.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics of Country Universe 
 
5.5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics – Logit Model 
 
This data set is obtained from OECD, IMF, World Bank, World Federation of Exchanges 
and national central banks. In this sample there were 232 years of systemic vulnerabilities 
for the base case as per the definition explained earlier, out of 870 usable observations. 
Innovation and contribution to data sources includes the use of World Federation of 
Exchanges data on dividend yields as a proxy for corporate sector health and using data 
on fluctuations in pension assets which have not been used before in the literature. Table 
5.5 shows the variables chosen for this paper and their descriptive statistics. It shows the 
mean growth in real GDP for OECD countries over the study period to be 2.9%, with a 
standard deviation of 2.7% and a slight skew to the left of 0.5 (normal distribution 
skewness is approximately zero), and almost normal kurtosis, or no fat tails, with kurtosis 
at 3.46 (normal distribution is approximately three).  
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Table 5.5: Macro Logit Model Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Acronym DRGDP HPI DEMI CAB BAG BAGDP PENS EMKTDY LIQ FUN SIGNAL Monitor
Long-Name
Delta Real GDP in 
%
House Price 
Indicator %
Delta Equity 
Market Index %
Current Account 
Balance %
Banking Sector 
Asset Growth
Banking Sector 
Assets to GDP
Pension Fund 
Assets to GDP
Equity Capital 
Markets 
Dividend Yield
Liquidity 
Indicator
Funding 
Indicator Signal Monitor
Definition
Change in Real 
GDP YoY
Real 
appreciation in 
House Prices YoY
Change in eqity 
capital markt 
index YoY
Current Account 
balance to GDP 
%
Change in 
banking sector 
assets YoY %
Banking Sector 
Assets to GDP %
Pension Fund 
Assets to GDP
Equity Capital 
Markets 
Dividend Yield %
Securities / T. 
Assets
Loans to 
Deposits Ratio
Model Output 
based on ex-
ante decision 
rule
No. Of Observations 825 246 691 811 613 649 243 287 481 481 840
Mean 2.87% 3.79% 18.83% -0.70% 13.03% 328.36% 36.18% 3.43% 18.65% 105.08% 34.29%
SD 2.7% 6.0% 45.0% 5.0% 15.3% 655.4% 45.9% 2.9% 6.5% 28.7% 47.5%
Skewness 0.5-                        0.4                        5.9                        0.2                        3.5                        3.5                        2.9                        4.0                        0.1                        0.6                        0.7                       
Kurtosis 3.5 0.7 57.0 1.7 16.1 11.1 19.2 20.8 -0.8 0.7 -1.6
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The mean appreciation in real house prices over the study period was 3.8%, with a 
standard deviation of 6% and a slight skew to the right of 0.4 (normal distribution 
skewness is approximately zero), and very thin tails with kurtosis at 0.75 (normal 
distribution is approximately three). The mean change in equity capital market indices 
over the study period was 18.8%, with a standard deviation of 45% and a skew to the right 
or positive skew of 5.92 (normal distribution skewness is approximately zero), and very 
fat tails with kurtosis at 57 (normal distribution is approximately three).  
 
The mean current account balance to GDP over the study period was -0.7%, with a 
standard deviation of 5% and a slight skew to the right of 0.16 (normal distribution 
skewness is approximately zero), and thin tails with kurtosis at 1.74 (normal distribution 
is approximately three). The mean banking sector asset growth over the study period was 
13%, with a standard deviation of 15.3% and a skew to the right of 3.46 (normal 
distribution skewness is approximately zero), and fat tails with kurtosis at 16.12 (normal 
distribution is approximately three) – fat tails suggest another area of potential research in 
different benchmarks for this variable based on a distribution other than the normal. The 
mean of banking sector assets to GDP over the study period was 328.4%, with a standard 
deviation of 655.4% and a skew to the right of 11.15 (normal distribution skewness is 
approximately zero), and fat tails with kurtosis at 11.15 (normal distribution is 
approximately three). 
 
The mean of pension fund assets to GDP over the study period was 36.2%, with a 
standard deviation of 45.9% and a skew to the right of 2.94 (normal distribution skewness 
is approximately zero), and fat tails with kurtosis at 19.17 (normal distribution is 
approximately three).  
 
The mean dividend yield in equity capital markets of OECD countries over the study 
period was 3.4%, with a standard deviation of 2.9% and a skew to the right of 3.99 
(normal distribution skewness is approximately zero), and fat tails with kurtosis at 20.77 
(normal distribution is approximately three). 
 
The mean holdings of securities to total assets by OECD banks as a liquidity indicator 
over the study period was 18.65%, with a standard deviation of 6.5% and a skew to the 
right of 0.1, so almost normally distributed. The mean loans to deposits ratio as a funding 
 
 
 128 
indicator for OECD banks was 105%, with a standard deviation of 29% and a slight 
positive skew of 0.6. 
 
5.5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics – Z-Score Model 
 
OECD comprises: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the US. Collectively, these 
countries captured 75% of global nominal GDP in 2007 (60% on a purchasing-power-
parity adjusted basis) and had a total population of 1.2 billion, 18% of total global 
population, respectively. OECD data on banking activity is available for 30 years, back to 
1979 for on-balance sheet activities. The data period for the Z-score application spans 
from 1989 to 2007 with 3 explanatory variables, system capital adequacy metric for each 
country, system return on average assets before provisions and system standard deviation 
of returns. The Z-score application is for a subset of 21 countries of the OECD for which 
the data was available. This data set is obtained from OECD and national central banks.  
 
Two of the three explanatory variables: equity to total assets as a capital adequacy metric 
and return on average assets as measured by net income before provisions divided by 
average assets are presented for a ten year period in the following Table 5.6. 
 
Over the ten-year period, average capital to total assets for the sample was 6%, while 
return on average assets averaged 1%. Country differences are pronounced, with the 
highest average capital held by Finland and the Czech Republic at 9% and the lowest held 
by Belgium at 3%. The highest returns were booked by US and New Zealand banks at 2% 
and the lowest returns by Japan and the Czech Republic at 0%. Higher returns help a 
system build its capital base, albeit slowly, whereas more direct measures such as capital 
raisings and capital injections are fast impact measures. The reverse is also true, with low 
returns slowly eroding the capital base and shocks resulting in quick capital erosion. 
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Table 5.6: Z-Score Macro Model Explanatory Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation.  
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Table 5.6: Z-Score Macro Model Explanatory Variable Descriptive Statistics-Continued 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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5.6 Empirical Estimations 
5.6.1. Logit Model Empirical Estimations 
Crisis Signal Forecasts 
 
To translate the model forecasts of probability of crises into judgments on whether a crisis 
is 1) Unlikely (some vulnerabilities); 2) Likely (overall fragility); or 3) Probable (near 
crisis situation), a heuristic decision rule is needed based on model output calibration, this 
is where regulator input is crucial. For the three Logit models given a range of 
probabilities from 0% to 30% on the whole, the calibration has been set to read 
1)Unlikely for any probability output less than 5%; 2) Likely for any output greater than 
5%, but less than 15%; and 3) Probable for any output greater than 15%.   
 
The forecasts are for t-1, t-2 and t-3, i.e. for the years 2006, 2005 and 2004 respectively 
for each of the three dependent variable specifications. The results are for In-Sample 
forecasts and out-of-sample forecasts are summarized below. 
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Table 5.7 (A): In-Sample Macro-Logit Forecasts for the 10 Basis Point Dependent 
Variable Specification 
       
        
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Austria 8.07                Likely 8.24        Likely 8.07        Likely
Belgium 10.90              Likely 11.13      Likely 8.84        Likely
Cananda 4.85                Unlikely 1.11        Unlikely -          Unlikely
Czech -                  Unlikely 4.50        Unlikely 5.77        Likely
Denmark 1.58                Unlikely 0.86        Unlikely 3.90        Unlikely
Finland -                  Unlikely 1.71        Unlikely -          Unlikely
France 10.04              Likely 7.27        Likely 6.70        Likely
Germany 10.14              Likely 12.99      Likely 11.67      Likely
Greece 1.48                Unlikely 4.64        Unlikely 0.05        Unlikely
Hungary 1.96                Unlikely 2.17        Unlikely 0.87        Unlikely
Iceland 5.25                Likely 1.58        Unlikely -          Unlikely
Ireland 3.72                Unlikely 13.98      Likely 6.23        Likely
Italy 5.07                Likely 5.63        Likely 3.07        Unlikely
Japan 0.06                Unlikely 0.93        Unlikely 0.39        Unlikely
Korea 5.56                Likely 8.67        Likely 8.11        Likely
Luxembourg 13.45              Likely 11.40      Likely 19.76      Probable
Mexico -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Netherlands 9.37                Likely 9.96        Likely 4.39        Unlikely
Norway 5.52                Likely 4.08        Unlikely 1.11        Unlikely
New Zealand 5.32                Likely 1.56        Unlikely -          Unlikely
Poland 2.76                Unlikely 5.43        Likely 2.85        Unlikely
Portugal 2.63                Unlikely 1.79        Unlikely 0.32        Unlikely
Slovenia 30.68              Probable 25.52      Probable 56.89      Probable
Spain 7.79                Likely 6.02        Likely 2.31        Unlikely
Sweden 4.45                Unlikely 5.99        Likely 2.70        Unlikely
Switzerland 5.02                Likely 6.54        Likely 2.47        Unlikely
Turkey 1.27                Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
UK -                  Unlikely 0.92        Unlikely -          Unlikely
US 1.20                Unlikely 0.21        Unlikely -          Unlikely
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
10 basis points
 
 
 133 
 
 
Table 5.7 (B): Out-of-Sample Macro-Logit Forecasts for the 10 Basis Point Dependent 
Variable Specification 
 
 
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia 0.39                Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Austria 10.85              Likely 11.65      Likely 13.72      Likely
Belgium 13.43              Likely 12.92      Likely 11.15      Likely
Cananda 10.12              Likely 1.94        Unlikely 0.85        Unlikely
Czech 0.31                Unlikely 7.85        Likely 11.35      Likely
Denmark 5.17                Likely 3.48        Unlikely 5.09        Likely
Finland -                  Unlikely 5.43        Likely 2.90        Unlikely
France 14.88              Likely 13.09      Likely 10.74      Likely
Germany 16.53              Probable 21.36      Probable 19.73      Probable
Greece 3.49                Unlikely 10.96      Likely 4.51        Unlikely
Hungary 2.29                Unlikely 2.46        Unlikely 0.42        Unlikely
Iceland 2.95                Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Ireland -                  Unlikely 15.09      Probable 3.09        Unlikely
Italy 9.59                Likely 11.75      Likely 8.46        Likely
Japan 2.00                Unlikely 3.38        Unlikely 2.50        Unlikely
Korea 10.44              Likely 13.79      Likely 12.36      Likely
Luxembourg 15.76              Probable 14.16      Likely 26.74      Probable
Mexico -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Netherlands 8.36                Likely 10.50      Likely 4.60        Unlikely
Norway 13.64              Likely 11.02      Likely 7.68        Likely
New Zealand 13.61              Likely 9.54        Likely 5.79        Likely
Poland 1.26                Unlikely 6.74        Likely 3.82        Unlikely
Portugal 6.81                Likely 6.00        Likely 3.55        Unlikely
Slovenia 39.74              Probable 34.48      Probable 76.97      Probable
Spain 11.41              Likely 9.25        Likely 5.97        Likely
Sweden 6.11                Likely 8.55        Likely 4.59        Unlikely
Switzerland 3.56                Unlikely 4.84        Unlikely 2.21        Unlikely
Turkey 0.37                Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
UK 1.31                Unlikely 3.21        Unlikely -          Unlikely
US 2.21                Unlikely 2.38        Unlikely 0.39        Unlikely
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
10 basis points
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Table 5.7 (C): In-Sample Macro- Logit Forecasts for the 50 Basis Point Dependent 
Variable Specification 
     
           
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Austria 10.96              Likely 10.66      Likely 10.89      Likely
Belgium 13.35              Likely 12.06      Likely 13.40      Likely
Cananda 13.79              Likely 9.36        Likely 9.15        Likely
Czech 3.62                Unlikely 15.44      Probable 14.55      Likely
Denmark 10.53              Likely 7.12        Likely 10.38      Likely
Finland 5.19                Likely 3.95        Unlikely 4.42        Unlikely
France 12.49              Likely 11.36      Likely 10.55      Likely
Germany 15.07              Likely 13.34      Likely 13.26      Likely
Greece 0.66                Unlikely 1.48        Unlikely 2.42        Unlikely
Hungary -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Iceland 1.54                Unlikely 4.02        Unlikely 3.16        Unlikely
Ireland 5.11                Likely 16.92      Probable 13.22      Likely
Italy 3.49                Unlikely 2.55        Unlikely 2.47        Unlikely
Japan -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Korea 12.10              Likely 12.21      Likely 12.14      Likely
Luxembourg 20.28              Probable 17.61      Probable 21.60      Probable
Mexico -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Netherlands 16.15              Likely 11.23      Likely 11.06      Likely
Norway 6.09                Likely 5.18        Likely 6.30        Likely
New Zealand 4.12                Unlikely 4.65        Unlikely 6.26        Likely
Poland 11.13              Likely 10.22      Likely 11.48      Likely
Portugal -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Slovenia 32.91              Probable 26.48      Probable 44.25      Probable
Spain 9.03                Likely 9.49        Likely 8.60        Likely
Sweden 10.79              Likely 10.85      Likely 10.48      Likely
Switzerland 11.41              Likely 10.24      Likely 8.72        Likely
Turkey 2.23                Unlikely 3.09        Unlikely 3.61        Unlikely
UK -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
US 7.80                Likely 8.30        Likely 9.13        Likely
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
50 basis points
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Table 5.7 (D): Out-of-Sample Macro-Logit Forecasts for the 50 Basis Point Dependent 
Variable Specification 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Austria 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Belgium 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Cananda 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Czech 12.8 Likely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Denmark 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Finland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
France 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Germany 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Greece 5.2 Likely 5.2 Likely 9.3 Likely
Hungary 0.8 Unlikely 0.7 Unlikely 2.3 Unlikely
Iceland 5.1 Likely 9.7 Likely 9.0 Likely
Ireland 0.0 Unlikely 5.4 Likely 0.0 Unlikely
Italy 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Japan 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.6 Unlikely
Korea 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Luxembourg 1.1 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 10.3 Likely
Mexico 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Netherlands 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Norway 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
New Zealand 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.8 Unlikely
Poland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Portugal 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Slovenia 38.0 Probable 24.1 Probable 63.4 Probable
Spain 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Sweden 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Switzerland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Turkey 8.5 Likely 10.4 Likely 12.7 Likely
UK 1.3 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
US 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
50 basis points
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Table 5.7 (E): In-Sample Macro-Logit Forecasts for the 100 Basis Point Dependent 
Variable Specification 
       
        
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Austria 5.01                Likely 4.61        Unlikely 7.22        Likely
Belgium 4.02                Unlikely 0.61        Unlikely 3.58        Unlikely
Cananda -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Czech 23.82              Probable 17.47      Probable 12.50      Likely
Denmark -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Finland -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
France -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Germany 8.73                Likely 5.53        Likely 6.94        Likely
Greece 17.23              Probable 15.66      Probable 20.26      Probable
Hungary 11.17              Likely 12.75      Likely 15.93      Probable
Iceland 0.60                Unlikely 12.44      Likely 15.51      Probable
Ireland -                  Unlikely 1.64        Unlikely -          Unlikely
Italy -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Japan 14.40              Likely 14.01      Likely 15.92      Probable
Korea 14.55              Likely 8.90        Likely 5.48        Likely
Luxembourg 13.79              Likely 12.85      Likely 11.54      Likely
Mexico 16.47              Probable 13.49      Likely 16.92      Probable
Netherlands -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Norway -                  Unlikely 5.23        Likely 6.16        Likely
New Zealand -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Poland 12.63              Likely 5.18        Likely 12.82      Likely
Portugal 6.47                Likely 4.14        Unlikely 4.79        Unlikely
Slovenia 26.28              Probable 23.86      Probable 17.54      Probable
Spain -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Sweden -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely 3.11        Unlikely
Switzerland -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Turkey 22.74              Likely 27.61      Probable 29.46      Probable
UK -                  Probable -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
US -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
100 basis points
 
 
 137 
Table 5.7 (F): Out-of-Sample Macro-Logit Forecasts for the 100 Basis Point Dependent 
Variable Specification 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Austria 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Belgium 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Cananda 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Czech 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Denmark 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Finland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
France 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Germany 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Greece 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Hungary 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Iceland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Ireland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Italy 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Japan 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Korea 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Luxembourg 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Mexico 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Netherlands 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Norway 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
New Zealand 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Poland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Portugal 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Slovenia 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Spain 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Sweden 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Switzerland 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Turkey 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
UK 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
US 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
100 basis points
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Note how the choice of dependent variable selection affects the overall performance of 
the model and thus the difficulty inherent in ‘calling’ crises correctly and the impact of 
the choice of dependent variable on the model. The key take away is that we need a range 
of dependent variable triggers for which results to be presented consistently to regulators 
to enable sound decision making. Or in other words, the inherent feedback loops between 
the choice of the regulator objective and the output of an EWS. 
 
An interesting extension is the consolidated forecast for all three dependent variable 
specifications, where the higher probability is chosen for any given year for any given 
country. This is presented in Table 5.8. It is equivalent to a regulator choosing to capture 
all alarm signals from different models in one matrix. 
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Table 5.8 (A): In-Sample Macro-Logit Model Consolidated Forecasts 
    
           
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia -                  Unlikely -          Unlikely -          Unlikely
Austria 10.96              Likely 10.66      Likely 10.89      Likely
Belgium 13.35              Likely 12.06      Likely 13.40      Likely
Cananda 13.79              Likely 9.36        Likely 9.15        Likely
Czech 23.82              Probable 17.47      Probable 14.55      Likely
Denmark 10.53              Likely 7.12        Likely 10.38      Likely
Finland 5.19                Likely 3.95        Unlikely 4.42        Unlikely
France 12.49              Likely 11.36      Likely 10.55      Likely
Germany 15.07              Probable 13.34      Likely 13.26      Likely
Greece 17.23              Probable 15.66      Probable 20.26      Probable
Hungary 11.17              Likely 12.75      Likely 15.93      Probable
Iceland 5.25                Likely 12.44      Likely 15.51      Probable
Ireland 5.11                Likely 16.92      Probable 13.22      Likely
Italy 5.07                Likely 5.63        Likely 3.07        Unlikely
Japan 14.40              Likely 14.01      Likely 15.92      Probable
Korea 14.55              Likely 12.21      Likely 12.14      Likely
Luxembourg 20.28              Probable 17.61      Probable 21.60      Probable
Mexico 16.47              Probable 13.49      Likely 16.92      Probable
Netherlands 16.15              Probable 11.23      Likely 11.06      Likely
Norway 6.09                Likely 5.23        Likely 6.30        Likely
New Zealand 5.32                Likely 4.65        Unlikely 6.26        Likely
Poland 12.63              Likely 10.22      Likely 12.82      Likely
Portugal 6.47                Likely 4.14        Unlikely 4.79        Unlikely
Slovenia 32.91              Probable 26.48      Probable 56.89      Probable
Spain 9.03                Likely 9.49        Likely 8.60        Likely
Sweden 10.79              Likely 10.85      Likely 10.48      Likely
Switzerland 11.41              Likely 10.24      Likely 8.72        Likely
Turkey 22.74              Probable 27.61      Probable 29.46      Probable
UK -                  Unlikely 0.92        Unlikely -          Unlikely
US 7.80                Likely 8.30        Likely 9.13        Likely
Consolidated Forecasts 
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
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Table 5.8 (B): Out-of-Sample Macro Logit Consolidated Forecasts 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
In Percent
Country Crisis Forecast
Crisis 
Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Crisis 
Forecast Crisis Likelihood
Australia 0.4 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Austria 10.8 Likely 11.6 Likely 13.7 Likely
Belgium 13.4 Likely 12.9 Likely 11.2 Likely
Cananda 10.1 Likely 1.9 Unlikely 0.9 Unlikely
Czech 12.8 Likely 7.8 Likely 11.4 Likely
Denmark 5.2 Likely 3.5 Unlikely 5.1 Likely
Finland 0.0 Likely 5.4 Likely 2.9 Unlikely
France 14.9 Likely 13.1 Likely 10.7 Likely
Germany 16.5 Probable 21.4 Probable 19.7 Probable
Greece 5.2 Likely 11.0 Likely 9.3 Likely
Hungary 2.3 Unlikely 2.5 Unlikely 2.3 Unlikely
Iceland 5.1 Likely 9.7 Likely 9.0 Likely
Ireland 0.0 Unlikely 15.1 Probable 3.1 Unlikely
Italy 9.6 Likely 11.7 Likely 8.5 Likely
Japan 2.0 Unlikely 3.4 Unlikely 2.5 Unlikely
Korea 10.4 Likely 13.8 Likely 12.4 Likely
Luxembourg 15.8 Probable 14.2 Likely 26.7 Probable
Mexico 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
Netherlands 8.4 Likely 10.5 Likely 4.6 Unlikely
Norway 13.6 Likely 11.0 Likely 7.7 Likely
New Zealand 13.6 Likely 9.5 Likely 5.8 Likely
Poland 1.3 Unlikely 6.7 Likely 3.8 Unlikely
Portugal 6.8 Likely 6.0 Likely 3.6 Unlikely
Slovenia 39.7 Probable 34.5 Probable 77.0 Probable
Spain 11.4 Likely 9.2 Likely 6.0 Likely
Sweden 6.1 Likely 8.5 Likely 4.6 Likely
Switzerland 3.6 Unlikely 4.8 Unlikely 2.2 Unlikely
Turkey 8.5 Likely 10.4 Likely 12.7 Likely
UK 1.3 Unlikely 3.2 Unlikely 0.0 Unlikely
US 2.2 Unlikely 2.4 Unlikely 0.4 Unlikely
Consolidated Forecasts 
1 Year (2006 base) 2 Year (2005 base) 3 Year (2004 Base)
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5.6.2 Z-Score Model Empirical Estimations 
 
Crisis Signal Forecasts 
 
To translate the Z-score backed out probability of default into judgments on whether a 
crisis signal is given or not, the change in probability of default by one SD (increase only) 
is compared to 3 year rolling, 5 year rolling and 10 year rolling SD of returns. For each of 
these rolling mean calibrations, a country is considered to have a crisis if its PD shifts by 
more than 1 SD.  
 
The forecasts are for t-1, t-2 and t-3, i.e. for the years 2006, 2005 and 2004 respectively 
for each of the rolling mean calibrations. The results for In-Sample forecasts and out-of-
sample forecasts are summarized below. 
 
The sample subset is smaller, but the forecasts follow the same pattern as the larger 
samples for the Signal Extraction and Logit calibrations, with the number of crises called 
using the 3-year benchmark higher than the five-year benchmark and higher than the 10-
year benchmark. This is intuitive as the three year mean is the most volatile and hence a 
crisis signal is issued much more easily than if we are calculating a 1 SD move from a 10 
year rolling mean. 
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Table 5.9 (A): Macro Z-Score Crises Forecasts - Base Case Dependent Variable 
Specification – 1 Year Forecast 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5.9 (B): Macro Z-Score Crises Forecasts -Base Case Dependent Variable 
Specification- 2-Year Forecast 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5.9 (C): Macro Z-Score Crises Forecasts - Base Case Dependent Variable 
Specification- 3-Year Forecast 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5.7 Forecasts and Model Performance 
 
5.7.1 Macro Logit Model Performance  
 
Table 5.10 (A): In-Sample NTSR Summary for Macro Logit Model 
               
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 57% 52% 64% 25% 15%
Type II % 9% 8% 8% 27% 18%
NSTR 0.62        0.57        0.70        0.34                  0.18                
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 82% 47% 29% 31% 20%
Type II % 118% 67% 86% 65% 48%
NSTR 4.50-        1.40        2.00        0.89                  0.38                
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 60% 0% 38% 30% 17%
Type II % 180% 160% 150% 150% 83%
NSTR 0.75-        -          0.75-        0.60-                  1.00                
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 4% 12% 12% 2% 1%
Type II % 22% 12% 20% 52% 36%
NSTR 0.06        0.14        0.15        0.04                  0.02                
*2005 forecast to predict 2005 and 2006 crises.
** 2005 forecast to predict 2005, 2006 and 2007 crises.
Consolidated Forecasts
1-Year Horizon
10 Basis Points
1-Year Horizon
50 Basis Points
1-Year Horizon
100 Basis Points
1-Year Horizon
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Table 5.10 (B): Out-of-Sample NTSR Summary for Macro Logit Model 
 
 
 
  
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 52% 40% 56% 19% 12%
Type II % 13% 16% 16% 35% 26%
NSTR 0.60        0.48        0.67        0.29                  0.17                
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 109% 80% 57% 46% 30%
Type II % 27% 13% 14% 19% 15%
NSTR 1.50        0.92        0.67        0.57                  0.35                
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 160% 100% 63% 80% 44%
Type II % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
NSTR 1.60        1.00        0.63        0.80                  0.44                
2-Year 
Horizon*
3-Year 
Horizon**
2005 2006 2007
Type I % 35% 32% 44% 15% 10%
Type II % 13% 16% 16% 44% 30%
NSTR 0.40        0.38        0.52        0.26                  0.14                
*2005 forecast to predict 2005 and 2006 crises.
** 2005 forecast to predict 2005, 2006 and 2007 crises.
Consolidated Forecasts
1-Year Horizon
10 Basis Points
1-Year Horizon
50 Basis Points
1-Year Horizon
100 Basis Points
1-Year Horizon
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5.7.2 Z-Score Model Performance  
 
5.7.2.1 Noise-To-Signal-Ratios 
Table 5.11 summarizes the model evaluation in terms of noise-to-signal ratios.  
 
Table 5.11 (A): Out-of-Sample Macro Z-Score Noise-To-Signal Ratio (NTSR) 
        
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
The results show better out of sample performance in the 10-year rolling mean 
calibration, over the three year forecast horizon, in terms of NTSR, these are consistent 
with Borio and Drehman (2009) in general who find the 10-year calibration out-
performing out-of-sample.  Out-of-Sample Type I errors are low in the 2 and 3 year 
forecast horizon and so are Type II errors, however, they are higher (worse) than the 
Signal Extraction and Logit model calibrations. Signal extraction is the best performing 
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methodology in terms of Type I errors, while the Logit methodology is the best in terms 
of NTSRs.    
Table 5.11 (B): In-Sample Macro Z-Score Noise-To-Signal Ratio (NTSR) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
5.7.2.2 Z-Score Model Comparison to World Bank  
In order to check the model output for robustness, the results are compared to the Z-
Scores published by the World Bank for the countries in the sample. The comparison is 
presented in Tables 5.12 (A) and 5.12 (B). The key highlights are as follows:  
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For the 20 countries in the sub-sample, from 1992 to 2007, there were 3 countries for 
which the WB had no data but which were compiled for this research - these are Finland, 
Korea, New Zealand. 
 
In general for all the countries for which data was available (17) the WB PDs are higher 
than the ones calculated under the methodology used in this application and the difference 
can be explained by the calculation methodology whereby WB uses standard deviation of 
NI as the denominator, whereas for this research the denominator is the SD of Operating 
profit before provisions (which is lower than NI volatility due to smoothing tools at the 
disposition of management). 
 
IF SDs are much higher for WB calculation of the Z-Score, then in turn WB Z-scores are 
lower than this research (this is indeed the case for all countries in the sample) and their 
inverse, the PD calculated by the World Bank is much higher (also true). 
 
This research focuses on the migration matrix rather than absolute thresholds, because this 
is the crisis indicator utilized. Comparing the migration matrices using the same 
methodology, a shift by more than 1 SD over a 5 year rolling mean, shows that for 14 
countries the migrations using both the WB data and data in this paper are the same in 
count, but with a small difference in timing (+/- 1 year). Also the indicator used in this 
application signals a crisis or a migration to a higher probability of default, one period 
before the migrations calculated using World Bank data (i.e. outperforming World Bank 
results). The migrations are dissimilar for six countries, for which one country there is no 
WB data and for the research the data was compiled (namely Korea).  
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Table 5.12 (A) Macro Z-Score Model Output in Comparison to World Bank  
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Table 5.12 (A) Macro Z-Score Model Output in Comparison to World Bank - Continued 
 
  
 
 
153 
 
 
Table 5.12 (B) Macro Z-Score Model Output in Comparison to World Bank (Migration Matrix)  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5.12 (B) Macro Z-Score Model Output in Comparison to World Bank (Migration Matrix) - Continued 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
 
5.8.1 Logit Model Conclusion 
Using a Logit framework and looking at OECD countries over a 30 year period a number of 
variables were found to be significant in predicting crises. These include growth in pension assets 
(positive and significant at the 5% level) and equity market dividend yield (positive coefficient, 
significant at the 10% level). The former is an indicator for the development of liquidity bubbles 
which leads to financial sector pains. The latter is a proxy for corporate balance sheet health on the 
premise that companies usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking order hypothesis, and also 
as free cash flows to equity shareholders, after debt service, are available. 
 
Banking sector assets growth was closely significant to the 10% level, indicating a strong 
relationship between rapid growth in the sector, its relative size to GDP and the development of 
vulnerabilities (positive coefficient). 
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of 
countries that vulnerabilities were building up across a dependent variable with three cases: a base 
case, a high change dynamic threshold case and a low change dynamic threshold case. Performance 
out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in terms of overall noise to signal ratios. These results show a 
significant improvement compared to earlier work, in terms of NTSR and Type I and Type II errors 
for all calibrations, with the exception of the 100 bps dependent variable calibration. Again a point to 
support the importance of the dependent variable regulator objective calibration and the inherent 
feedback loop to actual model performance. 
 
5.8.2. Z-Score Model Conclusion 
 
Using a Merton type Z-score framework and looking at OECD countries, movements in PD by more 
than one standard deviation were found to be significant in predicting crises. The PDs were 
calculated using a Merton type Z-score framework, where the Z-score is a capital adequacy measure 
plus returns on average assets (the latter defined as NI before provisions/average assets) all divided 
by the standard deviation of returns (same definition, NI before provisions/average assets).  
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of 
countries that vulnerabilities were building up across the base case dependent variable calibration. 
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The model performs well compared to World Bank published Z-Score indicators to calculate 
migration matrices in PDs. 
 
For the various models, the countries signaled to have crises do not map one to one in all three 
applications and some key countries called by the signal extraction to be susceptible to crises are not 
called by the Logit model but are called by the Z-score model, but the Logit model raises the alarm 
bell for other countries. These two findings reinforce the need by regulators to use different models 
and to look at all of them in judging the build up of vulnerabilities, even within the same system / 
country.  
 
5.9 Model Comparisons and Traffic Lights Summary 
 
In order to better evaluate how the various models map, one additional analysis component is 
necessary, in the form of a traffic light type analysis. Clearly one or more models are not expected to 
have the same results consistently, otherwise they would not be sufficiently different to be adding 
information to the decision making information set of a regulator. However, the confirmation of 
signals by both models should raise the red alarm and the disagreement should point to an amber 
alarm, whereas the full agreement for a no crisis signal should be a green light that the financial 
system is robust. 
 
This section is structured as follows: Macro Logit Model compared to Signal Extraction Model; 
Traffic Light Summary (Macro Logit Model and Signal Extraction); Macro-Applications (Z-Score 
and Logit) and Signal Extraction Comparison; Traffic Light Summary (Macro-applications and 
Signal Extraction); and Conclusion. 
 
5.9.1. Logit Comparison to Signal Extraction Findings 
 
For the Logit model, out-of-Sample performance shows consistently better results in terms of NTSR, 
Type I and Type II errors, with the exception of the 100 bps run which shows higher Type I error out 
of sample.  Again a point to support the importance of the dependent variable regulator objective 
calibration as it has an impact on model performance in calling the defined near crisis by the 
regulator. The Logit results improve to the NTSR calculation of the signal extraction application, 
however, Type I errors are worse for the Logit calibration. Also the countries signaled to have crises 
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do not fully map in both applications. These two findings reinforce the need by regulators to use 
different models and to look at all of them in judging the build up of vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 5.13 below presents the forecasts for both models, for the base case 50 basis points bundled 
calibration.  
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Table 5.13 - Macro Forecast Comparison Between Signal Extraction and Logit Models 
50 basis points bundled calibration 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5.9.2. Traffic Light Summary (Logit and Signal Extraction) 
Table 5.14 presents the traffic lights signal to regulators using the decision rule explained in section 
5.9. Note that the traffic signals panel is somewhat similar to a risk heat map and could be easily 
scaled to include other models as well or calibrated to modify output based on regulatory objective 
functions/ thresholds for intervention.  
 
Table 5.14: Traffic Lights for Logit and Signal Extraction Macro Models -50 BPs Bundled 
Calibration 
 
These results also improve to the NTSR 
calculation of the signal extraction 
application, however, Type I errors are 
worse for the Logit calibration as compared 
to the Signal extraction application. Also as 
mentioned, the countries signaled to have 
‘crises’ do not map one to one in both 
applications and some key countries called 
by the signal extraction to be susceptible to 
crises are not called by the Logit model, but 
the Logit model raises the alarm bell for 
other countries. These two findings reinforce 
the need by regulators to use different 
models and to look at all of them in judging 
the build up of vulnerabilities, even within 
the same system / country.  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Different models will invariably have different output in some aspects, one way to summarize the 
results is by looking at EWS models as a traffic light system, where a system is considered to be in 
the Red if more than two models used as decision making tools indicate a crisis, whereas in Amber 
mode, the system is in flux and needs to be monitored closely, while for Green mode, the system is 
robust with all models showing no signals. This traffic light approach is comparable to the risk heat 
maps adopted by global institutions analyzing financial stability and is scalable to incorporate as 
many models as required by regulators. 
 
Looking at the traffic light signals issued by the synthesis of the macro Logit and Signal extraction 
model outputs, most of the countries for the three years have amber signals, which is expected as 
most systems would be in flux with various variables moving picked up by both models. The model 
design is based on capturing movement and volatility in the system, whereby bigger movements 
translate into larger signals. Canada has a Green signal in 2007, meaning that the financial system 
and other explanatory variables were stable and the system as a whole was resilient in terms of 
stocks and flows. The same for France in 2007, although the ratio of bank/assets to GDP was much 
higher at 337% of GDP, compared to 177% of GDP in Canada. Other countries that have green 
signals include Mexico in 2006, New Zealand in 2006, and Spain in 2005. This again reflects a 
period of relative tranquility in the system, as the models are based on movement. The implication of 
this is that the traffic lights need to be monitored not only at a point in time, but also within the 
perspective of a rolling window. 
 
Finally, the countries that have red signals associated are correctly called by the synthesis of these 
two macro-models: Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Slovenia. One of the significant explanatory 
variables, banking assets to GDP in all three countries stood at 172% in Greece, Iceland almost 
1300% and Ireland 707%, and Slovakia almost 30 times GDP. Furthermore, banking sector asset 
growth, another significant explanatory variable, in all three countries saw a 20% increase in the 
years prior to a signal being issued.  
 
It is interesting to investigate further the inter-play between state and financial sectors. Juxtaposing 
Iceland and Greece, the former had good state management, but an extremely overleveraged banking 
sector at 1300% of GDP. While the latter had a healthy banking sector, at 172% of GDP, but poor 
state management of macro structural issues which currently threaten its exit altogether from the 
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European Union. The interconnection between state sector health, banking and sovereign crises is 
another area of research where EWS models would be of great value. 
 
The two macro models however, did not pick up on some of the countries which should have had red 
signals in hindsight, including the US and the UK. This improves substantially with the macro Z-
score model overlay discussed later and also the micro-model overlay for the final traffic lights 
synthesis. 
 
5.9.3. Macro-Applications (Z-Score, Logit) and Signal Extraction Comparison 
Comparing the Z-score macro application with the Logit macro application and signal extraction 
applications point to a number of key recommendations. First, regulator objective functions do have 
an impact on model performance, and therefore EWS should always be designed with a set of 
objective functions and crises evaluated for each set as evident from the output of the three 
methodologies based on the three scenarios for the magnitude of change in the dependent variable 
that is deemed systemic. Second, regulators should use a number of models simultaneously to 
monitor changes in their respective systems and the impact from spillovers from other 
interconnected systems as each model has strengths and weaknesses. Third, there is a lot of value in 
the initial data searching exercise for variables, because this helps determine at any one point in time 
on a dynamic basis as these are the factors that are moving in the system and could cause 
vulnerabilities. Last, regulatory oversight and judgment need to be exercised at all times without 
over reliance on models as clearly, the outcomes must be then mapped onto real life by the regulator 
and also assessed in terms of cost of intervention versus cost of waiting for certain further critical 
triggers and regulators need to exercise vigilance and prudence consistently. Table 5.15 below, 
presents the forecasts for all three models, for the base case 50 basis points bundled calibration 
dependent variable.  
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Table 5.15 - Out-of-Sample Forecast Comparison Between Macro Z-Score, Signal Extraction and Logit Models (50 basis points bundled 
dependent variable calibration) 
 
 
*For Z-score model, countries not in current sample, get a calibration of 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5.15 - Out-of-Sample Forecast Comparison Between Macro Z-Score, Signal Extraction and Logit Models (50 basis points bundled 
dependent variable calibration) - Continued 
 
 
 
*For Z-score model, countries not in current sample, get a calibration of 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5.9.4. Traffic Light Summary (Z-Score, Logit and Signal Extraction) 
In order to better evaluate how the various models map, we add the traffic light analysis component. 
Clearly the three models are not expected to have the same results consistently, otherwise they 
would not be sufficiently different to be adding information to the decision making information set 
of a regulator. However, the confirmation of signals by the three models should raise the red alarm 
and the disagreement should point to an amber alarm, whereas the full agreement for a no crisis 
signal should be a green light that the financial system is robust. Table 5.16 presents the traffic lights 
signal to regulators using the decision rule explained above for all three models. Note that the traffic 
signals panel is somewhat similar to a risk heat map and could be easily scaled to include other 
models as well or calibrated to modify output based on regulatory objective functions/ thresholds for 
intervention.  
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Table 5.16: Traffic Light Summary for Macro Z-Score, Logit and Signal Extraction Models 
50 Basis Points Dependent Variable Bundled Calibration 
 
Different models will invariably have 
different output in some aspects, one way 
to summarize the results is by looking at 
EWS models as a traffic light system, 
where a system is considered to be in the 
‘Red’ if more than two models used as 
decision making tools indicate a crisis, 
whereas in Amber mode, the system is in 
flux and needs to be monitored closely, 
while for Green mode, the system is robust 
with all models showing no signals. This 
traffic light approach is comparable to the 
risk heat maps adopted by global 
institutions analyzing financial stability 
and is scalable to incorporate as many 
models as required by regulators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Looking at the traffic light signals issued by the synthesis of the macro Logit, Signal extraction and 
Z-score model outputs, most of the countries for the three years have amber signals, which is 
expected as most systems would be in flux with various variables moving picked up by the three 
models, although we have an increase in red signals to 21, versus 8 in the Logit and Signal 
extraction synthesis. The model design is based on capturing movement and volatility in the system, 
whereby bigger movements translate into larger signals. Canada still has a ‘Green’ signal in 2007 
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after adding the third model, confirming that the financial system and other explanatory variables 
were stable and the system as a whole was resilient in terms of stocks and flows. The same for 
France in 2007, although the ratio of bank/assets to GDP was much higher at 337% of GDP, 
compared to 177% of GDP in Canada. Other countries that have ‘green’ signals include Mexico in 
2006, New Zealand in 2006, and Spain in 2005 and Portugal in 2006. This again reflects a period of 
relative ‘tranquility’ in the system, as the three models are based on movement. The implication of 
this is that the traffic lights need to be monitored not only at a point in time, but also within the 
perspective of a rolling window. 
 
Finally, the countries that have ‘red’ signals associated are correctly called by the synthesis of these 
three macro-models, and improve on just the use of two models: Austria (2006), Belgium (2005, 
2006, 2007), Canada (2005, 2006), Greece (2006,2007), Iceland (2005, 2006, 2007), Ireland (2005, 
2006), Luxembourg (2005) and Slovenia (2005, 2006), Sweden (2005), Switzerland (2006) and the 
US (2007). Two of the significant explanatory variables, banking assets to GDP and banking sector 
asset growth, significant explanatory variables, in all these countries were either very high as a 
percentage of GDP (ranging from a low of 2 x to a high of 30 x GDP), while banking sector asset 
growth in the year prior to a signal being issued was close to 20%. 
 
The three macro models however, did improve by picking up on some of the countries, including the 
US which should have had ‘red’ signals in hindsight in the two model synthesis. The UK is still in 
amber mode for this synthesis as it had the smallest equity index movements, another significant 
explanatory variable. This improves substantially with the micro-model overlay for the final traffic 
lights synthesis which incorporates the health of the top five banks in this picture. 
 
5.9.5. Conclusion 
The comparison of all three models point to a number of key recommendations. Firstly, regulator 
objective functions do have an impact on model performance, and therefore EWS should always be 
designed with a set of objective functions and crises evaluated for each set as evident from the 
output of the three methodologies based on the three scenarios for the magnitude of change in the 
dependent variable that is deemed systemic. Secondly, regulators should use a number of models 
simultaneously to monitor changes in their respective systems and the impact from spill-overs from 
other interconnected systems as each model has strengths and weaknesses. Thirdly, there is a lot of 
value in the initial data searching exercise for variables, because this helps determine at any one 
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point in time on a dynamic basis as these are the factors that are ‘moving’ in the system and could 
cause vulnerabilities. Lastly, regulatory oversight and judgment need to be exercised at all times 
without over reliance on models as clearly, the outcomes must be then mapped onto real life by the 
regulator and also assessed in terms of cost of intervention versus cost of waiting for certain further 
critical triggers and regulators need to exercise vigilance and prudence consistently. 
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6. Chapter Six: Micro-Application to Individual Banks and Rating Implications 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The recent crisis highlighted the failure of former early warning signals models, both on the macro 
and micro levels. Neither systemic crises were predicted nor individual bank failures by previously 
existing models, including Z-score type applications used by rating agencies. For example Moody’s 
KMV subset in application to banks, did not call the subsequent failure of key systemic institutions 
that collapsed. On the macro level, using a sample of 105 countries, covering the years 1979 to 2003, 
Davis and Karim (2008) cited earlier demonstrate this. This paper attributes this failure partly to 
dependent variable and independent variable specification and model empirical design, all three 
areas which we attempt to improve on in this micro-application.  
 
Commonly used dependent variable specifications in the past are ex-post measures of the cost of 
banking distress in the form of direct bailout funds, an elevated level of NPLs, nationalization and/or 
other form of government intervention or workout or restructuring solution. In the case of the failure 
of more than one institution, or the prevalence of any of the above measures across an entire banking 
system in a country or several countries, then the failures are deemed a systemic crisis. The history 
of costs of systemic crises as cited earlier includes Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) who find bailout 
costs averaged 10% of GDP in previous crises, with some crises much more damaging like the 
Mexican Tequila Crisis (1994) which cost 20% of GDP, and the Jamaican crisis (1996) which cost 
37% of GDP. According to the IMF, the past crisis of 2007 - 2010 had cumulative (indirect) output 
losses over 2008-2010 estimated at around 5% of global output (this amounts to around USD10.2 
trillion if we apply the rate to IMF global output estimates), while direct bailout measures by 
governments have almost tallied a similar figure and direct write-downs by agents tallied some 
USD3.4 trillion. These collectively are equivalent to 40% of global GDP in 2010. 
 
However, given that there is a substantial body of literature discussed earlier in chapters 4 and 5 that 
highlights the linkage between the build-up of financial fragility and crises, this motivated our 
research into the precursor to crises, namely the build-up of fragility in an individual institution as a 
necessary and sufficient condition to predict failure. By focusing on near failure, the model is 
calibrated to detect a pre-crisis and in turn would give policy makers more lead time to avert or at 
least minimize failure costs of an institution, mitigate contagion effects and avert systemic crises. 
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This is an important extension in two ways: firstly the addition of micro analysis to the previous 
chapters adds depth, with systems which have more institutions under stress, being scaled on the 
traffic light matrix as worse than systems that do not. The second extension is with regards to credit 
ratings or rankings within a system, whereby the micro application would allow regulators to do so. 
This way the EWS would be credible and usable by policy makers on both the macro and micro 
levels, and thus effective. Also the specification of the dependent variable to signal near-failure, 
means that a lot of data which was not previously utilized in a bank failure and EWS analysis will 
now be taken into account. 
 
Focusing on independent variable specifications, similar to the macro models, these evolved in 
earlier literature over three generations of thought. The first generation (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999 is an example) was based on macro weaknesses and relied on macro-economic indicators as 
explanatory variables such as real GDP growth, real exchange rates, current account balance, 
inflation, among others. Second generation was based on self-fulfilling prophecies and herding 
behavior using explanatory variables such as changes in real interest rates or changes in interest rate 
spreads which could signal changes in agent expectations. These include work by Flood and Garber 
(1984) and Obstfeld (1986), and Claessens (1991). Finally, third generation such as Krugman 
(1999), Bris and Koskinen (2000) and Cabellero and Krishnamurthy (2000) was based on contagion 
and spill-overs from other countries or markets which used explanatory variables such as changes in 
capital flows, changes in trade flows, in addition to other variables. Thus, independent variable use 
spanned across macro factors, micro factors, a combination of both, on an endogenous and 
exogenous level as the case may be.  
 
The choice of independent variables for this chapter was as such guided to include exogenous and 
endogenous variables representative of all three schools and across all the different classifications. 
We look at real GDP growth, banking sector asset growth, the level of banking sector assets to GDP, 
development of asset price bubble indicators (a house price indicator and an equity capital markets 
indicator), a dividend yield indicator as a proxy for the health of the corporate sector, a banking 
sector liquidity indicator and a banking sector funding indicator as micro structural indicators for the 
industry, and a pension funds to GDP indicator as a proxy for the development of liquidity bubbles. 
 
The specific empirical model designs used to predict banking distress fall into four categories and 
use the same approaches as in the previous applications discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. These 
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include: i) signals models; ii) logit/probit models; iii) Merton type models; and a less used class of 
models, iv) Binary recursive trees. In this chapter we use a signal extraction methodology. 
Predominantly in earlier literature such as Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999 and Alessi and Detken 
2008, the structure of the signal extraction model was based on a static threshold chosen for each 
independent variable determined on the basis of minimizing Type I and Type II errors in-sample for 
this variable or in other words minimizing the Noise-To-Signal Ratio (NTSR - which itself is 
another way of summarizing a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors) and assessing the 
probability of a crisis conditional a signal being issued. This paper improves on empirical design 
substantially with the choice of variable thresholds no longer static, but rather dynamic in the form 
of standard deviations from a chosen metric which in this case has been chosen as a long-run mean 
for a variable (this is somewhat similar to Borio and Drehmann (2009) who use gap analysis from a 
long term trend but for only two independent variables). By shifting the analysis to focus on standard 
deviations as opposed to absolute values, this model focuses on capturing volatility in a chosen 
variable, rather than thresholds chosen on the basis of output of a certain data period. This means 
that the model design as such is usable in different time periods and different states of the world.  
 
One of the problems with earlier models is that repeated exercises for different time periods always 
resulted in different performance of a fixed set of indicator variables. This is because causes for 
crises change over time and also because static thresholds chosen for each variable to signal a crisis 
are by default linked to whichever data period they were calibrated to. This explains why in-sample 
performance of these models was much better than out-of-sample and why the old models failed to 
predict the last crisis. The design of our model to read deviations from a chosen benchmark means 
that the chosen variables are valid for the data period for which the model was designed and for 
other data periods as well, thus improving on out-of-sample performance, another major weakness in 
earlier models.  
 
The results show similar performance in-sample and out-of-sample, unlike the previous applications 
which showed better out-of-sample performance and better lead time. This is explained by the length 
of the data series for the micro application. However, Type I errors for the 2-Year and 3-Year 
horizons are 14% in-sample and 17% out-of-sample, which out-performs earlier literature.  This 
compares to higher Out-of-Sample Type I errors for the 2 and 3 year forecast horizon in the Z-Score 
macro application, so there is an improvement here. The Signal extraction methodology remains the 
 
 
172 
 
best performing methodology in terms of Type I errors, while the Logit macro methodology is the 
best in terms of NTSRs.  
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of banks 
that vulnerabilities were building up. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in terms of 
overall noise to signal ratios. These results show a significant improvement compared to earlier 
work, in terms of NTSR and Type I and Type II errors for all calibrations. Signal extraction 
performed best in terms of Type I errors, the macro Logit model in terms of NTSR and the macro Z-
score model in terms of Type II errors. 
 
The overlay of the micro model improves the traffic lights matrix substantially, with countries like 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland and the UK in 2007, which were in Amber mode before, moving to Red. 
These two findings reinforce the need by regulators to use different models and to look at all of them 
in judging the build up of vulnerabilities, even within the same system / country.  
 
Different models will invariably have different output in some aspects, one way to summarize the 
results is by looking at EWS models as a traffic light system, where a system is considered to be in 
the Red if more than two models used as decision making tools indicate a crisis, whereas in Amber 
mode, the system is in flux and needs to be monitored closely, while for Green mode, the system is 
robust with all models showing no signals. This traffic light approach is comparable to the risk heat 
maps adopted by global institutions analyzing financial stability and is scalable to incorporate as 
many models as required by regulators. Also micro model improves the EWS system considerably. 
 
Using a Merton type Z-score framework and looking at OECD countries, movements in Probability 
of Default (PD) by more than one standard deviation in member banks in the sample which were 
aggregated were found to be significant in predicting crises. The PDs were calculated using a 
Merton type Z-score framework, where the Z-score is a capital adequacy measure plus returns on 
average assets all divided by the standard deviation of returns. Our innovation in the calculation of 
the Z-score on the micro level, is the same as what we have applied on the macro level. We use net 
income before provisions and taxes to average assets to gauge the true operating returns of a bank 
(system in the case of the macro model) and we also use the volatility of this same series for the 
denominator. 
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The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of 
countries that vulnerabilities were building up across their banking sectors. The countries signaled to 
have ‘crises’ in the previous applications do not map one to one in all of them and some key 
countries called by the signal extraction to be susceptible to crises are not called by the Logit model 
but are called by the Z-score model. The overlay of the micro model improves the traffic lights 
matrix substantially, with countries like Portugal, Italy, Ireland and the UK in 2007, which were in 
Amber mode before, moving to Red. These two findings reinforce the need by regulators to use 
different models and to look at all of them in judging the build up of vulnerabilities, even within the 
same system / country.  
 
The last section of this chapter overlays the micro model findings to the previous suite of models, Z-
Score, Logit and signal extraction and points to a measured improvement resulting from combining 
the micro and macro analysis. Regulator objective functions do have an impact on model 
performance, and therefore EWS should always be designed with a set of objective functions and 
crises evaluated for each set as evident from the output of the three methodologies based on the three 
scenarios for the magnitude of change in the dependent variable that is deemed systemic. Similarly 
the micro model is a valuable overlay to complete the picture. Also, regulators should use a number 
of models simultaneously to monitor changes in their respective systems and the impact from spill-
overs from other interconnected systems as each model has strengths and weaknesses. In addition, 
there is a lot of value in the initial data searching exercise for variables, because this helps determine 
at any one point in time on a dynamic basis as these are the factors that are ‘moving’ in the system 
and could cause vulnerabilities. Also as evident from the micro model, building robust databases on 
the micro level and the macro level are elementary to setting up an effective EWS. Lastly, regulatory 
oversight and judgment need to be exercised at all times without over reliance on models as clearly, 
the outcomes must be then mapped onto real life by the regulator and also assessed in terms of cost 
of intervention versus cost of waiting for certain further critical triggers and regulators need to 
exercise vigilance and prudence consistently. 
 
This rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Literature Review on Micro-Applications with a 
special focus on Merton Applications and Z-Score Subset and bank rating applications; Data and 
Descriptive Statistics of Bank Universe; Dependent Variable Set-Up for Z-Score Model; 
Explanatory Variable Set-Up for Z-Score Model; Preliminary Empirical Estimations; Forecasts and 
Model Performance; Bank Rating application and conclusions and traffic light summary. 
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6.2. Literature Review – Micro-Applications 
 
This approach has been mainly used to study individual bank failure, with empirical studies dating 
back to the 1970s, mainly relying on bank balance sheet and market information to explain and 
forecast the failure of individual institutions. These include studies with variations of a Merton type, 
options based model to predict expected number of defaults (END) Z-scores or distance to default 
(DD) for financial institutions or sovereigns and credit migrations (recent studies include Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes 2004, Fuertes and Kalotychou 2006 and Savona and Vezzoli, 2008, among 
others).   
 
A number of applications have used Merton type approaches on an aggregate level to calculate Z-
scores and distance to default measures. Tieman and Maechler (2009), adopt this ‘superbank’ 
approach, which aggregates all players on one ‘pseudo’ balance sheet (this approach was also 
adopted by the Central Bank of Egypt’s Macro-Prudential Unit for some of its stress-testing 
exercises). They focus on the short-run feedback effect from market-based indicators of financial 
sector risk to the real economy through the credit channel, and estimate this effect on an economy-
wide (macro) level. Their sample includes seven countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, and focuses on the largest banks in each of these countries (a 
total of 26 banks) over the period covered 1991–2007, the authors find that although there is 
considerable variation across indicators, in both cases, the period 2004 to mid-2007 is characterized 
by low risk, as reflected by (almost) uniformly high DD indicators or, conversely, low EDFs.  
 
A somewhat similar application, but with a focus on creating a new financial stability quantifiable 
metric is made by Martin Cihak (2007) who presents an integrated measure of financial stability 
which he calls ‘systemic loss’. The author looks at the financial system as if it’s a ‘portfolio’ of 
financial institutions’ and considers the whole ‘distribution’ of systemic losses of this aggregate 
portfolio, over one period. He proposes that systemic loss measurement should be based on i) 
probability of default; ii) loss given default; and iii) correlation of defaults across institutions. An 
earlier paper by Blejer and Schumacher (1998), uses a similar assessment of a distribution of losses 
of a financial system as a whole, but in a value-at-risk (VaR) type set-up, with regards to currency 
crises, by constructing a VaR metric for central banks and concludes that this is a useful monitor of 
sovereign risk. The analysis covers 29 countries, including 12 in which a systemic banking crisis 
started during the period of study according to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). The main findings are 
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that the indicators used do point to increased instability and using the Loss Given Default (LGD) and 
correlations across failures into account improves the measurement (reduces the noise-to-signal 
ratio). The following table, adapted from Cihak (2007), presents a summary of the different Merton 
type applications to predict banking and systemic crises and the advantages and drawbacks of each 
sub-set. 
 
Table 6.1:  Detailed Review of Micro Merton Type Methods for Crises Prediction and the Advantages 
and Disadvantages of Each 
Indicator Advantages Disadvantages 
DD or Z-Score (or 
probability of Default) 
Easy to calculate from individual 
institutions’ or for a portfolio, for 
DDs, Z-scores, or PDs. 
 Does not reflect contagion (correlation across 
failures if average of individual institutions). 
 Does not reflect LGD of individual institutions, 
even though can be partially addressed by 
weighting. 
 DD requires liquid market in financial institutions 
iNTSRuments used to back out the metric if market 
data is used. 
First-to-default and 
nth-to-default indicator 
 Clear theoretical underpinnings for 
the nth to default indicator 
 Does not fully reflect differences in LGD in 
different institutions. 
 FTD looks at individual vs systemic risk. 
Expected number of 
defaults (END) 
indicator 
 Relatively easy to interpret.  Does not reflect different LGDs in institutions. 
 Difficult to calculate as its not a closed form 
expression 
 Focuses only on central tendency of the 
distribution. 
 Depends on total number of institutions  
Distribution of 
systemic loss 
 Captures differences in LGD in 
institutions 
 Captures correlation across bank 
failures 
 Focuses only on central tendencies 
 May be difficult to calculate in some cases; no 
closed-form expression. 
 
Source: Adapted from Cihak (2007). 
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Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2004), using a Merton type approach, analyze the ability of equity and 
bond market signals as leading indicators in a sample of EU banks. They find both indicators are 
good leading metrics of fragility, with distance to default exhibiting lead times of 6 to 18 months, 
while bond spreads signal values close to problems only.  In a related study, Krainer and Lopez 
(2004), find that stock returns and equity-based default probabilities are useful indicators for US 
bank supervisors. The authors develop a model of supervisory ratings that combines supervisory and 
equity market information and find that their model forecasts supervisory rating changes by up to 
four quarters. Finally, an application to Estonia by Chen, Funke and Mannasoo (2006) attempts to 
predict bank fragility from market prices through the use of a Merton type approach and find that 
market indicators are moderately useful for anticipating future financial distress and rating changes.  
 
6.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics of Bank Universe 
 
In this chapter we look at micro individual bank data, looking at a sample of 139 banks, with assets 
of around USD50 trillion and capturing 55% of total banking assets in eleven OECD countries: the 
US, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Spain, Ireland and Greece. Collectively, these 
banks captured a minimum of 54% to 97% of their respective country banking market shares. OECD 
data on individual banks is available for 15 years, back to 1997 for on-balance sheet activities from 
Bankscope and Bloomberg. The data period for the Z-score application as such spans from 1997 to 
2007 (this contrasts with the macro Z-score application, where we have data going back to 1989) 
with 3 explanatory variables, capital adequacy metric for each bank, return on average assets before 
provisions for each bank and standard deviation of returns for each bank. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the number of banks studied in each country, total sample assets, total sector assets, 
country GDP and sector assets as a percentage of GDP. Note how banking sector assets to GDP in 
Ireland stood at 760% in 2007 and in the UK at 441%, the highest in this sub-sample of 11 countries. 
Also the highest concentration is in Portugal, with the top 5 banks capturing 86% of total sector 
assets, and the least is in the US where the market is more fragmented, at 23% (however, post the 
crisis, with bank failures and mergers, concentration ratios are conjectured to have increased 
significantly. For example, Fannie Mae’s balance sheet has grown from USD882 billion in 2007 to a 
whopping USD3.2 trillion, and Bank of America from USD1.7 trillion to USD2.3 trillion, 
respectively).  
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Banking sectors in Europe are highly concentrated as seen in the rest of the nine countries, which is 
one of the factors adding to the riskiness of the sector and to the implications of cross border 
interbank lending in the case of default in any part of Europe. Further more there are implications 
with regards to the funding that European banks are currently providing to US banks, another 
contagion channel in addition to plain vanilla asset exposures. 
 
Table 6.2: Micro Model Country Summary for 11 OECD Countries (Assets and Market Share Summary) 
No Country No. of 
Banks 
T. Assets of 
Sample 
(USD 
Bil.)* 
T. Sector 
Assets (USD 
Bil.)* 
Market 
Share of 
Sample/T. 
Sector 
Assets 
Market Share 
of Top 5 
Banks/T. 
Sector Assets 
(2007) 
GDP 
 
(USD 
Bil).* 
Sector 
Assets 
% of 
GDP 
1. US** 20 17, 436 32,000 54% 23% 13,808 230% 
2. UK 9 12,081 12,728 94% 40% 2,803 441% 
3. Germany 17 9,394 9,714 97% 58% 3,321 283% 
4. France 7 7,738 9,337 83% 77% 2,594 298% 
5. Italy 20 3,859 4,876 79% 61% 2,118 230% 
6. Japan 17 5,965 7,752 77% 60% 4,384 177% 
7. Canada 14 2,575 2,737 94% 82% 1,436 191% 
8. Spain 14 3,747 4,170 90% 69% 1,440 290% 
9. Ireland 6 1,498 1,980 75% 61% 261 760% 
10. Greece 8 498 575 87% 73% 313 260% 
11. Portugal 7 532 579 92% 86% 224 260% 
 Total 139  47,887   86,448  55% 67% 32,702 264% 
*2007, OECD data. 
** Note the US reports banking data excluding NBFI’s, the most important and systemically significant in our view are Fannie and Freddie Mac. 
Therefore we have included these in our calculation. Their exclusion results in sector assets to GDP of only 100%, which is the figure quoted in almost 
all literature on the US banking system. 
Source: OECD, Bankscope, Bloomberg, authors’ calculation. 
 
 
The following Table 6.3 provides key indicators for the top five banks in every country. The metrics 
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also included given their systemic importance in the US. A 
common theme is especially weak or negative return on average assets calculated on the basis of 
operating profits versus not income, for failed institutions. 
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Table 6.3: Micro Model Country Key Indicators for Top Five Banks in 11 OECD Countries 
 
 
*Data as of 2010, unless otherwise stated. 
Source: Bankscope, Bloomberg, authors’ calculation. 
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Table 6.3: Micro Model Country Key Indicators for Top Five Banks in 11 OECD Countries 
(Continued) 
 
 
 
*Data as of 2010, unless otherwise stated. 
Source: Bankscope, Bloomberg, authors’ calculation. 
 
From the table, the average equity / total assets of the top 55 banks stood at 6% in 2010, significantly 
below the Basel III guidelines of Tier 1 capital of 8.5% plus 2% as a conservation buffer for a total 
capital ratio of 10.5%. Assets/equity averaged 17x and both operating profit returns and net income 
returns are zero on average.  
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6.4. Dependent Variable Set-Up for the Micro Model 
 
This chapter uses the same adapted definition focusing on near-crises used in the macro applications, 
where each bank is identified as having a near-crisis or not based on a composite indicator of its 
solvency and profitability and changes in both thereof. By using this definition of near-crises as 
opposed to an ex-post metric of bank failure, such as losses as a percentage of GDP, NPL level, or 
bankruptcy, which identify failure at a stage which is too late for policy makers to take any action to 
actually prevent it – this adapted near-crisis or near distress definition would by default lead to a 
longer lead period for the signals issued with regards to a banking failure as they will point to 
imbalance and/or fragility build-up. 
 
Dependent Variable Specification 
 
The dependent variable designed to capture changes to bank solvency and profitability or periods of 
near-crisis or banking distress is composed of four components as follows: 
 
5. For any given year for any bank, if it saw a decrease in its capitalization of more than a 
certain number of basis points (delta capitalization as measured by capital/total assets); 
 
6. Or an increase in its capitalization of more than a certain number of basis points* (delta 
capitalization as measured by capital/total assets); 
 
7. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet falls by more 
than a number of basis points (delta NI before provisions/average balance sheet); 
 
8. Or if its net income before provisions as a percentage of average balance sheet is less than a 
certain number of basis points; 
this bank is deemed to be facing a near-crisis or a period of heightened fragility.  
 
The reason the profitability metrics were included as separate components, is to capture any over 
statement of capital or hidden non-performing loans. If these two metrics are really poor, while the 
former two seem robust, then we could potentially be faced with an inflated balance sheet or capital 
base or both. 
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The number of near-crises by bank and year are 1,030 observations out of 1,946 or 53% as per the 
following Table 6.4. From the perspective of a regulator, this paper puts forward the argument that 
regulators should always be concerned with predicting the ‘near failures’ and working on the 
conditions within their purview to prevent them from developing into failures.  
 
Table 6.4: Micro Model Bank Distress Definitions 
No. Criteria Fragility Spots 
1 Decrease in bank capitalization by 50 bps 478 
2 Increase in bank capitalization by 50 bps 434 
3 
Net income before provisions/ average balance sheet falls by more than 
50 bps 228 
4 Net income before provisions / average balance sheet is less than - 5 bps 114 
      
Total before eliminations 1,254 
Eliminations for double counting  1,030  
Total Observations 1,946 
Percentage Fragility Spots 53% 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Notes 
*The use of component two as part of the dependent variable specification was tested separately in the macro 
applications as an explanatory variable based on the intuition that banks would potentially increase their capital ex-ante 
in anticipation of taking on more risk in future. However, when calibrated as such the model performance for the 12 
unbundled runs (3 cases plus one consolidated times 3 dependent variable specifications unbundled) deteriorated 
drastically across the board. Which led the authors to another potential reasoning, which is that banks increase capital 
only if they know they have already taken on more risk, so this is a ‘post’ or dependent variable. This variable proxies 
the asymmetry in ‘realizing’ the impact of increased risk explicitly on the assets side (i.e. that ‘booking’ the risk happens 
with a lag after the action of risk taking has occurred). The increase in capital/total assets is then the mirror image to the 
decrease metric, where the assets  are booked and capital is catching up. We are grateful to Professors Alistair Milne and 
Steve Thomas of Cass Business School for their comments on this particular point.   
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6.5. Explanatory Variable Set-Up for the Micro Model 
 
Two of the components of the Z-score explanatory variable for the top five banks in every country: 
equity to total assets as a capital adequacy metric and return on average assets as measured by net 
income before provisions divided by average assets are presented for a ten year period in the 
following Table 6.5. PDs are backed out and the migration matrix calibrated whereby a shift in PDs 
is the explanatory variable that signals a near crisis. 
 
Over the ten-year period, average equity to total assets for the sample was 6%, while return on 
average assets averaged 0%. Bank differences are pronounced, with the highest average capital held 
by Italian banks in general, UBI Banca (16.7% and Intesa San Paolo in Italy 16.3%) and the lowest 
held by ten banks, across all countries, which hold less than 3.5% (Dexia Credit Locale, France, 
Depfa Ireland, Hypo Real Estate Holdings Germany, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae, Landesbank, Deutsche and Commerzbank in Germany and Barclays in the UK). The 
highest returns were booked by US, Greek and Spanish banks, 2% and above, which could be a 
reflection of credit risk on the books of these banks (BBVA Spain, National Bank of Greece, 
Citigroup in the US, Bank of America, EFG Eurobank Greece, and Banco Popular in Spain).  Two 
Irish banks have the lowest returns, Anglo Irish and Depfa. Higher returns help a system build its 
capital base, albeit slowly, whereas more direct measures such as capital raisings and capital 
injections are fast impact measures. The reverse is also true, with low returns slowly eroding the 
capital base and shocks resulting in quick capital erosion. 
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Table 6.5.(A) : Micro Model Bank Explanatory Variable Descriptive Statistics – Equity/Assets 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 6.5.(B): Micro Model Bank Explanatory Variable Descriptive Statistics- RoAA 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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6.6. Empirical Estimations 
 
Empirical Model 
 
The Z-score has been used extensively as a measure of individual financial institutions’ soundness as 
in Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, Tressel (2006) and Cihak (2007). The Z-score is defined as z ≡ 
(k+μ)/σ, where k is equity capital as percent of assets, μ is return as percent of assets, and σ is 
standard deviation of return on assets as a proxy for return volatility. The z-score is simple to 
calculate and its attractiveness lies in it being inversely related to the probability of a financial 
institution’s default.  
 
The probability of default for the integral from - to k, is given by 
 
p (μ < k) = ∫ φ (μ) dμ 
  
If μ is normally distributed, then p (μ < k) = ∫ N(0,1) dμ where z is the z-score. Hence if returns are 
normally distributed, the z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has 
to fall in order to deplete equity. In the case μ is not normally distributed, z is the lower bound on the 
probability of default (by Tchebycheff inequality) and therefore a higher z-score implies a lower 
probability of insolvency. 
 
The z-scores have several limitations as discussed in Table 6.1, the most important is that they are 
based on low frequency accounting data. Also, the z-score applied to an individual financial 
institution, does not take into account the correlation of institutions in the system. However, an 
advantage of the z-score is that it can be used for any institution, even if its not traded or its 
securities are not liquid enough to enable a higher frequency Merton type application.  
 
Similar to “portfolio DD,” we can define “portfolio z-score,” as z ≡ (k+μ)/σ, where k is total equity 
capital in the system as percent of total assets in the system, μ is total return as percent of total 
assets, and σ is standard deviation of the aggregate return on aggregate assets as a proxy for return 
volatility. The portfolio z-score is always higher than the sum of z-scores for the individual 
institutions.  
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Similar to the signal extraction and the Logit applications, the evaluation of a Z-score model could 
be done using a NTSR framework choosing the model that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio, ω, 
that is computed in as follows: 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
Where α is the size of the type I error and β is the size of the type II error, and where both are 
functions of the chosen variable threshold. 
 
Applying this to the Z-score model, the noise-to-signal ratio of each Z-score run, ω, would also be 
computed in the same way. Where α again is the size of the type I error and β is the size of the type 
II error. 
 
The question is from a regulatory perspective, if the objective function of the regulator is to prevent 
crises at all costs, then model evaluation should be on the basis of minimizing Type I errors as they 
are much more costly, and accepting Type II errors as a downside. By setting this objective function, 
the regulator would ensure a continuously healthy system and is taking the most risk-averse stance 
they could take. This is another innovation attempted throughout all three applications. 
 
6.7. Forecasts and Model Performance 
 
6.7.1 Crisis Signal Forecasts 
 
To translate the Z-score backed out probability of default into judgments on whether a crisis signal is 
given or not, the change in probability of default by one SD (increase only) is compared to 3 year 
rolling PDs, a bank is considered to have a crisis if its PD shifts by more than 1 SD.  
 
As the data period for the individual banks is only 15 years, compared to 30 years for the macro 
application, the number of observations is significantly reduced. Furthermore, as the failure signals 
are calculated on the basis of standard deviations from a 3 year rolling mean, which in turn is 
calculated on the basis of a three year rolling standard deviation of returns, we lose a total of six 
years of data in this exercise, leaving only 9 years of usable observations for the banks which have 
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the full 15 years available. This also means we have had to include the crisis years in the calculation, 
2008, 2009 and 2010 to ensure a minimum number of data points.  
 
The forecasts are for t-1, t-2 and t-3, i.e. for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively. The results 
for In-Sample forecasts and out-of-sample forecasts for the 139 banks are summarized below. 
 
The sample subset in terms of number of banks is larger, but the years less. The forecasts in-sample 
show 64 banks with vulnerabilities in 2008, 32 banks in 2009 and 29 banks in 2010, while out-of-
sample the corresponding forecasts are 29, 64 and 32 respectively. The forecasts correctly call the 
fragility in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, Bradford and Bingley, Hypo 
Real Estate Holding in Germany, HELABA (which recently failed the EBA stress testing exercise), 
Credit Agricole in France, Intesa San Paolo in Italy, Gruppo Monte dei Pasche, UBI Banca and 
several others. For institutions that failed prior to 2008, for example Lehman Brothers, the model 
shows zeroes as the institutions no longer exist. 
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Table 6.6: Micro Z-Score Bank Fragility Forecasts for 139 Banks 
Forecasts   In-Sample Out-of-Sample 
 
Bank 
 
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
1 Fannie Mae US 1 0 1 1 1 0 
2 
Bank of 
America US 1 0 1 1 1 0 
3 Freddie Mac US 1 1 0 0 1 1 
4 
JP Morgan 
Chase and Co US 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Citigroup Inc US 1 0 0 1 1 0 
6 
Wells Fargo and 
Company US 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 
Goldman Sachs 
Group US 1 0 1 0 1 0 
8 
Federal Home 
Loan Bank US 1 1 0 0 1 1 
9 Morgan Stanley US 0 0 0 1 0 0 
10 Wachovia Corp US 0 0 0 1 0 0 
11 GE Capital US 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 
Merrill Lynch 
and Co US 1 0 0 1 1 0 
13 
Prudential 
Financial US 1 0 0 0 1 0 
14 
First Union 
National Bank US 1 0 0 1 1 0 
15 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings inc US 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 Bear Stearns US 0 0 0 1 0 0 
17 
Credit Suisse 
USA Inc US 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 
Washington 
Mutual Inc US 0 0 0 1 0 0 
19 
Barclays Capital 
Inc US 0 0 0 1 0 0 
20 US Bancorp US 1 0 0 1 1 0 
21 Barclays PLC UK 1 0 0 0 1 0 
22 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc UK 1 0 0 1 1 0 
23 
Lloyds TSB 
Bank UK 1 0 0 0 1 0 
24 HSBC Holdings UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 HBOS Plc UK 1 0 0 0 1 0 
26 
National 
Westminster 
PLC UK 1 0 1 0 1 0 
27 
Standard 
Chartered Plc UK 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 
 
189 
 
28 
Bradford and 
Bingley UK 1 1 0 1 1 1 
29 Northern Rock UK 1 0 0 1 1 0 
30 Deutsche Bank Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 
Commerzbank 
AG Germany 0 1 0 0 0 1 
32 
Dresdner Bank 
AG Germany 1 0 0 0 1 0 
33 
Landesbank 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg Germany 1 0 0 1 1 0 
34 
UniCredit Bank 
AG Germany 1 0 0 0 1 0 
35 
Hypo Real 
Estate Holding Germany 1 1 0 1 1 1 
36 
Bayerische 
Landesbank Germany 1 0 1 0 1 0 
37 Eurohypo AG Germany 1 0 0 0 1 0 
38 WestLB Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 HELABA GER Germany 1 1 0 0 1 1 
40 HSH Nordbank Germany 1 0 0 1 1 0 
41 LBB Holding Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 WGZ Germany 1 0 1 0 1 0 
43 
Hypo Real 
Estate Intl Germany 0 0 0 1 0 0 
44 
Volkswagen Fin 
Services Germany 0 0 1 0 0 0 
45 Sachsen Bank Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 
46 BNP Paribas France 1 0 1 0 1 0 
47 
Credit Agricole 
Group France 1 0 0 0 1 0 
48 
Societe 
Generale France 0 0 0 1 0 0 
49 
Dexia Credit 
Local France 0 0 1 0 0 0 
50 
Credit Industriel 
et Commercial - 
CIC France 0 1 0 0 0 1 
51 HSBC France France 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52 Unicredit SPA Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
53 Intesa San Paolo Italy 1 0 0 1 1 0 
54 
Gruppo Monte 
dei Paschi Italy 1 0 1 0 1 0 
55 Banco Popolare Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
56 UBI Banca Italy 1 0 0 1 1 0 
57 
Banca Nationale 
del Lavoro Italy 0 1 0 1 0 1 
58 Mediobanca Italy 0 1 0 0 0 1 
59 
Banca Popolare 
dell'Emilia Italy 1 0 0 0 1 0 
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Romagna 
60 
Banca Popolare 
di Milano Italy 1 0 0 0 1 0 
61 BIIS SPA Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
62 
Casa di 
Risparmio di 
Parma Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
63 
CREDIOP-
DEXIA Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
64 Banca Carige Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
65 
Banca Populare 
di Vicenza Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66 Banca Firenza Italy 1 0 1 0 1 0 
67 CREDEM Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
68 
Credito 
Valtellinese Italy 0 1 0 0 0 1 
69 
Banco Popolare 
di Sondrio Italy 1 1 1 0 1 1 
70 
Deutsche Bank 
Italy Italy 1 0 0 1 1 0 
71 Mitsubishi Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 
72 Mizuho Japan 1 1 0 0 1 1 
73 Sumitomo Japan 1 0 0 0 1 0 
74 
Norinchukin 
Bank Japan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
75 
Resona 
Holdings 
(Daiwa) Japan 0 0 1 0 0 0 
76 Nomura Japan 1 1 0 0 1 1 
77 
Development 
Bank of Japan Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 
78 
Ueda Yagi 
Tanshi Japan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
79 Tokyo Tanshi Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 
80 
Bank of 
Yokohama Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 
81 
Shinsei Bank 
Limited Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 
82 Chiba Bank Ltd Japan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
83 
Hokuhoku Fin 
Group Japan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
84 
Japan Bank for 
Intl Coop Japan 0 0 1 0 0 0 
85 Shizuoka Bank Japan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
86 
Bank of 
Fukuoka Ltd Japan 1 0 0 0 1 0 
87 
Royal Bank of 
Canada Canada 0 1 0 0 0 1 
88 
Toronto 
Dominion Bank Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 
89 Bank of Nova Canada 1 0 0 0 1 0 
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Scotia 
90 
Bank of 
Montreal Canada 1 0 0 1 1 0 
91 
Canadian 
Imperial Bank 
of Commerce 
(CIBC) Canada 1 0 0 1 1 0 
92 
Desjardings 
Group Canada 1 0 0 0 1 0 
93 HSBC Canada Canada 0 1 1 0 0 1 
94 
Export 
Development 
Canada Canada 1 0 0 0 1 0 
95 
National Bank 
Financial 
Canada Canada 1 0 0 0 1 0 
96 
Laurentian Bank 
of Canada Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 
97 
Manulife Bank 
of Canada Canada 1 0 1 0 1 0 
98 
Banque de 
Developpement 
du Canada Canada 1 1 0 0 1 1 
99 
Canadian 
Western Bank Canada 1 0 1 0 1 0 
100 
Banco 
Santander SA Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
101 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
102 
LA CAIXA - 
Caja de Ahorros 
Barcelona Spain 1 0 0 0 1 0 
103 CAJA Madrid Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 
104 
Banco Popular 
Espanole Spain 0 0 1 0 0 0 
105 
Banco Espanol 
de Credito 
BANESTO Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
106 
Caja de Ahorros 
de Valencia Spain 1 0 0 1 1 0 
107 
Banco de 
Sabadell Spain 1 1 0 0 1 1 
108 
Caja de Ahorros 
del 
Mediterraneo Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 
109 
Novacaixa 
Galicia Spain 0 1 1 0 0 1 
110 
Caixa d'Estlavis 
de Catalunya Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 
111 
Santander 
Consumer 
Finance Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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112 
Instituto de 
Credito Official Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
113 Bankinter SA Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
114 Bank of Ireland Ireland 1 1 1 0 1 1 
115 
Allied Irish 
Bank Ireland 0 0 1 0 0 0 
116 Depfa  Bank Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 
117 
Irish Life and 
Permanent Ireland 1 1 0 0 1 1 
118 
Anglo Irish 
Bank Ireland 1 1 1 0 1 1 
119 
Ulster Bank 
Ireland Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 
120 
National Bank 
of Greece Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 
121 EFG Eurobank Greece 0 0 1 0 0 0 
122 Alpha Bank Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 
123 Piraeus Bank Greece 1 0 1 0 1 0 
124 
Agricultural 
Bank of Greece Greece 0 0 1 0 0 0 
125 
Emporiki Bank 
of Greece Greece 1 0 0 0 1 0 
126 Marfin Egnatia Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 
127 
Caixa Geral de 
Depositos Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
128 Millinium BCP Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
129 
Banco Espirito 
Santo Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 0 
130 
Santander Totta 
SGPS Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
131 Banco BPI SA Portugal 1 0 0 0 1 0 
132 BANIF SGPS Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
133 
Banco Popular 
Portugal Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
134 BBVA Portugal Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
135 Banco Itau Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
136 
Deutsche Bank 
Portugal Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
137 Banco Finantia Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
138 
Banco BAI 
Europe Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
139 
Tecnicredito 
SGPS Portugal 0 1 0 0 0 1 
   
64 32 29 29 64 32 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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6.7.2 Model Performance and Noise-To-Signal Ratios 
The results show similar performance in-sample and out-of-sample, unlike the previous three macro 
applications which showed better out-of-sample performance and better lead time. This is explained 
by the length of the data series for the micro application. However, Type I errors for the 2-Year and 
3-Year horizons are 14% in-sample and 17% out-of-sample, which out-performs earlier literature.  
This compares to higher Out-of-Sample Type I errors the 2 and 3 year forecast horizon in the Z-
Score macro application in paper 3 are slightly higher than the micro application, so there is an 
improvement here. The Signal extraction macro methodology remains the best performing 
methodology in terms of Type I errors, while the Logit macro methodology is the best in terms of 
NTSRs.    
 
Table 6.7 summarizes the model evaluation in terms of noise-to-signal ratios and shows In-Sample 
NTSR’s of 0.5 for the micro model over a three year horizon vs 0.33 for the macro model. Out-of-
sample the micro model NSTR stands at 0.6 versus 0.42 for the macro model, over a three year 
horizon, respectively. The poorer NSTR performance for the micro model is explained by the shorter 
number of years data for this application. The micro overlay improves the traffic lights matrix 
substantially, however. 
 
Table 6.7: Z-Score Noise-To-Signal Ratio (NTSR) Micro Model and Macro Model Comparison 
Micro Model  
In -Sample 
   
Macro Model  
In -Sample    
      2-Year* 3-Year**      2-Year* 3-Year** 
  Type I %   28% 14%  Type I %   36% 18% 
  Type II %   56% 44%  Type II %   64% 45% 
  NTSR   0.8 0.5  NTSR   1.0 0.33 
Out-of-Sample 
   
Out-of-Sample    
      2-Year* 3-Year**      2-Year* 3-Year** 
  Type I %   36% 17%  Type I %   36% 23% 
  Type II %   59% 47%  Type II %   57% 45% 
 
NTSR   0.9 0.6 NTSR   0.83 0.42 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
   
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a number of banks 
that vulnerabilities were building up across the base case dependent variable calibration. These 
results show a significant improvement compared to earlier work, in terms of NTSR and Type I and 
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Type II errors for all calibrations. Signal extraction performed best in terms of Type I errors, the 
Logit model in terms of NTSR and the Z-score model in terms of Type II erros. 
 
The overlay of the micro model improves the traffic lights matrix substantially, with countries like 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland and the UK in 2007, which were in ‘Amber’ mode before, moving to ‘Red’. 
These two findings reinforce the need by regulators to use different models and to look at all of them 
in judging the build up of vulnerabilities, even within the same system / country.  
 
Different models will invariably have different output in some aspects, one way to summarize the 
results is by looking at EWS models as a traffic light system, where a system is considered to be in 
the ‘Red’ if more than two models used as decision making tools indicate a crisis, whereas in Amber 
mode, the system is in flux and needs to be monitored closely, while for Green mode, the system is 
robust with all models showing no signals. This traffic light approach is comparable to the risk heat 
maps adopted by global institutions analysing financial stability and is scalable to incorporate as 
many models as required by regulators. Also micro model improves the EWS system considerably. 
 
For a recap of model performance for the previous applications, please refer to the relevant chapters. 
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6.8. Bank Rating Application 
 
With the dataset for the 139 banks for this paper in the eleven OECD countries, we 
construct a simple rating system, based on the number of 1 signals issued by bank to the 
total number of 1 and 0 signals by each bank.  A high percentage indicates high levels of 
stress, and vice versa.  A number of banks for which data is missing are currently showing 
0%, but this is because of the lack of signals, rather than their true rating, so these should 
be looked at in this light. 
 
We then rank the findings into quartiles for 2007 Vs 2010 and see which banks migrate 
between the two groups. The findings are interesting in terms of the ranking of the 
individual institutions as well in the stability of the migrations, which could indicate that 
this model outperforms other traditional rating methodologies. This could be an area of 
further research. Table 6.8 presents the quartiles for 2007 Vs 2010, while Table 6.9 
presents the bank ratings.  
 
The quartile members do not change between both periods, as the fragility which resulted 
in failure was there before 2007. Replicating the exercise for older time periods at three 
year intervals would be an interesting extension. 
 
Table 6.8: No of Banks in Risk Rating Quartiles (2007 Vs 2010) 
 
 Quartile 2007  Quartile 2010 
 First 73  First 73 
 Second 50  Second 50 
 Third 10  Third 10 
 Fourth 6  Fourth 6 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
There are a total of 16 banks in the third and fourth quartiles, they are in order of better to 
worse rating: Natwest (UK), CIBC (Canada), BANIF (Portugal), Caja Madrid (Spain), 
Citigroup (US), HSH Nordbank (Germany), Banco Popolare di Sondrio (Italy), Bradford 
and Bingley (UK), Mizuho (Japan), Hypo Real Estate Holding (Germany), Caja de 
Ahorros de Valencia (Spain), Novacaixa Galicia (Spain), Caixa d’Estlavis de Catalunya 
(Spain), Tecnicredito SGPS (Portugal). 
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Table 6.9 – Bank Ratings in 2010 
 
  Country 
1' Signals % of Total 
Signals by bank 
1 Credit Suisse USA Inc US 0% 
2 WestLB Germany 0% 
3 Credit Industriel et Commercial - CIC France 0% 
4 HSBC France France 0% 
5 Banco Popolare Italy 0% 
6 BIIS SPA Italy 0% 
7 Casa di Risparmio di Parma Italy 0% 
8 CREDIOP-DEXIA Italy 0% 
9 Banca Populare di Vicenza Italy 0% 
10 CREDEM Italy 0% 
11 Mitsubishi Japan 0% 
12 Development Bank of Japan Japan 0% 
13 Bank of Yokohama Japan 0% 
14 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain 0% 
15 Santander Consumer Finance Spain 0% 
16 Instituto de Credito Official Spain 0% 
17 Depfa  Bank Ireland 0% 
18 Ulster Bank Ireland Ireland 0% 
19 Alpha Bank Greece 0% 
20 Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal 0% 
21 Millinium BCP Portugal 0% 
22 Santander Totta SGPS Portugal 0% 
23 Banco Popular Portugal Portugal 0% 
24 BBVA Portugal Portugal 0% 
25 Banco Itau Portugal 0% 
26 Deutsche Bank Portugal Portugal 0% 
27 Banco Finantia Portugal 0% 
28 Unicredit SPA Italy 10% 
29 LBB Holding Germany 11% 
30 Toronto Dominion Bank Canada 11% 
31 Banco Espanol de Credito BANESTO Spain 11% 
32 National Bank of Greece Greece 11% 
33 EFG Eurobank Greece 11% 
34 Agricultural Bank of Greece Greece 11% 
35 Emporiki Bank of Greece Greece 11% 
36 JP Morgan Chase and Co US 13% 
37 Desjardings Group Canada 13% 
38 Wells Fargo and Company US 14% 
39 Washington Mutual Inc US 14% 
40 Chiba Bank Ltd Japan 14% 
41 Shizuoka Bank Japan 14% 
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42 LA CAIXA - Caja de Ahorros Barcelona Spain 14% 
43 Morgan Stanley US 17% 
44 GE Capital US 17% 
45 HBOS Plc UK 17% 
46 Japan Bank for Intl Coop Japan 17% 
47 Wachovia Corp US 20% 
48 Deutsche Bank Germany 20% 
49 Volkswagen Fin Services Germany 20% 
50 BNP Paribas France 20% 
51 Banca Nationale del Lavoro Italy 20% 
52 Deutsche Bank Italy Italy 20% 
53 Resona Holdings (Daiwa) Japan 20% 
54 Barclays PLC UK 22% 
55 Lloyds TSB Bank UK 22% 
56 HSBC Holdings UK 22% 
57 Standard Chartered Plc UK 22% 
58 Societe Generale France 22% 
59 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 22% 
60 Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 22% 
61 Bank of Montreal Canada 22% 
62 Laurentian Bank of Canada Canada 22% 
63 Banque de Developpement du Canada Canada 22% 
64 Allied Irish Bank Ireland 22% 
65 Banco Espirito Santo Portugal 22% 
66 Banco BPI SA Portugal 22% 
67 Merrill Lynch and Co US 25% 
68 Prudential Financial US 25% 
69 First Union National Bank US 25% 
70 Commerzbank AG Germany 25% 
71 UniCredit Bank AG Germany 25% 
72 Irish Life and Permanent Ireland 25% 
73 Banco BAI Europe Portugal 25% 
74 Banca Carige Italy 27% 
75 Freddie Mac US 29% 
76 Goldman Sachs Group US 29% 
77 Lehman Brothers Holdings inc US 29% 
78 US Bancorp US 29% 
79 Norinchukin Bank Japan 29% 
80 Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna Italy 30% 
81 Barclays Capital Inc US 33% 
82 Dresdner Bank AG Germany 33% 
83 Eurohypo AG Germany 33% 
84 Credit Agricole Group France 33% 
85 Banca Firenza Italy 33% 
86 Credito Valtellinese Italy 33% 
87 Sumitomo Japan 33% 
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88 Ueda Yagi Tanshi Japan 33% 
89 HSBC Canada Canada 33% 
90 Manulife Bank of Canada Canada 33% 
91 Canadian Western Bank Canada 33% 
92 Banco Santander SA Spain 33% 
93 Banco de Sabadell Spain 33% 
94 Bank of Ireland Ireland 33% 
95 Piraeus Bank Greece 33% 
96 Intesa San Paolo Italy 36% 
97 Export Development Canada Canada 38% 
98 Bankinter SA Spain 38% 
99 Federal Home Loan Bank US 40% 
100 Bear Stearns US 40% 
101 Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg Germany 40% 
102 Sachsen Bank Germany 40% 
103 Gruppo Monte dei Paschi Italy 40% 
104 Mediobanca Italy 40% 
105 Nomura Japan 40% 
106 Bank of America US 43% 
107 HELABA GER Germany 43% 
108 Bank of Fukuoka Ltd Japan 43% 
109 Marfin Egnatia Greece 43% 
110 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc UK 44% 
111 Northern Rock UK 44% 
112 Tokyo Tanshi Japan 44% 
113 Shinsei Bank Limited Japan 44% 
114 Banco Popular Espanole Spain 44% 
115 Anglo Irish Bank Ireland 44% 
116 Fannie Mae US 50% 
117 Bayerische Landesbank Germany 50% 
118 WGZ Germany 50% 
119 UBI Banca Italy 50% 
120 Banca Popolare di Milano Italy 50% 
121 Hokuhoku Fin Group Japan 50% 
122 National Bank Financial Canada Canada 50% 
123 Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo Spain 50% 
124 National Westminster PLC UK 56% 
125 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) Canada 56% 
126 BANIF SGPS Portugal 56% 
127 CAJA Madrid Spain 57% 
128 Citigroup Inc US 60% 
129 HSH Nordbank Germany 60% 
130 Banco Popolare di Sondrio Italy 60% 
131 Bradford and Bingley UK 63% 
132 Hypo Real Estate Intl Germany 67% 
133 Mizuho Japan 67% 
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134 Hypo Real Estate Holding Germany 80% 
135 Caja de Ahorros de Valencia Spain 83% 
136 Dexia Credit Local France 100% 
137 Novacaixa Galicia Spain 100% 
138 Caixa d'Estlavis de Catalunya Spain 100% 
139 Tecnicredito SGPS Portugal 100% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
6.9. Conclusions and Traffic Light Summary 
  
To synthesize all the previous applications from the vantage point of a regulator, we 
compiled this section. It is structured as follows: micro model overlay to previous 
applications; Traffic Light Summary with Micro Model; and Conclusion.  
 
 
6.9.1. Micro Model Overlay to Macro Models 
 
In order to better evaluate how the three previous applications map, we had one additional 
analysis component, in the form of a traffic light type analysis. As the three models are 
not expected to have the same results consistently, otherwise they would not be 
sufficiently different to be adding information to the decision making information set of a 
regulator. However, the confirmation of signals by the three models should raise the red 
alarm and the disagreement should point to an amber alarm, whereas the full agreement 
for a no crisis signal should be a green light that the financial system is robust. In this 
section, we overlay the findings of the micro model on the traffic light summary of the 
three previous models. The rationale is if on the micro level, banks are stressed, this 
should be another factor leading to financial instability. 
 
We overlay the findings of the micro model by calculating the percentage of 1 signals 
issued to total signals issued by the each bank in each country (1 and 0). We then 
aggregate these findings on a country level to come up with a country risk ranking. For 
any ranking higher than 6, we add a 1 signal to the respective country in the traffic light 
matrix. Looking at 2007, Greece is highly ranked, this possibly is on the back of data and 
reporting issues, where results were overstated. Ireland, Italy, Spain, the UK and Germany 
exhibit clear signs of stress. Moving forward to 2010 rankings, Ireland is now highly rated 
as all risks have materialized, the sector is substantially undercapitalized and realizing 
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negative returns, however the status is stable bankruptcy. Recall all models studied are 
designed to pick up on build-up of vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 6.10: Sum of Micro Signals by Country (2007) Vs (2010) 
Rank Country 2007 Rank Country 2010 
1 Greece 16% 1 Ireland 6% 
2 France 26% 2 Greece 11% 
3 US 27% 3 Japan 14% 
4 Portugal 27% 4 France 17% 
5 Japan 28% 5 US 21% 
6 Canada 28% 6 Canada 22% 
7 Ireland 29% 7 Germany 25% 
8 Italy 33% 8 Portugal 31% 
9 Spain 35% 9 Spain 34% 
10 UK 35% 10 Italy 35% 
11 Germany 37% 11 UK 37% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 6.11 below, presents the forecasts for all three models, for the base case 50 basis 
points bundled calibration dependent variable.  
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Table 6.11 - Out-of-Sample Forecasts Macro Z-Score, Signal Extraction and Logit Models (50 basis points bundled dependent variable 
calibration) – for Micro Overlay 
 
*For Z-score model, countries not in current sample, get a calibration of 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6.11 - Out-of-Sample Forecast Comparison Between Z-Score, Signal Extraction and Logit Models (50 basis points bundled dependent 
variable calibration) - ) – for Micro Overlay - Continued 
 
 
*For Z-score model, countries not in current sample, get a calibration of 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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6.9.2. Traffic Light Summary with Micro Model  
Table 6.12, presents the traffic lights signal to regulators using the decision rule explained 
above. Note that the traffic signals panel is somewhat similar to a risk heat map and could 
be easily scaled to include other models as well or calibrated to modify output based on 
regulatory objective functions/ thresholds for intervention.  
 
Table 6.12: Traffic Light Summary for Macro-Micro Overlay 50 Basis Points Dependent 
Variable Bundled Calibration 
 
 Looking at the traffic light signals issued 
by the synthesis of the macro and micro 
model outputs, most of the countries for 
the three years have amber signals, which 
is expected as most systems would be in 
flux with various variables moving picked 
up by the three models, although we have 
an increase in red signals to 25, versus 21 
in the macro synthesis. The model design 
is based on capturing movement and 
volatility in the system, whereby bigger 
movements translate into larger signals. 
Canada still has a ‘Green’ signal in 2007 
after adding the micro model, confirming 
that the financial system, other explanatory 
variables and largest banks in the system 
were stable and the system as a whole was 
resilient in terms of stocks and flows.  
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Other countries that have green signals include Mexico in 2006, New Zealand in 2006, 
and Spain in 2005 and Portugal in 2006. This again reflects a period of relative tranquility 
in the system, as the macro and micro models are based on movement. The implication of 
this is that the traffic lights need to be monitored not only at a point in time, but also 
within the perspective of a rolling window. 
 
Finally, the countries that have red signals associated are correctly called by the synthesis 
of these macro and micro models, and improve on just the use of macro models. The 
overlay of the financial strength of the top five banks in each country, which capture more 
than 75% of total sector assets in the 11 OECD countries in the smaller micro sample, 
improves the traffic lights substantially. 
  
The UK is now flagged based on the micro overlay, while others with red flags are 
Austria (2006), Belgium (2005, 2006, 2007), Canada (2005, 2006), Greece (2006,2007), 
Iceland (2005, 2006, 2007), Ireland (2005, 2006), Italy (2005), Luxembourg (2005), 
Portugal (2005) and Slovenia (2005, 2006), Spain (2005), Sweden (2005, 2007), 
Switzerland (2006), UK (2005) and the US (2007). In addition, the two significant 
explanatory variables, banking assets to GDP and banking sector asset growth, in all these 
countries again were either very high as a percentage of GDP (ranging from a low of 2 
times to a high of 30 times GDP), while banking sector asset growth in the year prior to a 
signal being issued was close to 20%. 
 
The three macro models however, did improve by picking up on some of the countries, 
including the US which should have had red signals in hindsight in the two model 
synthesis. The UK is still in amber mode for this synthesis as it had the smallest equity 
index movements, another significant explanatory variable. This improves substantially 
with the micro-model overlay for the final traffic lights synthesis which incorporates the 
health of the top five banks in this picture. 
 
The overlay of the micro model improves the traffic lights matrix substantially, these 
findings reinforce the need by regulators to use different models and to look at all of them 
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in judging the build up of vulnerabilities, even within the same system / country.  Also to 
look at the evolution of signals in a time series fashion. 
 
6.9.3 Conclusion  
Using a Merton type Z-score framework and looking at OECD countries, movements in 
PD by more than one standard deviation in member banks in the sample which were 
aggregated were found to be significant in predicting crises. The PDs were calculated 
using a Merton type Z-score framework, where the Z-score is a capital adequacy measure 
plus returns on average assets all divided by the standard deviation of returns.  
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up across their banking sectors. The 
countries signaled to have crises in the previous applications do not map one to one in all 
three applications and some key countries called by the signal extraction to be susceptible 
to crises are not called by the Logit model but are called by the Z-score model, but the 
Logit model raises the alarm bell for other countries.  
 
Different models will invariably have different output in some aspects, one way to 
summarize the results is by looking at EWS models as a traffic light system, where a 
system is considered to be in the ‘Red’ if more than two models used as decision making 
tools indicate a crisis, whereas in Amber mode, the system is in flux and needs to be 
monitored closely, while for Green mode, the system is robust with all models showing 
no signals. This traffic light approach is comparable to the risk heat maps adopted by 
global institutions analysing financial stability and is scalable to incorporate as many 
models as required by regulators. Also micro model improves the EWS system 
considerably. 
 
This section overlays the micro model findings to the previous suite of models, Z-Score, 
Logit and signal extraction and points to a measured improvement resulting from 
combining the micro and macro analysis. Regulator objective functions do have an impact 
on model performance, and therefore EWS should always be designed with a set of 
objective functions and crises evaluated for each set as evident from the output of the 
three previous methodologies based on the three scenarios for the magnitude of change in 
the dependent variable that is deemed systemic. Similarly the micro model is a valuable 
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overlay to complete the picture. Also, regulators should use a number of models 
simultaneously to monitor changes in their respective systems and the impact from spill-
overs from other interconnected systems as each model has strengths and weaknesses. In 
addition, there is a lot of value in the initial data searching exercise for variables, because 
this helps determine at any one point in time on a dynamic basis as these are the factors 
that are ‘moving’ in the system and could cause vulnerabilities. Also as evident from the 
micro model, building robust databases on the micro level and the macro level are 
elementary to setting up an effective EWS. Lastly, regulatory oversight and judgment 
need to be exercised at all times without over reliance on models as clearly, the outcomes 
must be then mapped onto real life by the regulator and also assessed in terms of cost of 
intervention versus cost of waiting for certain further critical triggers and regulators need 
to exercise vigilance and prudence consistently. 
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7. Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Regulation, Macro-prudential 
Analysis and EWS and Regulatory Challenges Ahead 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The recent crisis highlighted the failure of former early warning signals models, using a 
sample of 105 countries, covering the years 1979 to 2003, Davis and Karim (2008) apply 
macro EWS models, using signal extraction, Logit and binary recursive tree 
methodologies, to US and UK data to test for out-of-sample performance (whether a crisis 
was correctly called) from 2000 – 2007. They find that for the US, both models fail 
miserably with a probability of a crisis occurring in 2007 of 1% for the Logit model and 
0.6% for the binary tree model. For the UK, the results were similar, with the Logit 
probability of a crisis at 3.4% in 2007 and 0.6% for the binary tree model. This paper 
attributes this failure partly to dependent variable and independent variable specification 
and model empirical design, all three areas which we attempt to improve on.  
 
Commonly used dependent variable specifications in the past are ex-post measures of the 
cost of crises in the form of direct bailout funds or indirect GDP losses compared to its 
previous growth trajectory (Davis and Karim 2003). Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) find 
bailouts cost on average 10% of GDP, with some crises much more damaging like the 
Mexican Tequila Crisis (1994) which cost 20% of GDP, and the Jamaican crisis (1996) 
which cost 37% of GDP. According to the IMF, the past crisis of 2007 - 2010 had 
cumulative (indirect) output losses over 2008-2010 estimated at around 5% of global 
output (this amounts to around USD10.2 trillion if we apply the rate to IMF global output 
estimates), while direct bailout measures by governments have almost tallied a similar 
figure and direct write-downs by agents tallied some USD3.4 trillion. These collectively 
are equivalent to 40% of global GDP in 2010. 
 
However, given that there is a substantial body of literature that highlights the linkage 
between the build-up of financial fragility and crises, this motivated our research into the 
precursor to crises, namely the build-up of financial vulnerabilities. In their book Crisis 
Economics Roubini and Mihm (2010) consistently highlight the linkage between financial 
fragility, the build up of imbalances and systemic financial crises and conclude that 
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financial crises would not result in system wide distress in the absence of financial 
fragility. While Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) and Jagtiani, Kolari, Lemieux and Shin 
(2003) prove that low capital adequacy and a fragile banking sector is a leading indicator 
of banking distress, signaling a high likelihood of near-term bank failure. Furthermore, 
Cihak and Shaeck (2007) confirm the importance of bank profitability for the detection of 
systemic banking problems. Therefore, a dependent variable specification which focuses 
on ex-ante prediction, on banking sector fragility, as measured by capital adequacy and 
banking sector profitability was intuitive to us. As a measure it is also both necessary and 
sufficient for the prediction of full- fledged crises, but not vice versa. This dependent 
variable could be viewed as a near crisis or ‘Near Failure’ or ‘Fragility’ on the micro/ 
individual institution level. By focusing on near crises, the model is calibrated to detect a 
pre-crisis and in turn would give policy makers more lead time to avert or at least 
minimize crises costs. This way the EWS would be credible and usable by policy makers, 
and thus effective. Also the specification of the dependent variable to signal near-crises, 
means that a lot of data which was not previously utilized in an EWS analysis will now be 
taken into account. 
 
Focusing on independent variable specifications, these evolved in earlier literature over 
three generations of thought. The first generation (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, is an 
example) was based on macro weaknesses and relied on macro-economic indicators as 
explanatory variables such as real GDP growth, real exchange rates, current account 
balance, inflation, etc. Second generation was based on self-fulfilling prophecies and 
herding behavior using explanatory variables such as changes in real interest rates or 
changes in interest rate spreads which could signal changes in agent expectations. These 
include work by Flood and Garber (1984) and Obstfeld (1986), and Claessens (1991). 
Finally, third generation such as Krugman (1999), Bris and Koskinen (2000) and 
Cabellero and Krishnamurthy (2000) was based on contagion and spill-overs from other 
countries or markets which used explanatory variables such as changes in capital flows, 
changes in trade flows, in addition to other variables. Thus independent variable use 
spanned across macro factors, micro factors, a combination of both, on an endogenous 
and exogenous level as the case may be.  
 
The choice of independent variables was as such guided to include exogenous and 
endogenous variables representative of all three schools and across all the different 
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classifications. We look at real GDP growth, banking sector asset growth, the level of 
banking sector assets to GDP, development of asset price bubble indicators (a house price 
indicator and an equity capital markets indicator), a dividend yield indicator as a proxy for 
the health of the corporate sector, a banking sector liquidity indicator and a banking sector 
funding indicator as micro structural indicators for the industry, and a pension funds to 
GDP indicator as a proxy for the development of liquidity bubbles. 
 
The specific empirical model designs used to predict crises fall into four categories: i) 
signals models; ii) logit/probit models; iii) Merton type models; and a less used class of 
models, iv) Binary recursive trees. In this research we use signal extraction, logit and Z-
score methodologies, in macro and micro applications. This research improves on 
empirical design substantially with the choice of variable thresholds no longer static, but 
rather dynamic in the form of standard deviations from a chosen metric which in this case 
has been chosen as a long-run mean for a variable. By shifting the analysis to focus on 
standard deviations as opposed to absolute values, this model focuses on capturing 
volatility in a chosen variable, rather than thresholds chosen on the basis of output of a 
certain data period. This means that the model design as such is usable in different time 
periods and different states of the world.  
 
One of the problems with earlier models is that repeated exercises for different time 
periods always resulted in different performance of a fixed set of indicator variables. This 
is because causes for crises change over time and also because static thresholds chosen for 
each variable to signal a crisis are by default linked to whichever data period they were 
calibrated to. This explains why in-sample performance of these models was much better 
than out-of-sample and why the old models failed to predict the last crisis. The design of 
our model to read deviations from a chosen benchmark means that the chosen variables 
are valid for the data period for which the model was designed and for other data periods 
as well, thus improving on out-of-sample performance, another major weakness in earlier 
models.  
 
The banking sector prior to the crisis was highly concentrated, and after the crisis it will 
become more concentrated, give the implementation of Basle III requirements, which in 
effect would force a number of institutions to merge and result in even bigger entities. 
This has a number of implications for the design of EWS and their use to help 
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implementation of countercyclical measures for LCFIs. The scope of changes in 
regulatory issues is sizable in both Europe and in the US. 
 
EWS and analytic tools in light of the aforementioned need to take into account that each 
crisis will be different, have different triggers and unravel in a different manner to its 
predecessors, yet it will also be similar in other ways to previous crises. Therefore the best 
way to prevent a crisis is to ensure that the ‘system’ is as healthy as possible by attacking 
imbalances before they accumulate which is what this research focuses on by the 
innovation in dependent variable. 
 
The EWS in itself is a necessary starting point, however it is nowhere near sufficient, it 
has to be approached as part of a set of decision suites to be used as demonstrated 
throughout this research. The importance of a strong macroprudential surveillance and 
systemic regulator function with wide reaching powers to safeguard against financial 
instability is paramount. Having a robust early warning signals system (EWS) in place is 
the core ‘brain’ component of such a system. It will serve in satisfying two key goals in 
the oversight of systemic financial stability: a) limiting financial system-wide distress, 
and b) avoiding output or GDP costs. The earlier and more reliable this system is in 
predicting instability - and the more easily understood, mapped and shared with a high 
degree of transparency among the parties concerned with safeguarding financial stability 
in any country and indeed across borders – the more likely it will achieve its objectives by 
allowing sufficient lead time for action. The past crisis highlighted the global nature of 
shocks and thus a global EWS is needed to assess and disseminate key threats to financial 
stability and information on systemic vulnerabilities in a quantifiable manner. By so doing 
the EWS will assist policy makers in preventing crises, in a financial world with more 
integrity and more ethics.  
 
This rest of the chapter is structured as follows: 7.2 Conclusions for macro and micro 
applications; Macro-Micro Combined Application; and Conclusion and Traffic Lights 
Summary.  While section 7.3 covers Regulation, macroprudential Analysis and EWS, 
section 7.4 covers Regulatory Challenges Ahead and Basle III; and finally section 7.5 
concludes. 
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7.2 Summary Conclusions 
7.2.1 Signal Extraction 
Using a signal extraction framework and looking at OECD countries over a 30 year 
period two variables were found to be significant in predicting crises. These include 
growth in pension assets (positive and significant at the 5% level) and equity market 
dividend yield (positive coefficient, significant at the 10% level). The former is an 
indicator for the development of liquidity bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. 
The latter is a proxy for corporate balance sheet health on the premise that companies 
usually raise dividends, in line with the pecking order hypothesis, and also as free cash 
flows to equity shareholders, after debt service, are available. 
 
Banking sector assets growth was also significant, indicating a strong relationship 
between rapid growth in the sector, its relative size to GDP and the development of 
vulnerabilities (positive coefficient). 
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up across 144 runs for an 
unbundled dependent variable of four components, with three cases: a base case, a high 
change dynamic threshold case and a low change dynamic threshold case. For the base 
case dependent variable runs, the consolidation run shows the best in-sample model, is the 
3-year rolling one standard deviation, very closely followed by the 10-year rolling one 
standard deviation specification. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in 
terms of overall noise to signal ratios, with the range falling from 1.60 to 0.6. Levels of 
Type I errors are also very low ranging from a high of 36% to a low of 0% - or no misses. 
These results show a significant improvement compared to earlier work, for example the 
median NTSR in Borio and Drehmann (2009) applied to the same period 2004 – 2008, is 
0.67 over the three year forecast horizon and the median Type I error is 30%. The 
outperformance also holds in comparison to KLR99, where Type I errors over a two year 
horizon range between 25% for the best individual indicator to 9% for the poorest 
individual indicator, whereas for this model, the corresponding figure is 4% to 0%.   
 
This research proposes that we should focus on minimizing Type I error as the optimal 
regulator objective function as this is the most conservative approach and it would ensure 
continuous action to ensure a sound system as such. Although Type II errors might be 
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more, however if the regulator objective is clearly formulated to be having a healthy 
financial system and continually correcting imbalances as they develop, then this is what 
the model will achieve. This objective is equivalent to avoiding crises at all costs. The 
best out-of-sample model, is the 10-year rolling one standard deviation specification with 
a Type I error of 0% and a noise-to-signal ratio of 0.6. These results show a significant 
improvement compared to earlier work. Using an adapted crisis definition as measured by 
a solvency proxy, in itself an innovation, has improved the performance of the model in 
terms of minimizing Type I errors over a three year period and NTSR out-of-sample. 
Furthermore out-of-sample performance is better than in-sample performance. A major 
improvement to previously existing models. 
 
Furthermore, an evaluation of model performance had it been calibrated using the crises 
definitions in earlier literature compared to the near-crises definition proposed by this 
research, shows clearly that the model with the new dependent variable specification 
outperforms substantially the model with the old dependent or crisis variable 
specification. This outperformance is across Type I and Type II errors as well as overall 
Noise-To-Signal-Ratios (NTSRs).  
 
7.2.2 Macro Applications Conclusions  
Logit Model 
For the Logit framework, looking at OECD countries over a 30 year period a number of 
variables were found to be significant in predicting crises. These include growth in 
pension assets (positive and significant at the 5% level) and equity market dividend yield 
(positive coefficient, significant at the 10% level). The former is an indicator for the 
development of liquidity bubbles which leads to financial sector pains. The latter is a 
proxy for corporate balance sheet health on the premise that companies usually raise 
dividends, in line with the pecking order hypothesis, and also as free cash flows to equity 
shareholders, after debt service, are available. 
 
Banking sector assets growth was also significant, indicating a strong relationship 
between rapid growth in the sector, its relative size to GDP and the development of 
vulnerabilities (positive coefficient). 
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The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up across a dependent variable with 
three cases: a base case, a high change dynamic threshold case and a low change dynamic 
threshold case. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in terms of overall 
noise to signal ratios. These results show a significant improvement compared to earlier 
work, in terms of NTSR and Type I and Type II errors for all calibrations, with the 
exception of the 100 bps dependent variable calibration. Again a point to support the 
importance of the dependent variable regulator objective calibration and the inherent 
feedback loop to actual model performance. 
 
Z-Score Macro Model 
Using a Merton type Z-score framework and looking at OECD countries, movements in 
PD by more than one standard deviation were found to be significant in predicting crises. 
The PDs were calculated using a Merton type Z-score framework, where the Z-score is a 
capital adequacy measure plus returns on average assets (the latter defined as NI before 
provisions/average assets) all divided by the standard deviation of returns (same 
definition, NI before provisions/average assets).  
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of countries that vulnerabilities were building up across the base case dependent 
variable calibration. The model performs well compared to World Bank published Z-
Score indicators to calculate migration matrices in PDs. 
 
This research focuses on the migration matrix rather than absolute thresholds, because this 
is the crisis indicator utilized. Comparing the migration matrices using the same 
methodology, a shift by more than 1 SD over a 5 year rolling mean, shows that for 14 
countries the migrations using both the WB data and data in this paper are the same in 
count, but with a small difference in timing (+/- 1 year). Also the indicator used in this 
application signals a ‘crisis’ or a ‘migration’ to a higher probability of default, one period 
before the migrations calculated using World Bank data (i.e. outperforming World Bank 
results). The migrations are dissimilar for six countries, for which one country there is no 
WB data and for the research the data was compiled (namely Korea).  
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7.2.3. Micro Application Conclusion 
 
The Z-Score micro-application results show similar performance in-sample and out-of-
sample, unlike the previous three macro applications which showed better out-of-sample 
performance and better lead time. This is explained by the length of the data series for the 
micro application. However, Type I errors for the 2-Year and 3-Year horizons are 14% in-
sample and 17% out-of-sample, which out-performs earlier literature.  This compares to 
higher Out-of-Sample Type I errors for the 2 and 3 year forecast horizon in the Z-Score 
macro application that are slightly higher than the micro application, so there is an 
improvement here. The Signal extraction macro methodology remains the best performing 
methodology in terms of Type I errors, while the Logit macro methodology is the best in 
terms of NTSRs.    
 
The output model shows that as early as 2004, clear signals were being given for a 
number of banks that vulnerabilities were building up across the base case dependent 
variable calibration. Performance out-of-sample, is better than in-sample in terms of 
overall noise to signal ratios. These results show a significant improvement compared to 
earlier work, in terms of NTSR and Type I and Type II errors for all calibrations. Signal 
extraction performed best in terms of Type I errors, the Logit model in terms of NTSR 
and the Z-score model in terms of Type II errors. 
 
7.2.4. Macro-Micro Combined Applications  
The overlay of the micro model improves the traffic lights matrix substantially, with 
countries like Portugal, Italy, Ireland and the UK in 2007, which were in ‘Amber’ mode 
before, moving to ‘Red’. These two findings reinforce the need by regulators to use 
different models and to look at all of them in judging the build up of vulnerabilities, even 
within the same system / country.  
 
7.2.5. Conclusion 
 
The models presented in this research on the macro and micro levels provide significant 
improvement to earlier research in terms of dependent variable specification, model 
design, out-of-sample performance, NTSR and most importantly Type I errors. 
Furthermore they are locationally and temporally consistent due to the dynamic research 
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design and do suffer from over fitting. By using an innovation in the dependent variable 
specification to focus on near crises, lead time is improved and information disregarded in 
previous analysis on vulnerability build up is also incorporated. 
 
The choice of dependent variable selection affects the overall performance of the model 
and thus the difficulty inherent in calling crises correctly and the impact of the choice of 
dependent variable on the model. The key take away is that we need a range of dependent 
variable triggers for which results to be presented consistently to regulators to enable 
sound decision making. Or in other words, the inherent feedback loops between the 
choice of the regulator objective and the output of an EWS. 
 
For the various models, the countries signaled to have crises do not map one to one in all 
three applications and some key countries called by the signal extraction to be susceptible 
to crises are not called by the Logit model but are called by the Z-score model, but the 
Logit model raises the alarm bell for other countries. These two findings reinforce the 
need by regulators to use different models and to look at all of them in judging the build 
up of vulnerabilities, even within the same system / country.  
 
Also, in line with Staikouras (2004) and Staikouras and Kalotychou (2005), the interplay 
between banking and currency crisis, is an important dimension to focus on for emerging 
market applications. While given the growth in banking exposure to international lending, 
this factor has and will continue to gain more prominence in the build up of financial 
vulnerability. Finally, the development of new products and innovation in the financial 
sector which is continuous, has implications for any EWS in the need to incorporate non-
bank financial institutions on the one hand (this research incorporates one indicator, 
pension fund assets) and off-balance sheet activity.  
 
7.3 Overview of Regulatory Regimes and Response to the Crisis of 2007-2010 
 
José Viñals, IMF Financial Counselor and Director, Monetary and Capital Markets 
Department, (Berlin, 20 May 2010) outlines five key areas for effective financial market 
regulation, where a delicate balance needs to be maintained in the redesign of regulatory 
frameworks: macro-prudential and micro-prudential dimensions; regulation and 
supervision; banks and non-banks; safety of the system versus its efficiency; and 
 
 
218 
 
regulations which are tailored to national requirements, without compromising 
consistency with international regulation, versus international regulation. Other prominent 
figures with government mandates such as Hank Paulson comment on how the regulatory 
structure had not kept up with the changes in the financial markets and as a result a 
‘patchwork’ system of regulation existed, with similar patterns in other major financial 
centers.  Markets and players outpaced regulation. A challenge for regulators that will 
persist is how to cope with market growth and promote its efficiency, while ensuring the 
system’s safety and stability. In Mohamed El Erian’s book When Markets Collide, he 
endorses this view ‘The modern financial complex has morphed into something 
unrecognizable to many astute market veterans and academics’. 
 
The past and ongoing crisis has brought this regulator dilemma to the forefront, and the 
question of which regulatory regimes were the most effective or minimized losses during 
the downturn and how this impacts future design of regulation, needed to be studied. How 
regimes reacted to the past crisis, the actions taken, the set of policy tools and the impact 
of these on losses realized and on the speed of crisis unraveling and its resolution all hold 
lessons to be learnt. The debate will shape the face of financial regulation over the coming 
decades  and how to approach regulation in general whether through a ‘light touch’ or 
more ‘intrusive’ measures. This section is structured as follows: the architecture of the 
existing regulatory regimes pre-crisis; highlights the losses by type of regulatory regime; 
the various policy responses and tools on a country and global level; and highlights 
planned policy changes triggered by the crisis.  
 
7.3.1. Existing regulatory regimes pre-crisis 
Nier (2009) reviews financial stability and regulatory frameworks architecture and the 
costs and benefits associated thereof, against the backdrop of the recent crisis. He weighs 
the strengths and weaknesses of existing structures including the integrated model, the 
twin peaks model and hybrid models. The single-integrated regulator (SIR) model has one 
regulator overseeing market regulation (commercial banks, mutual funds and pension 
funds and insurance companies) and the central bank overseeing lender of last resort 
(LOLR) activities and payments oversight. Examples of SIR-type models were the UK 
before the abolishment of the FSA, Germany (although it had announced the abolishment 
of BaFin, it retracted and maintained the supervisory body), Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland, among others. Twin peaks models have the central bank overseeing 
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systemic risk, including LOLR and payment systems and all potentially systemic 
institutions and another regulatory body handling regulation of financial services. 
Examples of TP-type systems include the UK currently, Netherlands, Bulgaria and South 
Africa, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
 
7.3.2. Losses by type of regulatory regime 
In some preliminary empirical results covering the period from 2Q07 to 2Q08, Nier 
(2009) classifies the losses associated with each main type of regulatory regime (single-
integrated regulator, SIR versus twin peaks, TP) in Europe and finds greater losses 
associated with the SIR model. While total losses in TP countries booked around USD40 
billion, the comparative figure for SIR countries is USD126 billion. The overall loss to 
credit ratio also draws a similar picture with the total for TPs at 0.5%, compared to SIRs 
at 2.9%. These findings support the argument that having a twin peaks-type regulatory 
setup is more effective. With the previous SIR setup in the UK for example, there was 
potential for a lot of ‘lost’ information in having the Bank of England only regulating 
LOLR activities as it is relatively detached from the banking supervisory function and all 
the information bank supervisors are privy to, including regular discussions with market 
players. Therefore, twin peak systems have been found to be more effective in ensuring 
that regulators have a broader perspective and information is not compartmentalized.  
  
 
7.3.3. Policy response 
Regulatory policy response to the crisis has been far-reaching, from direct intervention in 
the financial sector through capital injections, purchase of assets, central bank provision 
of liquidity and guarantees, in addition to traditional coordinated monetary action and 
fiscal stimulus and last but not least quantitative easing. These measures have collectively 
ranged from less than 1% of GDP to almost 20% in the UK.  
 
In 2008 the IMF’s GFSR identified three interrelated areas that authorities need to 
continue to address as the global financial system deleverages: firstly insufficient capital, 
second falling and uncertain asset valuations and third dysfunctional capital markets. This 
is challenging given that monetary policy tools were mostly exhausted, not only because 
of some of the characteristics of balance sheet recessions which were applicable, but more 
importantly, because rates are at very low levels and as such transmission channels were 
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partly severed. Transmission channels were affected by the increasing importance of the 
shadow banking system, which was affected much less by changes in reserve 
requirements and base interest rates. Banks moved away from a stable deposit base to 
larger proportion of short-term funding through wholesale funding markets and their cost 
of funding in these markets was not strongly linked to monetary policy actions. 
Governments have responded as such by directly pumping liquidity into their banking 
systems in the form of capital, thereby part or fully nationalizing failed institutions; 
providing asset protection, liquidity extension and guarantees to banks and instruments 
issued by banks; and attempting to enhance transparency in financial markets and kick 
start the securitization markets using various tools.  
 
With the onset of the crisis, policy makers fell back on the traditional monetary policy 
tool: cutting interest rates. The dramatic evolution of interest rate cuts to almost zero 
percent in developed economies and the degree of coordination during the implementation 
between the various authorities since 2007 was exceptional. Having exhausted this tool, 
and with the disconnect between base rates and interbank and other market rates – 
because of the shift in risk premiums (in general investors discovered they had been 
underpricing risk), with London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) spreads hiking to as high 
as 360 bps in April 2009 up from an average spread of a few basis points to base rates 
prior to the crisis (banks were seen as having credit risk higher than previously thought, as 
evidenced by the failure of some institutions). The Fed announced USD1.2 trillion in 
March 2009 in quantitative easing and the Bank of England GBP75 billion, respectively – 
the latter was raised to GBP200 billion subsequently. A number of other not-so-
mainstream liquidity-creating tools were used such as asset swaps. Collectively these led 
to the growth of the Fed’s balance sheet by more than 250% and the Bank of England’s 
balance sheet by more than 220% from March 2007 to end of 2010.  
 
Fiscal stimulus in G-20 countries in 2009 was projected to be around 1.5% of GDP 
according to the IMF, while overall fiscal balance in advanced economies was projected 
to deteriorate by 3.25% to -7% percent of GDP in 2009. The US has announced a 
stimulus package to the tune of 2% of GDP in 2009 and for a total of 4.6% until 2011 (or 
USD787 billion). The banking losses were transferred onto the sovereign balance sheets, 
which resulted in the loss of the US of its Triple AAA credit rating by S&P, while a 
number of countries, Greece and Ireland, have received full fledged bail outs, with 
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Portugal, Spain and Italy being watched closely for any signs of deterioration and have 
announced their own austerity packages to appease the markets. 
 
While some countries had a better fiscal standing at the beginning of the crisis, the bailed 
out nations did not. Canada, China, France, Germany, the UK and the US had smaller 
levels of deficits, public debt and interest rates. Others, like India and Italy, had higher 
real interest rates and debt levels. Japan had the highest level of debt among developed 
countries, standing at almost 200% of GDP and was recently downgraded by Moody’s as 
a result. The size of the increase in public debt, however, was largest for the UK and the 
US, for the former increasing by half the amount outstanding and by a third almost for the 
US.  
 
The increase in government debt has had significant crowding-out effects: for every 10% 
of increase in government debt, global GDP is forecast to drop by 1.3% (1.2% for the US, 
respectively, IMF). Furthermore, fiscal deterioration in advanced economies poses an 
additional threat to future global growth, as these very same nations have to deal with the 
effects of a rapidly ageing population and the consequences on pension funding deficits, 
among others.  
 
From crisis onset to end 2010, the IMF has pledged USD1.1 trillion to help developing 
countries weather the crisis. From November 2008 to March 2009, the IMF has given 
assistance to Romania, Ukraine, Hungary, Pakistan, Belarus, Latvia, Iceland, Georgia, 
Armenia and Serbia of more than USD60 billion, ranging from 1% to 11% of GDP for 
these countries. The Institute of International Finance (IIF) has estimated that capital 
flows to emerging economies in 2009 will be 80% lower than in 2007. The G20 meeting 
in April 2009 in London saw global leaders pledging some USD500 billion to USD750 
billion in additional resources for the IMF to fund these measures and others. The IMF 
has also introduced a new instrument, a Flexible Credit Line (FCL). This instrument is in 
effect a contingent line of credit and the first one has been requested by Mexico for 
USD47 billion.  
 
7.3.4. Regulatory challenges and proposed changes 
The IMF identified a set of policy challenges ahead that would require addressing. These 
include policies to: secure a backdrop for economic recovery; strengthen the banking 
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sector and promote resumption of lending; revive securitization markets; prevent crises in 
emerging markets in Europe which remain vulnerable to deleveraging; ensure orderly 
disengagement or exit strategies for regulators; and to manage the recent transfer of 
private risks to sovereign balance sheets. It proposes the following priorities for reform: i) 
restoring market discipline, ii) addressing fiscal risks caused by financial institutions (the 
idea of a ‘systemic tax’), iii) living wills, iv) a macroprudential approach to policy making 
and v) integrating the oversight of LCFI’s into the global financial market. There are a 
number of structural issues which pose challenges to the global reform agenda, these are 
outlined below. 
 
Banking sectors and individual institutions are too big to fail. The current size of the 
banking sectors in a number of countries and the size of selected banks relative to the 
GDP of their host countries range from 100% in the US (this excludes Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and other specialized institutions, which if they were to be included would 
render a ratio of 232%) to more than 800% in Switzerland. Banks should support 
economic growth rather than economic growth supporting bank growth which seems to 
have been the case here given these size comparisons. 
 
Moreover, the ratio of a single bank’s assets to a host country’s GDP should not be 
greater than a small percentage of its national GDP, deemed reasonable to ensure a fairly 
diversified, non-concentrated sector in any given country. These ratios of more than 500% 
in the case of Icelandic Bank Kauphthing, Credit Suisse 250% and Dexia 200% explain 
why when two of these banks collapsed, they had to be rescued not by their hosts, but by 
cross-border coordinated efforts. The case of financial centers is even more complicated 
and different rules will have to apply with the caveat being always how to safeguard the 
national system in the case of the unwinding or failure of any or a number of the 
international institutions operating in the host country or financial hub, examples are 
Switzerland as mentioned above with banking assets being 8xGDP and Bahrain, with 
banking assets at 11 times GDP. 
 
Many countries have now, on the national level, undertaken overhauls of their regulatory 
arrangements: Germany recently abolished BaFin and delegated all its responsibilities 
back to the Bundesbank (this decision was later reversed), the Fed has been also mandated 
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with systemic regulation in the US and in the UK, the FSA was abolished– and the Bank 
of England established systemic regulation functions.  
 
In its April 2009 summit the G7 broadened the mandate of a previously established body, 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) established in 1999 and renamed the entity the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB). The membership of the board includes national financial 
authorities (central banks, supervisory authorities, finance ministries); international 
financial institutions (BIS, ECB, EC, IMF, WB, OECD), international standard setters and 
committees of central bank experts (BCBS; IAIS; IOSCO; IASB; CGFS; CPSS). The 
board’s mandate is to 
1) assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, 2) identify and oversee action 
needed to address them, 3) promote coordination and information sharing among 
authorities responsible for financial stability, 4) monitor and advise on market 
developments, 5) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards, 6) 
collaborate with the IMF, including in conducting early warning exercises, 7) undertake 
joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of the international standard 
setting bodies, 8) set guidelines for and support supervisory colleges and 9) come up with 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management (particularly for systemically 
important firms). Two key issues are underscored by the board: first that ‘there is no 
single silver bullet’, that a combination of approaches to assess and address systemic risks 
is needed. Second: ‘no one size fits all’ – the choice of policy action has to be determined 
by the structure, the size of the financial system, nature and extent of domestic and cross-
border linkages and the status of the institution as being subject to the ‘home’ or ‘host’ 
jurisdictions (i.e. it is an independent subsidiary, with the mother company not liable for 
its deposits or liabilities, or merely a branch, with all the regulatory implications thereof).  
 
Other ‘super’ regulators also set up in 2009, include the European Systemic Risk Board at 
a European level, while in the US more powers were delegated to the Fed. The mandate 
of the ESRB is the macroprudential oversight of the financial system within the European 
Union. It aims to prevent and mitigate systemic risks in the financial system within the 
European system to prevent financial distress. It is also charged with issuing risk 
warnings, giving recommendations on measures and following-up on implementation. 
The Risk Board will have 33 full members: the 27 EU central bank governors, the ECB 
president and vice-president, a Commission member and the three chairs of the new 
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European Supervisory Authorities - the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European 
Securities Authority (ESA). A representative from one national supervisory authority or 
each EU country may attend the meetings of the ESRB, but - to ensure close cooperation - 
will have no voting rights.  The EBA has been under the spotlight with its mandate of 
publishing periodic stress testing results for European banks, albeit it has been under 
criticism as well with respect to the severity of scenarios used and tests design. 
 
A centralized clearing house for a segment of the CDS market was expected to be fully 
operational towards the end of 2009. However, this has not materialized. The clearing 
house was to ensure that for any given participant, all transactions on the same underlying 
entity would be netted to a single position, and single margin account maintained on its 
entire portfolio of CDS. Bringing OTC derivatives on to regulated exchanges and 
standardizing the instruments, should help enhance transparency and market discipline. 
The reasons possibly for this initiative not being implemented are some of these 
instruments are highly structured or tailored to the needs of specific investors, so 
standardization might not be feasible and/or desirable. 
 
In 2009 the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) proposed the following changes to restore the 
level and quality of bank capital in 2009:1. Higher (and better quality) risk-weighted 
capital requirements: capital adequacy requirements should dictate banks holding more 
capital as compared to the risk profile of their assets not only in terms of the ratio of 
capital to be held but also the quality of this capital. 2. Countercyclical credit-loss 
provisioning: provisioning rules that would require banks to take more provisions in 
‘good’ times, at the upturn of the credit cycle and ‘less’ provisions when times are bad, at 
the downturn of the credit cycle. 3. formal leverage ratio and formal Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio: Formal leverage ratio to ‘cap’ the extent of leverage banks can engage in, in 
addition to the minimum capital requirements. A liquidity coverage ratio ensuring banks 
keep sufficient, good quality liquidity. These ratios are commonly used by multi-lateral 
development institutions and domestic development institutions; 4. Mandatory capital 
insurance or contingent capital: Capital reserves that could be ‘called upon’ when they are 
needed, whether it be in the form of insurance, capital notes with a certain structure, or 
reserves of a special nature. 5. Convertible capital: Hybrid debt or hybrid capital notes, 
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convertible to capital. 6. Subordinated debt issuance frequency: Put policies in place for 
the use of subordinated debt and its issuance frequency, again subject to leverage limits. 
7. Prefunding of deposit insurance: That deposit insurance be prefunded not on a ‘pay as 
you go’ basis, or the money to be provided in the case of a crisis. 8. Capital charges linked 
to systemic risk (Acharya et al.): This is similar in concept to a systemic tax or that 
institutions with a large contribution to systemic risk pay an ‘insurance’ premium to the 
regulator. This tax or premium could fund a ‘systemic risk fund’ of sorts. A detailed 
discussion of Basle III and phasing arrangements is discussed in Section c. 
 
Other key concepts for the new global architecture design are countercyclical regulation 
and lean against the wind (LATW) policies, with the main causes of the previous crisis 
being an asset price bubble and a credit boom. Tax havens: streamlining regulation to 
ensure taxing of high earners and improve tax yield. Bank bonus structures and pay caps: 
including longer vesting periods and stronger claw back provisions. Bank living wills: 
banks have to draw their own resolution plans for key strategic businesses which kick into 
action when and if their resolution is needed. Bank systemic tax: A systemic tax on large 
institutions with a high systemic impact is proposed by leading academics - an institution 
which contributes more to overall systemic risk should pay a mandatory ‘systemic 
insurance premium’. This is the same as the BCBS proposition. Taxation of financial 
transactions A proposal was made to impose taxes on financial transactions by the various 
regulators to generate some USD150 billion in the US. Similar proposals were made in 
Europe (France) but have not been approved. Finally, IOSCO proposed regulation of 
financial products and is considering expanding its regulatory scope to include more 
direct supervision of investment products, credit rating agencies and hedge funds. 
 
 
7.4. Macroprudential Analysis and Early Warning Systems 
 
Turner (2009) and IMF analyses indicate that the length of the recession post a banking 
stress episode is eight quarters on average, versus only three quarters for recessions which 
are not preceded by financial stress. So in addition to the motivation presented for this 
course of research on EWS, this further highlights the impact of large imbalance build-up 
on cost and duration of a crisis and hence the need to identify a crisis at a ‘pre-crisis’ time, 
namely the build-up of imbalances at the stage of financial fragility by focusing on a near 
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crisis innovative dependent variable. This is the role early warning systems (EWS) should 
play. This section starts with a general conceptual discussion of early warning systems for 
crises and the required elements for a robust system, linking through to the research 
undertaken and highlighting innovations. This is followed by a historical survey of EWS 
design and an evaluation of how well existing models predicted the past crisis and how 
this research improves on this. 
 
 
7.4.1. General conceptual design and elements of a robust and applicable EWS 
A robust and applicable EWS is a cornerstone of any sound framework for ensuring 
financial sector stability. S. Lall et al. (2008) identify the following elements: pre-crisis 
sanctions on undercapitalized financial institutions that pose systemic risks (in this respect 
the importance of a thorough stress- and back-testing framework directly linked to 
macroprudential regulation is needed. During the past crisis, the usefulness of this tool 
was abandoned prematurely); legal and institutional mechanisms to deal quickly with 
weak financial institutions; and an effective deposit insurance system.  
 
The IMF cautions though that EWS systems are not a substitute for sound and balanced 
judgments on financial weaknesses. The EWS also needs to be usable by policy makers in 
a practical manner. Borio and Drehmann (2009) underscore the importance of 
applicability and the need to take the policy maker’s objectives into account when 
designing an EWS. Thus the choice of models and the selection of thresholds taking into 
account the trade-off between correctly calling crises and false alarms (NTSRs) should be 
tailored to the policy makers’ objectives. They also identify that one of the design features 
of an effective EWS should be the clear quantitative delineation of the definition of a 
crisis (e.g. indirect cost of failures as a percentage of GDP, a bank run on a specific 
percentage of bank deposits is what the system would classify as a crisis, or others, but a 
clear ‘crisis’ objective which can be measured). The advantage of a quantifiable objective 
as such is that it would also enable cross-border objective comparisons as well as 
standardized time series analysis. Karim and Davis (2008) stipulate two further conditions 
for an effective EWS: having sufficient lead time to allow the policy maker to take action 
and that it is simple enough to be understood by policy makers at all levels. The 
usefulness of such an EWS, the authors continue, is that it would enable authorities to 
warn financial market players of potential risks in speeches and various publications and 
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also alert bank examiners that they need to do more thorough examinations at times of 
elevated stress. A credible EWS would also justify direct policy action to avoid a crisis by 
policy makers through the use of prudential measures on lending to certain sectors or in 
the form of monetary and macro action. 
 
In this research we delineate this objective as bank capitalization changing by a given 
number of basis points deemed suitable by the regulator and bank profitability dropping 
by a certain number of basis points deemed to signal by the regulator an unhealthy 
development in the system. As another cross check on the sources of data and the way the 
analysis is conducted and to ensure that institutions which are not profitable but do not see 
changes in this poor profitability status, if institutions have profitability of below a certain 
number of basis points deemed by the regulator to indicate that these institutions are 
unhealthy, this also is a quantifiable measure of near crisis in the system. All analysis in 
the macro applications is conducted on a super balance sheet approach, whereby the 
financial system is summarized by the aggregate balance sheet of the system compiled by 
regulatory bodies. 
 
7.4.2. History of EWS design and this research 
EWS are used to i) identify the macro states where policy action is needed (macro-
models), ii) provide a rating system of individual institutions for a peer group or financial 
system in a country or indeed globally (micro-models), and iii) map the choice of policy 
tools to reduce crises costs. The evolution of EWS historically follows through from the 
evolution of their theoretical underpinnings which dictate the design to trace the 
hypothesized causes of crises. The theory on banking crises is usually categorized 
according to four generations (Breuer 2004). First-generation models (for example 
Mishkin, 1978), hypothesize that a poor macroeconomic setting adversely affects banks’ 
borrowers and in turn impacts the depositors themselves, resulting in bank runs which 
ultimately lead to the closure of financial institutions. Second-generation models focus on 
depositor behavior and regard banking crises as ‘sunspot’ events or self-fulfilling 
prophecies, unrelated to the business cycle. Third-generation models highlight the role 
played by boom and bust cycles in the economy (and twin crises – a twin crisis is when 
there is a simultaneous balance of payments or currency crisis coupled with a banking 
crisis, e.g. the Asian crisis in 1998), with banking problems arising on the asset side of the 
institutions being fuelled by excessive lending against collateral such as real estate and 
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equities. A bust cycle then causes asset prices to fall, financial institutions to lend less and 
a credit crunch to develop, which leads to further economic slowdown and more borrower 
defaults. Finally, fourth-generation models seek to identify the features of the institutional 
environment that set the stage for the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, which then 
gives rise to banking problems. 
 
From the literature review, a multitude of empirical models to assess such indicators have 
been developed in two main strands: models which rely on macroeconomic indicators as 
key explanatory variables and models that asses how microeconomic factors contribute to 
banking crises. These were followed by a number of integrated empirical models which 
took both types of explanatory variables into account. These models use different 
methodologies and either predict individual bank failure or look at systemic banking 
crises as a whole. The methodologies mainly fall into four categories: a) signals models 
(which include sub-branches of first-generation, second-generation and third-generation 
type models), b) logit/probit models, iii) Merton-type models and a less-used class of 
models, and d) binary recursive trees. 
 
In this research, some features of all the above are used, with innovations in near crisis 
definitions, explanatory variables, model design, model applicability to different time 
periods and to different countries and regions, among others. This model can be used by 
regulators on a global or regional level, or by individual country regulators on an 
aggregate system level or on a micro level for individual banks. This links through and 
would complement two best practice models used by the OeNB and by the Bank of 
England. 
 
In Austria the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) uses a proprietary model for 
systemic risk analysis and stress testing of the banking system. Boss, Krenn, Puhr and 
Summer (2006) outline the key features of this model with the building blocks comprising 
market risk, non-interbank credit risk and an interbank network model. The factors chosen 
for each building block are the ones which maximize out-of-sample performance. The 
output of this model consists of problem statistics of the banking system, identification of 
fundamental versus contagion-type potential problem events and a value at risk for the 
lender of last resort or ‘price tag’ for intervention. This model could be improved in 
design by using a dynamic set up, and/or some inputs or outputs of this model could feed 
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into the EWS discussed in this research or could be fed from the EWS discussed in this 
research. 
 
In the UK, the Bank of England also uses a network type model, but focusing on a set of 
six identified vulnerabilities, while recognizing that other vulnerabilities might not be 
identified or measured. The model then attempts to analyze the ways that a potential 
shock could trigger each vulnerability and identify which sub-sectors of the financial and 
non-financial sector will be affected It also seeks to find out what the second-order effects 
and feedback effects between the real economy and the financial sector are and the impact 
of the combined effects of transmission channels. Similarly for this model, it could be 
improved in design by using a dynamic set up, and/or some inputs or outputs of this 
model could feed into the EWS discussed in this research or could be fed from the EWS 
discussed in this research. 
 
Moving on to Micro-models, which identify states where policy action is required and 
whose output is mainly the identification of systemic hot spots, were supplemented by 
central banks and agencies to provide rating systems of institutions within their 
jurisdiction on a micro-level. These include, but are not limited to, analyses of capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management, efficiency, liquidity and sensitivities to various 
risks, commonly called CAMELS for short, analysis rankings of financial institutions, and 
all derivatives thereof. As shown by the application to 139 banks in this research, the 
model presented here easily renders itself to provide an internal ranking of banks within a 
system or across a sample in a number of countries. 
 
Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) provide a comprehensive survey of EWS used by European 
regulators, utilizing a unique database of individual bank distress across the European 
Union from the mid-1990s to 2008 on the basis of which they identify a set of indicators 
(CAMELS based) and thresholds to distinguish between sound banks and banks 
vulnerable to financial distress. They highlight the usefulness of an EU-level early 
warning system based on this model, with published results by banks compared by 
benchmarks to enhance market discipline. The dataset is based on Bankscope data, on 
5,708 banks, plus information obtained from NewsPlus/Factiva on each bank with regards 
to any financial support or other forms of rescue or merger. The authors identify 79 
distress events for 54 banks. Using a Logit model they find that the model would have 
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correctly called more than 55% to 68% of distress cases correctly. The explanatory 
variables they find most useful are: capitalization, asset quality and profitability. While 
cost-to-income ratios and basic liquidity indicators failed poorly (a liquidity indicator 
which measures wholesale percentage financing of liabilities was useful, however). They 
also find depositor discipline has an important signaling effect (if a bank pays higher rates 
on its deposits than its competitors, it has a higher probability of distress).  This research 
uses both capitalization and efficiency metrics as the dependent variable and link through 
to how to predict this, as such because the prediction is for the variables which lead to 
distress as per this discussion, it has proven empirically and also intuitively that it does 
improve on lead times and help identify vulnerability build ups, before they develop into 
full fledged crises. 
 
7.4.3. Performance of EWS models in the past and this research 
 
As stated clear motivation for this research, EWS models described in the literature had 
failed in predicting the global meltdown of 2007-2010. In addition to research design 
issues discussed, there are possibly other non-quantifiable aspects such as ‘gambling and 
looting’ and other behavioral issues that might not have been possible to map. Asli 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (2005), Kane (1989) and Akerlof and Romer 
(1993) had dubbed the US savings and loans crisis in the 1980s as such an episode. They 
demonstrated how the erosion of bank capital following financial liberalization, generous 
deposit insurance and ineffective regulation conspired to make ‘gambling and looting’ an 
optimal strategy for scores of bank managers. Other cases of systemic wide crises which 
resulted from fraud are Venezuela (1994), and Guinea in 1985 where the six main banks, 
accounting for over 95% of the system, were closed on a single day on the back of 
widespread bank fraud (Honohan 1997). In the design of the dependent variable, this 
research addresses this by looking at symmetric changes in capital, meaning that also 
increases in capitalization of the system by a certain number of basis points could be the 
sign of vulnerabilities which built up, bankers know that they have taken risks which have 
not yet been reflected on their balance sheets. A banker’s optimization function is to 
minimize capital and maximize returns, if bankers increase capital, it is not to hedge 
against future risk they will take, but to cover for risk they know they have already taken. 
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Recall Davis and Karim (2008) assessment on whether EWS based on a) logit and b) 
binomial tree, binary recursive trees (BRT) approaches for the UK and US economies 
could have helped raise the alarm about an impending crisis before the recent crisis. Using 
a sample of 105 countries and covering the years 1979 to 2003, Davis and Karim (2008) 
apply the models to US and UK data to test for out-of-sample performance from 2000–
2007 (they partition the sample first into a sub-set until 1999, and the rest). In both cases, 
they set the start date of the crisis as 2007. They find that for the US, both models fail 
miserably with a probability of a crisis occurring in 2007 of 1% predicted by the logit 
model and 0.6% predicted by the binary tree model. For the UK, the results were similar, 
with logit model predicting the probability of a crisis at 3.4% in 2007 and the binary tree 
model assigning a 0.6% probability of a crisis occurring.. The authors identify a short 
checklist approach for detecting financial instability, including a) regime shifts, b) entry 
conditions, c) debt accumulation, 4) innovation in financial markets, and 5) risk 
concentration.  
 
More interestingly, Davis and Karim (2008) also considered a ‘checklist approach’ of 
indicators previously used. They find that the models were not largely successful and as 
such suggest a broadening of the approach to a more comprehensive set of 
macroprudential analyses. They start with a survey of the various financial stability 
reviews (IMF, ECB, Bank of England and BIS) in the spring of 2007 to gauge whether 
any of them showed concern over an impending crisis. They find that collectively these 
reports did point out: deterioration in credit quality of US subprime mortgages; high 
European institutions’ exposure to the US subprime market; rising corporate leverage; 
rising household indebtedness; rising capital flows into emerging markets; concerns about 
credit-risk transfer between markets; high asset prices and irrational exuberance; 
complacency by LCFIs; poor perception of risk due to the ‘originate and distribute’ 
model; the potential of liquidity ‘vanishing’ from markets; a likely rise in investor’s risk 
aversion in the case of a shock and most importantly a significant deviation from historic 
norms for many of these indicators. The BIS concluded that ‘a tail event affecting the 
global economy might at some point have much higher costs than is commonly 
supposed’. Thus while the features of the crisis were correctly recognized on a collective 
level, the extent was not. It is worth noting, however, that the Bank of England’s FSR of 
April 2007correctly identified most of the key vulnerabilities to include the major causes 
of the recent crises and estimated a potential loss of UK bank’s tier I capital of up to 30% 
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to 40% (or GBP47 billion to GBP62 billion), given certain scenarios, an estimate which 
was very accurate for the first-order-effects of the crisis in the first stages. 
 
If these bodies had conducted a combined stress test with all the fragilities identified, 
perhaps they would have they been able to predict the crisis, this view is supported by 
Borio and Drehmann (2008) who identify crucial features of an operational framework to 
address financial instability as including setting up institutional arrangements that 
leverage the comparative expertise of the various authorities involved in safeguarding 
financial stability. It is worth mentioning that none of these bodies included an analysis of 
SIVs, a key feature in this crisis nor other off-balance sheet items or a proxy for them 
thereof. In this research, this is also not addressed explicitly, but indirectly the effects are 
captured through development of asset price bubbles gauged by both a stock market index 
and a housing price index and growth of pension fund assets. The rationale is these 
variables are a reflection of the amount of liquidity available in the system to chase 
investments, and this liquidity, if it is not on-balance sheet, which is being measured 
explicitly, then it must come from off-balance sheet sources. 
 
A 2006 IMF review of EWS in use and the next steps forward concludes that EWS 
models have shown mixed results in terms of forecasting accuracy, but nevertheless offer 
a systematic, objective and consistent method to predict crises which avoids analysts’ 
biases. It also stresses the importance of developing a set of building blocks to predict 
foreign exchange crises, debt crises, sovereign risk, banking crises, financial market 
linkages/spillovers, and contagion and cross-country linkages. Bell and Pain (2000), after 
reviewing the existing EWS models up till 2000, with a special application to the Asian 
crisis, conclude that the models are subject to some significant weaknesses and 
limitations, especially as potential tools for policy makers. 
 
Gunther and Moore (2002) analyze EWS in real time using a probit approach and identify 
as such one reason why EWS have performed so poorly. This study is interesting in that it 
uses a unique set of banking data over 1996 through to 1998 which includes both 
originally reported and revised financial variables for 12 financial ratios based on 
CAMELS. They find adverse revisions to initially reported data to be associated with 
downgrades in supervisory ratings. As such these results highlight the auditing role of 
bank exams and the implications thereof on a realistic assessment of EWS model 
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accuracy. If the data on which an EWS is based is revised, then naturally the original 
output of the model was distorted. In a related study, O’Keefe et al (2003) stress the 
importance of loan underwriting practices in the determination of bank credit risk and 
study the relationship between examiners’ assessments of the riskiness of bankers’ 
lending practices and subsequent changes in the riskiness of bank portfolios. The authors 
investigate whether examiner assessments should as such serve as aids to an EWS which 
is based on real time data. They find that higher (lower) risk in underwriting practices is 
indeed associated with subsequent increases (decreases) in non-performing assets 
generally. This research addresses links through and addresses some of the weaknesses 
described above, as such it improves on previous research. 
 
7.5. Regulatory Challenges Ahead and Basle III 
 
7.5.1. Regulatory Challenges Ahead 
Global leaders in the aftermath of the current crisis have underscored the importance of an 
EWS. ‘An early warning system must be established to identify upstream increases in 
risks...’ Heads of State or Government of European Union, November 7, 2008.  While the 
De Larosière Report, on 25 February, 2009 states ‘The Group recommends that the IMF, 
in close cooperation with other interested bodies … is put in charge of developing and 
operating a financial stability early warning system, accompanied by an international risk 
map and credit register. The early warning system should aim to deliver clear messages to 
policy makers and to recommend pre-emptive policy responses ...’  This links through to 
the importance of EWS in directing policy action design and tools. 
 
Given the prohibitive cost of crises, a number of studies were conducted to empirically 
assess cross-country intervention policies to determine which policies could minimize the 
costs of crises and should therefore be utilized once the alarm has been raised by an EWS, 
and which measures increase the costs and should be avoided. Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003) constructed a database with 40 banking crises and the respective policy responses 
by governments according to five categories: a) blanket guarantees to depositors, b) 
liquidity support to banks, c) bank recapitalization, d) financial assistance to debtors and 
5) forbearance. The authors link the various intervention policies and the fiscal cost of the 
bailout and find that the more generous bailouts had higher fiscal costs as expected. 
Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2004) find that these generous bailouts do not reduce 
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the output cost of banking crises as measured by the output loss relative to trend during 
the crisis period. Both studies endorse the view that the high moral hazard associated with 
bailouts which are too generous is more detrimental than effective. 
 
Hoggarth and Reidhill (2003) survey various measures of reducing the net costs of crisis 
resolution and of reducing the probability of future crises. They outline a number of 
qualitative measures including the preferable use of private sector solutions, loss 
imposition on bank stakeholders and shareholders to reduce moral hazard (Greece is a 
good example but in a sovereign application), increasing transparency and disclosure of 
resolution programs in general, minimizing forbearance and expediting resolution. They 
also explore the various resolution strategies and their cost impact including: unassisted 
resolutions (bank status remains the same or is changed/private sector merger), liquidation 
and assisted resolutions (bank status remains the same, open bank assistance, bank status 
changed, bridge banks, outright government ownership). Santomero and Hoffman (1998) 
provide a similar survey that focuses on three distinct case studies in this respect, US 
banks, Scandinavian banks and French banks, arriving at the same conclusions as Hogarth 
and Reidhill,. 
 
EWS design should help regulators test which policy tools are necessary and which will 
be sufficient to avert a crisis. Kaufman (2001) notes that in times of credit crunch, the 
whole economy contracts. If the government tries to force it out of a contraction through 
too much intervention using policy tools, coercing banks to increase lending could have 
negative consequences because it only weakens the banks further by making them extend 
excessively risky loans and exacerbates the size of the problem in the long run. He depicts 
the lifecycle of market-government regulation as follows:  
 
Market regulation ⇒ market failures ⇒ ‘horror stories’ ⇒ government intervention 
(regulation) ⇒ government failures ⇒ government deregulation ⇒ market regulation ⇒ 
market failure. 
 
While government policy actions are necessary, as seen from Kaufman’s depiction, they 
are not sufficient. Sufficiency would stem from the revamping of financial stability 
frameworks and other structural reforms which will ensure a sounder and safer system in 
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the long run. Also more streamlining of global financial stability frameworks and 
strengthening frameworks in developing and emerging countries is needed as where or 
when the next crisis will hit remains unknown. Even though here are a number of robust 
frameworks in developed countries; the need for streamlining and further cooperation 
cross-border has been highlighted by the cross-border evolution of the recent crisis. Also 
financial stability frameworks will need to be brought up to international best practice in 
developing and emerging markets, with the developed world in poor economic health and 
suffering from an ageing population, banks will have to start expanding more in these 
countries looking for growth. Banks have already indicated that they will start allocating 
more capital to less restrictive regulatory environments – i.e to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage for operations set up in countries with weak regulators compared to strong home 
country regulation. As the operations of banks grow in developing and emerging markets, 
ensuring developed countries’ stability will in part have to be addressed by ensuring 
stability of developing markets. This is clearly demoNTSRated by the Dubai World 
credit-risk transfer example, with a ‘problem’ exposure by Standard Chartered and HSBC 
of USD26 billion. More recently, problems have emerged with a large Saudi business 
conglomerate, Al Saad Group, which reportedly has USD20 billion in problem loans 
owed to local and international players, for which it offered 8 cents to the dollar to its 
creditors during attempted settlement negotiations which broke down. This development 
is foreseen by Kaufman’s (2001) empirical evaluation over three decades, whereby, he 
notes that since 1973, losses from banking crises as a percent of GDP were nearly four 
times as great in emerging economies which had poor financial stability frameworks - 
providing open-ended financial support to their banks - than countries that provided 
smaller or no such support. 
 
Procyclicality and boundary problems in financial regulation dictate the need for a meta-
theory for guiding new EWS design. Goodhart et al have written extensively on the 
subject. This meta space has implications for the design of an effective EWS and there are 
tradeoffs. Four main elements of this meta-space are: a) regulator objectives: price 
stability versus financial stability, b) macroprudential versus microprudential analysis, c) 
procyclical versus countercyclical measures, and d) rules-based versus risk-based 
regulation.  
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7.5.2 Regulator Objectives: Price Stability vs Financial Stability 
Goodhart et al (2006) present the various tradeoffs between central banks’ objectives of 
price stability versus financial stability and the implications thereof. In terms of price 
stability, measurement and definition is established, the iNTSRuments for control are 
present, there is a high degree of accountability, there is a forecasting structure based on 
central tendencies and a simple administrative procedure is in place. In terms of financial 
stability there are many challenges in measurement and definition, control tools, 
accountability, forecasting and administrative procedures. Consequently, designing EWS 
which address the latter is a challenging task given the ‘fluid’ nature of the components. 
This would necessarily also imply that the ‘optimal’ EWS also be of a dynamic and 
‘fluid’ nature within each sub-category in order to satisfy regulator objectives. This 
research takes these considerations into account. 
 
7.5.3 Macroprudential versus microprudential analysis 
Borio (2006) delineates the tradeoffs in both analysis approaches. A macroprudential 
approach takes into account correlations and common exposures among institutions, 
whereas a microprudential approach focuses only on individual institutions. For an EWS 
design to be effective, it has to take into account both types of analysis to ensure 
completeness and a comprehensive mapping of risk on a ‘gross’ and ‘net’ basis, after 
taking into account the eliminated or offset risks within a system, and the positive or 
negative impact of having a strong or weak regulator, respectively. This research takes 
these considerations into account. 
 
7.5.6 Procyclical versus countercyclical measures 
Goodhart (2008) explores procyclical versus countercyclical measures through a 
discussion of the boundary problem in financial regulation. He reiterates his proposal that 
state and time-varying capital adequacy requirements are needed (similar to the Spanish 
model) through a discussion of how and where to set the boundary for regulation. Too 
much regulation could result in disintermediation, competitive inequality (no level-
playing-field), and inefficiency and higher spreads. Wadhwani (2008) finds that there are 
strong theoretical and empirical reasons for considering a ‘lean-against-the-wind’ 
(LATW), countercyclical tilt to monetary policy to enhance macroeconomic stability. He 
discusses Bernanke’s proposition on the difficulty of ‘safe popping’ an asset bubble 
without grave consequences on the economy. He also cites one case, Sweden, where 
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LATW actually worked. With house prices increasing drastically in Sweden, on a few 
occasions in 2004-5, the Riksbank did for that reason lean against the wind and did not 
take rates down as quickly as they could have considering the outlook for inflation alone. 
Thus for an EWS to be ‘implementable’, it has to give sufficient lead time to enable 
countercyclical/LATW policy action and also identify the most effective tools for policy 
action as such. This research takes these considerations into account. 
 
7.5.7 Rules-based versus risk-based regulation 
The roll-out of Basle II in 2004 and its global adoption by banks starting 2007, with full 
compliance originally expected by 2010, has been blamed for increasing procyclicality 
and hence exacerbating the recent crisis. However, if Basle II had been adopted in its 
entirety, before the crisis had developed, it would have achieved its initial objectives of a 
introducing a more risk-sensitive capital measurement and minimum regulatory capital 
requirement and a ‘risk-based’ regulations and supervision framework as opposed to a 
‘rules-based’ framework of regulation and supervision. Basle II’s three pillars are a self-
contained framework with its own internal checks and balances. The main problem was 
that only Pillar I was being rolled out, while Pillars II and III were still ‘playing catch-up’. 
Pillar II, on supervision, through the use of stress testing, gives regulators the tool to 
enforce minimum capital requirements on the basis of differentiated risk exposures of 
various institutions, discarding Basle I’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Pillar III on market 
discipline would ensure that whatever is not addressed by Pillars, I and II is captured by 
the ‘market’. For the most recent crisis, it’s my view that we had a failure of pillars II and 
III, rather than pillar I. Pillar II’s stress tests, albeit not sufficient without adding an 
additional component for liquidity stress tests and for back testing as well, never got the 
chance to be utilized, and regulators were still trying to fully comprehend the various 
models used by banks under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach. While pillar III on 
market discipline was undermined in two key ways. Firstly in scope, it was not generic 
enough to require that systemically significant markets in which banks are active must be 
subject to a minimum level of accepted transparency and disclosure on their operations. 
With notional outstanding value of the global derivatives markets at more than ten times 
global GDP and more than twenty times global banking assets, these markets should have 
been subject to minimum transparency and disclosure. Secondly, by not acknowledging 
the weaknesses inherent in markets given that the built-in assumptions of rationality and 
efficiency necessary for market functioning do not hold all the time. If we do not assume 
 
 
238 
 
that markets are rational or efficient, then a world with market dislocations is possible and 
we always have to be on our toes so to speak – there is no room for complacency and for 
trusting the markets to continuously self-correct without financial collapses. Working on 
this basis, Pillar III would have signaled to regulators that shifts they saw in the market 
pre-crisis needed to be investigated more thoroughly or that ‘something might be wrong’ 
and the market is trying to tell us something. Basle III is an extension of Basle II, but with 
some fixed ratios more in line with a Basle I set up. 
 
From this discussion, it also follows then that in a risk-based regulatory setup, the role of 
the regulator is far more paramount to the safe-guarding of a system’s stability, much 
more so than in a simple rules-based setup. A weak regulator would in effect jeopardize a 
strong system and a strong regulator would strengthen a weak system. 
 
7.5.8 Basle III 
Basle III is an enhancement to Basle II with some fixed measures to specifically address 
key issues that led to the previous crisis of 2007-2010. Special emphasis on liquidity risk, 
the procyclicality in Basle II by bringing back some static capital requirements and a 
systemic surcharge on all institutions. Basle III also puts more emphasis on the quality of 
the capital held by banks, rather than just levels, while the introduction of new contingent 
capital to ‘automatically’ be converted to capital based on pre-defined triggers ensures 
that capital can be shored up automatically in times of need. Formal leverage and liquidity 
ratios are introduced along with a stable funding requirement. Off-balance sheet activities 
are scrutinized in more detail and there are increased requirements on counterparty credit 
risk. Finally, Basle III aims to improve transparency across the board. Basle III still has 
the three main pillars of Basle II, however, with enhancements applied as discussed. 
Table 7.1 discusses the regulatory elements of Basle III and the proposed requirement. 
The net result is the recognition of more risk weighted assets, recognizing less 
instruments as eligible for capital and increasing capital requirements as well based on the 
modified measures.  Banking industry activities will be severely curtailed and profitability 
impacted, but safety should be improved substantively.  
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Table 7.1 Basle III Regulatory Elements and Requirements 
Higher 
Minimum Tier 
1 Capital 
Requirement 
-Tier 1 Capital Ratio increases from 4% to 6% 
-The ratio will be set at 4.5% from 1 January 2013, 5.5% from 1 January 2014 and 6% 
from 1 January 2015 
-Predominance of common equity will now reach 82.3% of Tier 1 capital, inclusive of 
capital conservation buffer 
New Capital 
Conservation 
Buffer 
-Used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress 
-Banks will be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future 
periods of stress binging the total common equity requirement to 7% (4.5% common 
equity requirement and the 2.5% capital conservation buffer) 
-The capital conservation buffer must be met exclusively with common equity 
-Banks that do not maintain the capital conservation buffer will face restrictions on pay-
outs of dividends, share buybacks and bonuses. 
Countercyclical 
Capital Buffer 
-A countercyclical buffer within a range of 0% to 2.5% of common equity or other fully 
loss absorbing capital will be implemented according to national circumstances 
-When in effect, this is an extension to the conservation buffer. 
Higher 
Minimum Tier 
1 Common 
Equity 
Requirement 
-Tier 1 Common Equity Requirement increase from 2% to 4.5% 
-The ratio will be set at 3.5% from 1 January 2013, 4% from 1 January 2014 and 4.5% 
from 1 January 2015. 
Liquidity 
Standard 
-Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to ensure that sufficient high quality liquid resources 
are available for one month survival in case of a stress scenario, 1 January 2015. 
-Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to promote resiliency over longer-term time horizons 
by creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable 
sources of funding on an on going structural basis 
-Additional liquidity monitoring metrics focused on maturity mismatch, concentration 
of funding and available unencumbered assets 
Leverage Ratio -A supplemental 3% non-risk based leverage ratio which serves as a backstop to the 
measures outlined above 
- Parallel run between 2013-2017, migration to Pillar 1 from 2018 
Minimum 
Total Capital 
Ratio 
- Remains at 8% 
-The addition of the capital conservation buffer increases the total amount of capital a 
bank must hold to 10.5% of risk-weighted assets, of which 8.5% must be tier 1 capital. 
-Tier 2 capital iNTSRuments will be harmonized; tier 3 capital will be phased out 
Source: Moody’s Analytics, BCBS, BIS. 
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7.6. Conclusion  
 
The banking sector prior to the crisis was highly concentrated, and after the crisis it will 
become more concentrated, give the implementation of Basle III requirements, which in 
effect would force a number of institutions to merge and result in even bigger entities. 
This has a number of implications for the design of EWS and their use to help 
implementation of countercyclical measures for LCFIs. The scope of changes in 
regulatory issues is sizable in both Europe and in the US. 
 
The last crisis showed clearly that regulators need to better understand what is happening 
in their financial markets. One way to achieve this would be through greater market 
discipline, sharing more with participants and players on a national level and publicly 
warning against eminent threats. Sharing information publicly with the market through 
preset regular schedules via publications, presentations and hearings at national 
assemblies should ensure effectiveness. Greater market discipline should be used as a tool 
bearing in mind that for it to be effective, its scope should include all systemically 
significant markets and these need to have a minimum level of accepted transparency and 
disclosure. Also that markets are neither necessarily always efficient nor rational, 
deviations should be investigated diligently.  
 
Regulators need to communicate closely with industry players to understand the 
businesses their players are involved in, how they are making their profits and the risks 
they are accumulating in the process. More importantly, they must be on very good terms 
with the leaders of systemically significant institutions on a personal level.  
 
Another important design aspect is the governance structures of regulators, discouraging 
group think and protecting whistle-blowers, the more balanced to ensure a diversity of 
opinions, the better. Strengthening the whistle-blower channel means that differing views 
can and will be heard. Also ensuring adequate representation from the private sector on 
regulatory boards and sufficient ‘brainstorming’ open up discussions with the private 
sector on upcoming regulations and existing regulations. Listening to views from think 
tanks and independent economists is also crucial in ensuring regulators are not divorced 
from the market.  
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Businesses succeed or fail and the same applies to financial institutions. Each stakeholder 
in a business should always share the ‘burden’ commensurate to the nature of its stake 
holding. Thus equity shareholders, with unlimited upside, should also pay for the costs of 
getting wiped out. Likewise with debt holders, an investor - though only getting a fixed 
return on its debt - should expect repayment, prior to equity shareholders receiving any 
funds in the case of failure. Any exceptions will result in playing fields which are not 
level. 
 
Investors, especially those in charge of money belonging to others, have a fiduciary duty 
not only to make the best investments for their clients on an absolute-return basis, but also 
on a risk-adjusted basis. Agents and principal investors should apply prudence and 
undertake necessary due diligence before embarking on an investment. An investor 
should understand what they are investing in, the mapping of the returns and the risks and 
if they don’t then perhaps a degree of modesty is required and opportunities forgone if 
necessary.  
 
Inclusion of a strong ethical code of conduct and ethics training for both regulators and 
private sector players is crucial – if anything the last crisis was also a clear crisis of ethics 
and governance. If mortgage brokers had not extended loans to people who could not 
repay them, then the subprime market would have not collapsed and the crisis would 
possibly not have occurred. If mortgage brokers had extended these loans, but we had 
much lower leverage levels because banks were not seeking extra yield at any cost, then 
the crisis would have been nowhere close to what it was in terms of magnitude. If 
investment officers were not overzealous in investing in products for which they did not 
perform sufficient due diligence because they were following the herd, the magnitude of 
the spillover would have been much less.  
 
Ethics have a quantifiable value, and their value is derived from a complete default 
scenario. Without ethics, all contractual obligations would not be worth the paper they are 
written on and indeed markets cannot function.  
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EWS and analytic tools in light of the aforementioned need to take into account that each 
crisis will be different, have different triggers and unravel in a different manner to its 
predecessors. Therefore the best way to prevent a crisis is to ensure that the ‘system’ is as 
healthy as possible by attacking imbalances before they accumulate which is what this 
research focuses on by the innovation in dependent variable. 
 
The EWS in itself is a necessary starting point, however it is nowhere near sufficient, it 
has to be approached as part of a set of decision suites to be used as demoNTSRated 
throughout this research. The importance of a strong macroprudential surveillance and 
systemic regulator function with wide reaching powers to safeguard against financial 
instability is paramount. Having a robust early warning signals system (EWS) in place is 
the core ‘brain’ component of such a system. It will serve in satisfying two key goals in 
the oversight of systemic financial stability: a) limiting financial system-wide distress, 
and b) avoiding output or GDP costs. The earlier and more reliable this system is in 
predicting instability - and the more easily understood, mapped and shared with a high 
degree of transparency among the parties concerned with safeguarding financial stability 
in any country and indeed across borders – the more likely it will achieve its objectives by 
allowing sufficient lead time for action. The past crisis highlighted the global nature of 
shocks and thus a global EWS is needed to assess and disseminate key threats to financial 
stability and information on systemic vulnerabilities in a quantifiable manner. By so doing 
the EWS will assist policy makers in preventing crises, in a financial world with more 
integrity and more ethics.  
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